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A B S T RACT
This thesis is an attempt to clarify, and hence to
understand, two of the rivalries which were disunifying factors
in the umraa of Medina during the lifetime of Muhammad. The
divisive qualities of the Ansar and the Munafiqun have, in the
past, been ignored and only their influence upon the religious
development of Islam has been examined.
The rivalry between the Ansar and the Kuhajirun of Quraysh
was the origin of the great north/south rivalry which plagued
the Islamic empire in the centuries to come, although the
seeds of the dispute may be found in the Jahiliya. There
remains very little historical evidence of this rivalry although
on one occasion it was sufficiently serious to suggest that a
minor incident might have provoked a full scale civil war.
When it was realized that the Muslims were going to be
successful in their conflict with the Quraysh, the Ansar became
more resigned to their fate although the election of Abu Bakr
indicated that they were not yet reconciled to their position
as second class citizens.
A study of the historical activities of the Munafiqun
indicates that the English word 'hypocrite' does not adequately
translate the more complex connotations of the word Munafiq.
Their rivalry with the other Muslims was another facet of the
struggle of the Madinese against the domination of the Quraysh.
They focused the resentment of the Ansar and acted as an
internal opposition party until it was realized that victory
was impossible. They have been portrayed as the villains of
Islamic history and their name has been blackened to an extent
which is not justified by a careful study of the available
information. The story of their withdrawal from the Muslim
army on the route to Uhud is held as an example of their
perfidy and yet it seems certain that the story was a later
creation designed to shift the blame for the defeat from
Muhammad. The Munafiqun represented the traditional values of
Madinese society and as such were closely allied to the Jewish
tribes. When Muhammad finally joined the pro-Arab faction of
Medina they allied themselves to the Jewish faction out of a
desire to maintain the status quo.
Ibn Ubayy was the leader of the Munafiqun and as such has
been vilified by the Muslim historians. During the Jahiliya
he had been one of the leading figures of Medina and he
continued to play this role after the Hijra, championing the
rights of the Madinese against the Quraysh. His early
conversion led to a final reconciliation with Muhammad as
evidenced by the Prophet praying for him. He failed in his
objective of retaining power in the face of the threat posed
by Islam because he and the Munafiqun were unable to offer an
ideology which could cope with the cnanging society of the
community. By accepting a principle of independent action as
a tenet of belief he was unable to maintain a body of support
upon which he could rely. With the loss of his Jewish allies
his failure was complete.
Muhammad was forced to control the two rivalries in order
to preserve the existence of the umrna. In many ways he acted
as a- traditional tribal leader but, by virtue of the fact that
- iv -
he was also the Messenger of God, he was able to apply
innovative methods which had never been used effectively in
Arabia. Unity was not finally achieved until after his death;
however, by the emphasis which was placed upon it the basis
was laid for the later expansion of Islam.
Prom the study of the rivalries certain implications as
to the beginnings of historical writing among the Arabs can be
drawn, especially in relation to the biography of Muhammad.
m
The Islamic bias of the historians should have precluded the
inclusion of all but a small portion of the material which
relates to the rivalries; however, it did not. It may be
concluded that the material was retained in explanation of the
descent of Qur'anic verses and to glorify the person of
Muhammad. By analysing the basic accounts of some incidents
there is an obvious development seen in the handling of the
material until the time of al-Tabari when tafsir was divorced
from history. Ibn Ishaq had expected his readers to be
conversant with the verses of the Qur'an and al-Waqidi had
felt it necessary to add a more detailed explanation.
It is obvious from the texts that there were other
rivalries and disunifying factors in the umma, but any records
of them have been removed as unnecessary for the understanding
of the Qur'an and as unsuitable for the image of Muhammad as it
was conceived in the years after his death. It is also certain
that there were other outbreaks of the rivalry between the
groups under study in this thesis which have been omitted
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I N T R 0 D U CT I 0 N
The study of the two rivalries which is indicated by the
title of this work is a clarification of the historical incidents
surrounding two areas of conflict in the umroa as it was founded
and led by the Prophet Muhammad during his life in Medina.
Prom the material devoted to these rivalries and the way it is
handled in the major historical texts, implications as to the
development of historical writing and the comprehensiveness of
the sira literature as an historical source will be drawn.
The two rivalries in question are those between the Ansar
and the Muhajirun and between the ffiunafiqun and the other
Muslims. These two disputes formed a continuing and serious
problem for Muhammad in his attempts to incorporate his
followers into the single cohesive unit which he advocated as
the proper body politic for the believers. These two areas
of dissension were chosen because of their close relationship
to each other. On occasion an incident properly belongs to
either of the two rivalries. Furthermore the parties involved
in the disputes were all Muslims. In both cases the rivalries
occur within the community of the Muslims and are a disruptive
force with which Muhammad was forced to deal in order to
preserve the community itself.
The study is restricted to the lifetime of the Prophet by
the material covered by the sira literature. Events before and
after this period are indicated when they are relevant to the
study, but in the case of the Kunafiqun this group had dis¬
solved before the death of Muhammad when it became obvious that
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a victory, returning a share of political power to the citizens
of Medina, was no longer possible. The sentiments which were
expressed by the Munafiqun and which formed the base on which
they built their power, were those that later caused the Ansar
•
to attempt to regain the position of leadership at the time of
the election of Abu Bakr to the Caliphate. The activities of
the Ansar continued on after the death of the Prophet. The
city of Medina acted as a focal point of opposition to the
established authority during the Umayyad period until it was
finally crushed at the battle of al-Harra, when the influence
of the Ansar and their descendants was destroyed.
There has never been an attempt to clarify the incidents
of the rivalries in such a way as to extra.ct, from the inform¬
ation available, the material which may be considered
historically accurate and hence to present a picture of the
factions which has not been over-shadowed by the person of the
Prophet. This is especially true in the case of the Munafiqun.
A proper understanding of their name has been attempted;
however, this only dwells upon the religious aspects of the
group. The usage of the name as it appears in the historical
texts is compared with the religious application as it is seen
in the Qur'an and this study suggests that the usual translation,
•hypocrites*, is not an accurate representation of the role
which they played.
The leader of the Munafiqun, 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy, is
also examined and again there is a conflict with the traditional
view of the man. His name has been vilified by the early
Muslim commentators and their attitudes toward him have
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coloured even modern scholarship. He was not a sinner, yet
nor was he a saint. Prom within the Muslim faith he acted as
the proponent of the traditional values of Arab society at
that time, a role which placed him firmly in opposition to
many, but not all, of the changes that were being instituted
by Muhammad. The attacks upon him by the commenta.tors and
historians were justified by the many references to his
activities in the Qur'an. Yet the strength of those values
which he championed was evidenced by the resurgence of the
traditional Arab society during the rule of the Umayyad
dynasty.
The study of the rivalries brings into question the
reasons for the preservation and writing of the sira literature
by the earliest scholars and its development until the field
of history became an accepted academic discipline in its own
right. The material has a very close relationship with the
Qur'anic exegesis and it was to this end that the information
was collected and preserved by the earliest transmitters. To
this was added the material which glorified the position and
the role of the Prophet. Prom these two types of material
comes almost all the information which bears on the two rivalries.
How the material is used by the historians bears this out.
It also becomes logical to assume that there were other
incidents which have not been preserved by the transmitters
because they cast no light on the understanding of the Qur'an
and because they were believed to show Muhammad and some of his
followers in anurbecoming light. For the purposes of this
portion of the study the three texts of Ibn Ishaq, al-Waqidi and
_ 4 _
al-Tabari will be used as being representative of the develop-
ment of the historical writing about the life of the Prophet.
The focal point for the study is the Qur'an itself. It
is the only source which can be accepted as being authentic and
it can be used, as it is in this study, as a source of
confirmation for the accuracy of the historical information.
The Qur'an rarely gives actual historical details, however it
often alludes to incidents in terms which are supported by the
texts. The text of the Qur'an which has been used is the
standard Egyptian edition and quotations are from the translation
by Mohammad Marmaduke Pickthall. A second translation, that
of Richard Bell, has been used throughout for the chronological
dating of the verses rather than for the translation itself.
The commentaries of al-Baydawi and al-Tabari have been used
• •
and the latter especially has proven, because of its historical
overtones, to be particularly illuminating as to the incidents
surrounding the descent of certain verses.
As regards the historical texts, the primary ones have
been those of Ibn Ishaq, al-Waqidi, al-Baladhuri and al-Tabarl.
• •
Although these form the basis for the study, other works,
especially the biographical dictionaries of Ibn Sa'd, Ibn Hajar
and Ibn {Abd al-Barr, have been used wherever relevant. Other
works, some of which incorporate what may be considered as
primary material, such as Abu al-Fara.i al-Isbahanl (Kitab al-
Aghani) and Ibn al-Athir (Al-Kamil fi-'l-Tarlkh) have also been
consulted.
The literature on the rivalries in question is of little
value, as all too often the roles of the Ansar and the Munafiqun
- 5 -
are left with a description that conforms with the traditional
Muslim accounts. ^^ There has been very little work done on
their activities as disunifying agents operating from within
the umma. This is especially true in the case of the Munafiqun.
The best modern account and the work upon which this study is
based is that of VV.M. Watt, Muhammad in Medina. In many ways
•
this study might be considered as an amplification of the
original work done by Watt. Studies of the political activities
of the Ansar are largely concentrated on their later movements
during the time of the civil wars. The earlier period is
largely ignored, possibly because of the lack of concrete
information.
The primary texts are used with the utmost of caution and
the basic principle is a comparison with the Qur'an. An
incident as it is preserved must conform with the relevant
Qur'anic passages in order to be accepted as historically
accurate. There is one notable exception to this rule of
procedure, the account of events preceding the battle of Uhud,
•
and this is treated as a special case for reasons which will
become apparent. Poetry has been almost totally excluded from
this study, and this is particularly pertinent to the rivalry
between the Ansar and the Kuhajirun where a large amount of
information is in this form. Modern scholarship has cast such
grave doubts upon this poetry that it can no longer be used
for a study of the history of the Prophet despite its
(1) The most important of these works are mentioned in
the various chapters.
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importance to a study of the political activities of the Ansar
at a later date.
This is not a study of the political activities of Muhammad
but rather of the factions that were at work during the time
that he was establishing his control over the community. There
is, however, a thread running throughout the work which shows
Muhammad acting as a statesman and a politician endeavouring to
control the internal disunity threatening his larger goal.
His prophetic function is of primary importance here as the
admonition of the Qur'anic verses was a major weapon which could
be used with some effect as all the parties in these disputes
were, at least nominally, Muslim.
CHAPTEA I
THE ANSAR AMD THE MUHAJIRUN
The Ansar were the citizens of Medina who helped Muhammad
• •
during his life with them and to them is traditionally given
much of the credit for his final success. The word ansar is
commonly translated into English as 'helpers', referring to them
as the 'helpers of the Prophet'. This conforms to the sense of
the word as it appears in the dictionaries, the Qur'an, and
the historical texts. After the Hijra of the Prophet their
tribal names gradually came to be discarded in favour of this
new title. It must be pointed out that the use of Ansar as a
designation was not complete until many years after the death
of Muhammad, possibly during the early years of the Umayyad
dynasty.
The Madinese were divided into two tribal groupings,
B.al-Aws and B.al-Khazraj, who were known together as the
B.Qayla. Despite this close relationship there had been a state
of almost continual hostility between these tribes for a period
possibly as long as a century. This feuding culminated in the
•day of Bu'ath' only a few years before the Hijra. The result
of this battle was the predominance of Aws over Khazraj and,
due to the death of the leaders, a political vacuum into which
Muhammad was able to step. There is a tradition, ultimately
derived from *A'isha, stating that the battle of Bu'ath was
instigated by God in order to facilitate Muhammad's mission.
(1) Bukh,v,38.
The isnad for this tradition, 'Urwa b. al-Zubayr, his son
Hisham, and finally two Kufans with close connections with the
B. Quraysh, Abu Usama and 'Ubayd b. Isma'Il, would seem to be
sound but the tradition itself was certainly produced at some
later date.
V/hen Muhammad first led his party to Medina several of the
clans of the settlement did not enter into agreement with him.
Certain clans of the Aws were kept from joining the community
(2)
of Muhammad by the leadership of Abu Qays b. al-Aslat of
B. Wa'il b. Zayd. Other sources indicate that Abu Qays fled to
(3) _
Mecca rather than submit to Muhammad. Abu 'Amir al-Rahib
was so opposed to the arrival of Muhammad that he fled to Mecca
with fifty followers from Aws and fought with the Quraysh at
(4)
Uhud. The opposition, in these cases, may have been due to
the influence of the Jewish tribes although this is more easily
seen in the relationship between the Munafiqun and the Jews.
However, as evidence of his success grew, all the tribal groupings
joined.
Despite their honoured place in the history of the period
many of them were opposed to the position which was rapidly
gained by the Kuhajirun in Medina, although most of them do not
seem to have objected to the overall role of Muhammad. This
resentment against the growing power and influence of the
newcomers was led by the Munafiqun, upon whom were focused the
(2) II, 201.
(3) Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Isti'ab fi Ma'rifat al-Ashab. Ed.
'Ali Muhammad al-Bajawi, (Cairo, 1960),iv,1734; Usd.vi.236.
(4) Bal,A,i,313; Waq.i,205-206.
feelings of the people. The final gasp of this resentment was
the attempt of the Khazraj to elect Sa'd b. 'Ubada as the
successor of Muhammad. When this failed the Ansar were destined
• •
to political obscurity although for many years the city remained
a centre of opposition to the ruling power of Islam.
Throughout the period of Muhammad's life in Medina there
was a continuing rivalry between the native inhabitants of the
community, the Ansar, and the newcomers, the Muhajirun. The
latter were held to represent the Quraysh of Mecca even in the
later years v/hen Arab tribesmen were admitted to their ranks.
When listing the groups that made up the Muslim army at the
conquest of Mecca the Muhajirun are equated with the Quraysh
although the citizens of Medina are grouped together as the
(5)
Ansar. On at least one occasion this rivalry was used as
the impetus for what may be considered as an attempt to provoke
a civil war between the two parties.
The beginning of the rivalry between these two groups,
representing the citizens of Mecca and Medina, is shrouded in
mystery. It has been argued that the lack of close relations
between the two cities was due to a commercial conflict stemming
(6)
from rival trade networks. Mecca, by having its sanctuary
established as the centre of the worship of Allah, 'the supreme
God', and hence the main site of pilgimage for the area, had
achieved a religious victory over the other cults of the area.
(5) II, 557.
(6) M.A. Shaban, Islamic History AD 600-750 (AH 132); A New
Interpretation. (Cambridge, "1969), 10.
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This gave the Quraysh a distinct advantage in their economic
dealings over any competition. In addition to the benefits
which the security of the sanctuary and the regular visit of
the pilgrims gave to them, the Quraysh would certainly be
aided in their dealings with the other tribes by the prestige
gained from being the custodians of the shrine.
It has been declared that another cause of this rivalry
(7)
was the hostility between the Arabs of the north and the south.
This is not the place to delve into the beginnings of the
struggle between the north and the south but again some persons
trace it to a mercantile origin. The traders of Medina were
envious of the success of the ffieccans who, by virtue of their
trade connections, were pro-Byzantine in their feelings. In
reaction to this the Madinese were pro-Persian, thus giving
themselves the orientation toward the south which later Muslim
(8)
scholars expanded into a southern genealogy. There are,
unfortunately, no primary sources which give support to this
theory. Its development is due to the implications drawn from
the few available facts and the theory, therefore, must be con¬
sidered as doubtful.
Goldziher's monumental study of the question does give some
support to the preceding theory, but only in a general way. He
definitely puts the formal beginnings of the north/south rivalry
into the Islamic period stating that it was based upon those
(7) Joseph Chelhod, Introduction \ la Sociologie de 1*Islam.
(Paris, 1958), 88.
(8) De Lacy O'Leary, Arabia Before Muhammad. (London, 1927), 17.
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tribes who joined each side with those on the side of the Ansar
coming to be considered of southern descent and those with
the Quraysh from the north. He supports this with the fact that
the Prophet's poet, Hassan b. Thabit al-Ansarl, was considered
• •
to be the major propagandist for the southern cause and as late
as the third century a poetry contest proved that the Ansar were
still considered as the leading representatives of the southern
(9)
tribes. Yet he also accepts that during the pre-Islamic
period there was already a consciousness of the difference
between the Arabs of the north and the south and this feeling
of difference was later developed into the feuds of the Islamic
period.
This rivalry, despite the problems which it later gave
Muhammad, may actually have helped his cause and the acceptance
of his people by the Madinese. As mentioned above, it has been
postulated that there was a trade network operated by the Jews
of Medina in opposition to that of the Quraysh. It operated
through the Jewish communities on the west coast of Arabia,
extending from Najran to southern Syria. Hence the Madinese
were willing to accept the arrival of Muhammad and his followers
if it would further the dissensions in the ranks of the Quraysh
and would bring to Medina the technical assistance of members
(11)
of this tribe of mercantile experts.
(9) Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies. Vol.1, Ed. S.M. Stern,
(Chicago, 1967), 90-92.
(10) ibid, 89ff.
(11) Shaban, op.cit. , 10-11.
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The two theories for the beginnings of this rivalry, as
they are stated by Goldziher and Shaban, conflict. Although
possible, the idea propounded by Shaban is not as well supported
as that of Goldziher and, until further evidence comes to light
to support it, it must be considered as an interesting proposition
rather than an acceptable theory.
The rivalry between the two groups continued, as can be seen
from the reference to the poetry contest above, long after the
death of Muhammad. The Ansar consistently resisted the accretion
• •
of power by the Quraysh, especially the establishment of the
Umayyad dynasty which they saw, correctly, as the movement of
the powerbase away from Arabia, where they could claim a position
of some dominance, to Syria, a stronghold of the Quraysh based
on the emigrants in the conquering Muslim armies. The manpower
of the Syrian armies under the Umayyads was largely made up of
those Arabs who had infiltrated into this area and settled there
before the coming of Islam. After the conquests these men were
led by the newcomers whose leaders were all from the Quraysh and
hence, opposed to the Ansar.
The beginning and end of this rivalry are beyond the
scope of this study which is limited to those activities which
took place during the tenure of Muhammad in Medina. The welcome
with which Muhammad was received is described in various sources
as enthusiastic at the very least. As he passed through the
streets upon his entry, the people vied for the honour of having
(12)
him as a guest in their homes, but he refused them all.
(12) al-Ya'qubl, Tarikh al-Ya'qubi. (Beirut, 1960),ii,41;
Tab,ii,396; Bal.P, 18-19.
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Further traditions relate that he was offered all the unoccupied
lands or even the people's houses if he wished but he again
(13) - -
refused. Al-Bukhari records two versions of the same
incident. In one, each man of the Ansar gave to Muhammad the
• •
revenues of certain palm trees as a support. In the second,
(14)
the Muslims alone gave the revenues of their trees. In both
cases the revenues remained with Muhammad until after B. Qurayza
• •
and B. al-Nadir had been dealt with and they were then returned
to their original owners. These stories must always be
received with a large degree of scepticism as they seem all
too eager to prove how well Muhammad was received. Almost
certainly they were compiled later by members of the Ansar
trying to prove their claim vis a vis the Quraysh.
Al-Ya'qubi records one contrary tradition when he relates
that Muhammad stayed with Sa'd b. Khaythama of B. *Amr b. 'Awf
The B. 'Amr became insolent and during the night their Munafiqun
(15)
either threw stones at him or reviled him (yar.jumunahu). '
This would seem to support the view that not all the Madinese
were in favour of the arrival of the Prophet. It has been
pointed out that it was the closeness of the ties with the
Jewish tribes which kept some clans, particularly of Aws, from
Joining the Muslims.
It is much more likely that his first followers, in any
(13) Bal, F_,_ 19.
(14) Bukh, v, 113; Bukh, iv, 106.
(15) al-Ya'qubi, op.cit., ii, 41.
(16) Muh/Med, 194.
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number, were those members of the Ansar who were related to him,
- (17)
the B. al-Najjar , and those other tribesmen such as the
Khazraj who had heard of the Messiah from their Jewish
neighbours and wanted to become associated with him before the
(1Q\
Jews. By virtue of this one should beware of the term
Ansar, especially during the early part of Muhammad's life in
• •
Medina. It would seem to refer to all the people of the
community; however,it is much more probable that it only means
those persons who had already declared a conversion to Islam.
It is generally accepted that there was no outcry at the time
of the Hijra and that most people, although not all, accepted
the presence of Muhammad and his followers. Al-Tabari records,
• •
and states that he accepts as true, that the site chosen by
Muhammad for his mosque had previously been used, in part, as
(19)
a graveyard. Al-Samhudi preserves several traditions which
refer to the graves although there is some confusion with a
mosque built by a private individual. Muhammad ordered the graves
to be dug up and the bones moved or even thrown out.
The fact that there were no protests, or at least none worth
recording, at what could only be regarded as an act of desecration
(17) II, 235.
(18) ibid. 198.
(19) Tab,ii,397; al-Suhayll, al-Raud al-Unuf fi Tafsir al-Sirat
• • ——————————————————————
al-Nabawiya l'Ibn Hisham. Ed. Taha *Abd al-Ru'uf Sa'd^
(Cairo, 1971), ii, 247; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya w'al-Nihaya.
(Beirut, 1966), iii, 215.
(20) al-Samhudi, Wafa' al-Wafa, (Cairo, 1326 AH), i, 233, 240.
would certainly indicate a friendly acceptance of the situation.
The battle of Badr in March, 624 AD (Ramadan, 2 AH) was
the first occasion on which a lack of unity between the Ansar
©
and the Muhajirun can be seen. When Muhammad announced his
intention of attacking the caravan of Quraysh, the people
answered his summons, some eagerly, others reluctantly, because
(21)
they had not thought that the apostle would go to war.
While it can be easily accepted that some of the Muslims
were not eager to go out with the party, the excuse given would
seem to be weak and could quite easily be a later addition to
the story. Some men, including 'Uthman b. 'Affan, Talha b.
e ©
'Ubayd Allah, Usayd b. Hudayr and Sa'id b. Zayd, were not present
• •
at the battle for varying reasons. Some gave excuses but none
were blamed for not being present. The fact that it was
difficult to raise the army is referred to in the Qur'an:
Even as thy Lord caused thee (Muhammad) to go
forth from home with the Truth, and lo! a party
of the believers were averse (to it)
Disputing with thee of the Truth after it
had been made manifest, as if they were
(22)
being driven to death visible.
These verses would seem to indicate that there was a great
deal more opposition than merely the thought that there would
not be any fighting. The same point is stressed in the tradition
(21) II, 289; Tab. ii, 427. Both traditions are from the
same source: 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbas.
(22) Qur'an, 8/5-6
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about the building of the shelter for Muhammad for his use
during the battle and the presence of a riding beast for the
possibility of a hasty retreat. Sa'd b. Mu'adh recommended
this on the grounds that there were many men who had been left
behind who were loyal and would have joined them had they
(23)
suspected that there would be a battle. Several of these
men who did not attend the battle were given shares in the
(24)
booty by Muhammad and were not blamed for their absence. '
Al-Tabari records that the men went out only hoping for some
booty easily obtained from the relatively weak caravan of Abu
Sufyan and it was because of this attitude that God sent down
(25)
the verses above and below. Al-Baladhuri records the story
of Khubayb b. Isaf who converted to Islam so that he might join
(26)
the Muslim army in hope of gaining some booty.
When the Muslim party realised that the Quraysh had sent
a large relief force toward them, another problem seems to have
arisen. With the threat of a major battle before him, Muhammad
felt it necessary to ask his men if they would support him.
Representatives of the Muhajirun spoke and confirmed their
willingness to fight the Quraysh and they were followed by
Sa'd b. Mu'adh on behalf of the Ansar who also agreed to support
(27) •
Muhammad. It seems likely that Abu Bakr and 'Umar did not
actually speak at this time. Only Miqdad b. 'Umar and Sa'd
(23) II, 297; Tab, ii, 440.
(24) Waq, i, 101.
(25) Tab, Taf. ix, 185.
♦
(26) Bal, Aj_ i , 288.
(27) II, 293-294; Tab. ii, 434-435.
- 17 -
b. Mu*adh are actually quoted and it is only stated that Abu
Bakr and 'Umar spoke well. One version of the incident says
that only Miqdad spoke, omitting even Sa'd, and says that he made
his statement either when they were about to fight or at the
time when Muhammad, still in Medina, was urging them to go
out to Badr.^ This tradition would support the supposition
that Abu Bakr and 'Umar did not speak publicly at this time
and casts some doubt on the participation of Sa'd. Nevertheless
if the incident is to be accepted, and the evidence is in
favour of this, it is probable that the two men, one Muhajir
and one from the Ansar, spoke. The former encouraged the
latter by the use of a Qur'anic quotation which implied a stain
on the honour of those who might leave the Prophet with even
fewer men. The entire story of the incident of the oath-taking
is confused in some of the sources, with the order of the
speakers changed and words commonly attributed to one person
(29)
given to another. Despite the confusion in some of the
texts, the outlines of the story are clear and confirmed by
the existence of Qur'anic verses alluding to it.
The reason for the oath, as given by Ibn Ishaq, is that
the oath sworn by the Ansar at al-'Aqaba was only for the
defence of Muhammad within the territory of Medina. This
implies that a battle with the Quraysh would be an offensive
(28) Bal, Aj. i, 293-294.




action, beyond the letter of the oath, and hence would require
a new undertaking. However, this also implies that an attack
on a caravan would be a defensive act; a point which is hard
to accept.
The commentary about the two Qur'anic verses above,
supports the idea that the two are a single unit as they are
(31)
discussed together. and this is followed by Bell in his
(32)
division of the Sura into its component parts. Throughout
the commentaries the consensus of opinion is that the Muslims
were very averse to facing the Quraysh who had come in defence
of their caravan. It is emphasised that it was the fighting
that was objected to rather than the raid on a virtually
(33)
defenceless group of merchants. There is a tradition
which states that those who were "disputing with Thee of the
(34)
truth" were the unbelievers oi Mecca. However, this is
rejected and almost certainly is an attempt to alter the
impression that might have been gained of the attitude of the
early Muslims. These verses are very closely connected with
the following one, quoted below, and the historical background
to them, taken largely from Ibn Ishaq, is stated in the section
(35)
devoted to verse seven and it is also in this section that
is found the description of the oaths given before Badr.
(31) Tab, Taf. ix, 181 ff.
(32) Bell, i, 162.
(33) Tab, Taf. ix, 182.
(34) ibid, ix, 183.
(35) ibid, ix, 184 ff.
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Al-Tabari preserves a tradition concerning the speech of
Miqdad which may cast some light on the incident. Immediately
before narrating the speech of Miqdad it is reported that when
Muhammad was angry his cheeks became red. MiqdSd came across
Muhammad in this condition and said, "Rejoice 0 Messenger of
c
( Og \
God; by God we will not say to you ..." . This would seem
to indicate that Muhammad was very disturbed before this
incident and would argue in support of the supposition that there
was a great fear that the Muslims might not support the Prophet.
This point is made very clearly in a tradition, which is not
transmitted by Ibn Ishaq, where it is stated that Muhammad,
• •
having been informed by Gabriel of the advance of the Qurashi
army, feared that the Ansar would desert him because of the terms
(37)
of their original oath. In the version of the story trans¬
mitted by al-Baydawi, Muhammad is described as becoming angry
• •
at the attitude of the people when they realised that the
caravan had escaped them and that now they had to face the enemy
army. Muhammad had asked for advice from the people and this
was the reaction that he received. Therefore Abu Bakr and
— (38}'Urnar spoke and were followed by Sa'd and Miqdad.
Another point must be mentioned. In the texts it is
stressed that Badr was the first expedition which included men
from the Ansar. Yet Watt has pointed out that in order to raise
(36) Tab, ii, 434; Abu al-Para,1, Kitab al-Aghani, (Cairo. 1969-
1974), iv, 1391.
(37) Tab, Taf, ix, 186.
(38) Bay, iii, 42.
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the numbers involved in some of the earlier expeditions
(39)
Muhammad must certainly have made use of men from the Ansar.
e •
Once again it must be said that these raids would have been
offensive and beyond the confines of Medina. Consequently the
story of the oath, with the reason given for it, is probably
an attempt, by legal argument, to obscure a charge of timidity,
or even cowardice, v/hich might possibly be levelled against
the entire party, but most definitely against the Ansar who had
the most to lose in a 'total' war with the Quraysh. A
reference to this charge may be seen in the verse immediately
following the two given above:
And when Allah promised you one of the two
bands (of the enemy) that it should be yours,
and ye longed that other than the armed one
might be yours. And Allah willed that He
should cause the Truth to triumph by His words,
and cut the root of the disbeliever;
The commentary on this verse demonstrates the relationship
of this verse to the hesitation of the Muslims, and especially
the Ansar, and it relates the details of the movements as the
(41)
parties advanced to Badr. It is stressed that the Muslims
were hoping for booty and not a battle and that the two parties
were the caravan and the army of Quraysh.
It must be said that once the issue was joined no members
(39) Huh/Med. 3.
(40) Qur'an, 8/7.
(41) Tab, Taf, ix, 184 ff.
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of the Muslim party are recorded as having faltered but this
does not obliterate the initial hesitations which may have been
due more to a fear of the financial and political consequences
than to any physical fear.
The distinction drawn by the contemporaries between the
Ansar and the Muhajirun is pointed out by the incident which
immediately preceded the general melee. In common with other
battles of the era, this one began with a series of single
combats. Three heroes of Quraysh made a challenge to an equal
number from the Muslim side. Three men from the Ansar responded
but al-Waqidi reports that Muhammad did not wish to have these
men strike the first blows for Islam. Therefore he ordered them
to return to their places in the ranks and their places in the
- - (42)
field to be taken by Muhajirun from his own clan of B. Hashim.
This version is also reported from the transmission of al-Umawi
(43)
although the same text also gives the following account.
This description is drawn largely from Ibn Ishaq and recounts
that the return of the Ansar was requested by the Quraysh
saying, "You are nobles and our peers but we desire men of our
(44)
own lineage." Both stories may be considered suspect,
however the latter would seem more likely. The Quraysh, as
yet, had no reason to fight with the Ansar, the only Meccan
blood having been spilled so far by a Muhajir. By asking for
men of their own people the Quraysh were attempting to remove
(42) Waq, i, 68; IS, ii, 17.
(43) Ibn Kathir, op.cit. , iii, 273.
(44) II, 299; Tab, ii, 426.
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a stain on the honour of the tribe created when relatives
went into opposition to their own families. This, however,
may also have been an attempt to weaken the Muslim force by
widening an already present division. It is strange that the
Ansar made no protest despite the importance the Arabs attached
to prowess in warfare as a part of muruwwa.
(45)
One text reports that the following verses were sent
down about the duels before the battle:
These twain (the believers and the dis¬
believers) are two opponents who contend
concerning their Lord. But as for those
who disbelieve, garments of fire will be
cut out for them; boiling fluid will be
poured on their heads.
Y/hereby that which is in their bellies,
and their skins too, will be melted.
And for them are hooked rods of iron.
Whenever, in their anguish, they would go
forth from thence they are driven back
therein and (it is said unto them):
Taste the doom of burning. ^ ^
There is, however, a great deal of controversy as to whether
the "two opponents" referred to are the contenders in the duels
before Badr. Al-Tabarl seems to say that they are; however^he
also records traditions which indicate that the opponents to
the believers are the 'people of the Book' or all those who do
(45) Ibn Kathir, op.cit., iii, 273.
(46) Qur'an, 22/19-22.
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not believe in God's message. There is also one tradition
(47)
which states that the reference is to heaven and hell. Al-
Wahidi gives two traditions which indicate that the reference
is to the duellists or to the 'people of the book' but makes
no judgement.Al-Baydawi indicates that the reference may
be to the unbelievers in general but devotes more space and
(49)
details to stating that it refers to the Jews and the Muslims.
It seems probable that, as a modern commentator has said, the
parties in dispute are the believers and those who debate
with them. The references to Badr were an attempt to find
an historic hook on which to hang the verses.
It is also interesting to note that the Ansar made no
protest when Muhammad declared that members of the B. Hashim
and certain others were not to be killed if met on the battle-
(51)
field. The only protest that was raised was by a Muhajir
who knew that he would be facing close members of his own
(52)
family. These stories sound like a later addition to
explain away the fact that the father of the ruling house (the
'Abbasids) had opposed Muhammad. The pro-'Abbasid nature of
these reports is even more striking in a later account which
implies that al-'Abbas had become a Muslim before this, possibly
(47) Tab, Taf, xvii, 131-132.
(48) al-Wahidi, Asbab al-Nuzul. (Cairo, 1968), 207-208.
(49) Bay, iv, 52.
(50) Bell, i, 315.
(51) II, 301-302; Tab, ii, 449-451.
(52) II, 301.
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even before the Hijra, and remained in Mecca helping those
Muslims who remained there and passing on information to
Muhammad. When he requested permission to emigrate he was told:
"You are the last of the Kuhajirun as I am the last of the
(53)
Prophets.
The battle of Uhud in March 625 AD (Shawwal, 3 AH) is,
as will be seen later, of far more importance for a study of
the activities of Ibn Ubayy and his followers than for an
examination of the rivalry between the Ansar and the Muhajirun.
However, al-Tabari, and following him Ibn al-Athir, record
that before the battle began Abu Sufyan sent to the Ansar
saying:
You men of Aws and Khazraj, leave me to
deal with my cousin and we will depart from
you, for we have no need to fight you.
(54)
The Ansar remained loyal to Muhammad and refused his offer.
• •
The point of this incident is lost, for certainly after the
battle of Badr in which the Ansar played such a prominent role,
there were sufficient blood feuds engendered to make this
offer impossible. Al-Tabari claims to have received this
tradition from Ibn Ishaq but this is not confirmed as it is
not found in the Sira, nor is there any reference to it in the
Qur'an. It is much more likely that this is a later creation
intended to strengthen the position of the Ansar by indicating
their loyalty to Muhammad. In this context it may be noted
that the isnad given by al-Tabari passes back through Ibn
(53) Usd. iii, 165.
(54) Tab,ii,511; Kamil, ii,151; Abu al-Para,i, op.cit., xv, 5493.
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Ishaq to a man from the Ansar of B. Salima and the other
• •
references to the incident are both, almost certainly, lifted
from al-Tabarl.
The story of the siege and the expulsion of the B. al-
Nadir rightly belongs to the section concerned with the
Munafiqun, however the division of the booty which was obtained
from this group involves the Ansar.
And that which Allah gave as spoil unto His
messenger from them, ye urged not any horse
or riding-camel for the sake thereof, but
Allah giveth His messenger lordship over
whom He will. Allah is Able to do all
things. ^
This verse is commonly accepted as having been sent down
concerning the booty which was obtained after the expulsion of
— (^
the B. al-Nadir from their homes. It might be pointed out
that some of the accounts preserved by al-Tabari say that it
»
may have come down on this occasion, although others indicate
that it came down about the submission of Fadak, the
(57)
destruction of B. Qurayza or the attack on Khaybar. One
account states that it refers to the booty taken from the
B. Qurayza which was then given to the Muhajirun of Quraysh^8^;
an incident which is almost certainly a confusion with the
(55) Qur'an, 59/6.
(56) Bay, v, 125; al-Wahidi, op.cit., 278-279; Bell, ii, 568.
(57) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 35-36.
(58) ibid. xxviii, 36.
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event which occured as described below. Whatever the occasion
of its descent, and it almost certainly relates to the expulsion
of B. al-Nadir, it formed the legal and religious justification
for the distribution of the booty.
Various versions of how this booty was distributed have
been given to us. Al-Husayn from al-Kalbi records that
• •
Muhammad went to the Ansar and asked their permission to add
• •
the new possessions to those of the Ansar and then to divide the
total between the Ansar and the Kuhajirun because of the poverty
among the latter. If they preferred he would give all of the
booty to the Muhajirun leaving the Ansar with what was theirs
already. The Ansar are said to have answered that the Muhajirun
were welcome to all of the booty and any other of their
(59)
possessions which they needed. Al-Waqidi gives the same
basic story with the additional detail that Sa'd b. 'Ubada and
Sa'd b. Mu'adh were the spokesmen for the Ansar. Hence
the booty was given only to the Muhajirun with the exception
of two poor men from the Ansar. Ibn Ishaq specifies that only
• •
■" "" C 61}
the 'first' Muhajirun were given a share. There is
preserved a report that Sa'd b. Mu'adh was given a sword but
- (62^
there is no other mention of awards to the Ansar. Other
versions in al-Ya'qubi, al-Tabari, and Ibn al-Athir make no
mention of the initial offer although the end results are the
(59) Bal, Pj_ 38.
(60) Waq, i, 378-379.
(61) II, 438; Tab, ii, 555; Kamil, ii,174; Ibn Kathlr, op.cit.,iv, 76,
(62) wSq, i, 379.
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same.
This kindness from the Ansar on behalf of the Muhajirun
is extolled in two Qur'anic verses following the one given
above:
And (it is) for the poor fugitives who have
been driven out from their homes and their
belongings, who seek bounty from Allah and
help Allah and His messenger; They are the
loyal.
Those who entered the city and the faith
before them love those who flee unto them
for refuge, and find in their breasts no
need for that which hath been given them,
but prefer (the fugitives) above themselves
though poverty become their lot. And whoso
is saved from his own avarice— such are
(6
they who are successful.
The commentary on these verses confirms that they were sent
down concerning the attitude of the Ansar toward the booty
received at the time of the capitulation of the B. al-Nadlr. ^^)
The version which states that it was the booty taken from
B. Qurayza is repeated however,no comment is made and
other traditions relate to B. al-Nadir.
(63) Qur'an, 59/8-9.
(64) Tab, Taf. xxviii. 40 ff; Bay, v, 126; al-Wahidl,
• •
op.cit., 280-281.
(65) Tab, Taf. xxviii, 40.
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There does seem to be an inconsistency in the story that
led the Ansar to donate magnanimously the booty to the
o
Muhajirun. The point to the story is that until this time
the Ansar had been supporting the Muhajirun and this
distribution of the booty relieved them of this necessity.
Yet references in the texts v/ould indicate that by this time
the subsidy from the Ansar was only a portion of the amount
required and that the Muhajirun, or at least a portion of them,
were capable of supporting themselves.
There had been several successful expeditions before the
expulsion of the B. al-Nadir. Nakhla, Badr, al-Kudr, al-
Qarada and Qatan were all occasions on which booty had been taken
and the expulsion of the B. Qaynuqa* certainly must have aided
in supporting the Muslims. The amount of booty taken on only
one of these raids, al-Qarada, is emphasized and the portion
given to Muhammad, the fifth, reached twenty thousand dirhams.^^
Traditionally it is also implied that the Muhajirun
arrived in Medina penniless and were, of necessity, forced to
subsist upon the generosity of the Ansar. Although there is
( f>7)
evidence to support this there is also evidence to show
that some of the Muhajirun were able to bring considerable
resources with them. 'Umar stated that he was one of the
wealthiest men of Quraysh and offered half of it to a man if
(66) V/aq, i, 198; al-Samhudi, op.cit. , i, 200.
(67) An example is the story of Suhayb b. Sinan who was
forced to give all his funds to the Quraysh before
they would let him leave. II, 729,#'266 from Ibn Hisham.
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he would remain in Medina and not return to Mecca. Abu
Bakr was said to have taken five or six thousand dirhams with
him, a not inconsiderable sum.Three families are listed
who made the emigration in toto and "with their property".
It is also certain that the Muhajirun, true to their tribal
profession, established themselves in trade soon after their
arrival, as the well-known story of *Abd al-Rahman b. *Awf
(71)
indicates. A tradition reports that as Muhammad and Abu
Bakr were approaching Medina on their journey of emigration
from Mecca, they met al-Zubayr and a group of Muslim merchants
who were returning from Syria v/ith a caravan. Al-Zubayr
(72)
clothed both Muhammad and Abu Bakr in white robes.
A tradition from Musa b. 'Uqba states that this caravan
(73)
was made up of Muslims but was returning to Mecca. There
is no indication that al-Zubayr and other Muslims moved to
Medina after Muhammad made the Hijra and therefore the
reference to Mecca is inconsistent with the facts as they are
now known. Even if the story is a later creation it indicates
a belief that commerce was begun by the Muslims at the time of
the Hijra.




(71) IS, iii, 125; Bukh, v, 39.
(72) Ibn Kathir, op.cit., iii, 186; al-Samhudi, op.cit.. i, 174.
(73) II, xliv.
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and the expedition against the B. al-Nadir was almost exactly
three years after the arrival of Muhammad in Medina, some of the
©
Kuhajirun, and probably the largest number of them, would be
capable of supporting themselves by this time. This would
substantiate Watt's view that the Ansar were not forced to
pay regularly but were urged to 'contribute' as much as
(74)
possible.
Because the Muhajirun were almost certainly not in such
desperate straits as is commonly accepted, it seems strange that
there is no mention of any outcry from the Ansar at the loss
of the booty. They had taken equal risks with the Muhajirun
during the siege and the later incident at al-Ji'rana shows
that they were willing to protest when they felt that they
had been done an injustice. Several statements indicate that
it was only the "first Emigrants" who were given shares in
what must have been a fairly considerable amount of booty and
hence another source of agitation. A desire for the material
goods of life or, more bluntly, greed, is too deeply engrained
into the human soul for there not to have been some protest.
The Munafiqun had been active in their opposition to Muhammad
during the siege and surely they would have led any opposition,
or if there was none, they would have tried to create it. No
record of any protest has been preserved, probably because it
is not referred to in any Qur'anic verses. It seems likely
that the Qur'anic verses given above were intended to indicate
God's gratitude to those who agreed to the distribution and to
(74) Muh/Med, 251.
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shame into silence those who disapproved.
The raid on the B. al-Mustaliq at al-Muraysi4 was the
• •
occasion for the most serious outbreak of the rivalry between
the Ansar and the Muhajirun. As many of the details of this
incident involve the leader of the Munafiqun, *Abd Allah b.
Ubayy, it is also dealt with in the next chapter. However*, as
regards the problems between the Ansar and the Euhajirun, Ibn
Ishaq records that a dispute broke out over first rights to the
water between Jahjah b. Mas'ud of the B. Ghifar, a hired servant
of *Umar, and Sinan b. V/abar al-Juhani, an ally of B. 'Awf
b. al-Khazraj. They came to blows and each tried to summon
help from his party, either the Muhajirun or the Ansar. 'Abd
Allah b. Ubayy used this incident to try and inflame the Ansar
•
against the newcomers quoting the proverb: "Peed a dog and
it will devour you." He urged his followers to turn upon the
Qurashi emigrants after the return to Medina saying that"the
stronger will drive out the weaker." This must have fallen
upon ears made receptive by the growing wealth, power and
control of the Muhajirun in Medina, for, when word of this was
brought to Muhammad by Zayd b. 'Arqam, 'Umar suggested that Ibn
Ubayy be killed. Muhammad refrained from this act but, rather,
(75)
exhausted both parties by a forced march toward Medina.
Ibn Sa'd briefly recounts the same tale, however he states that
Jahjah called for the help of the Quraysh and the Kinana rather
than from the Muhajirun. fie also adds that the violence was
ended by the Quraysh speaking with the Aws ana Khazraj and
(75) II, 490-491.
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finally the two instigators made peace. Al-Waqidi confirms
the story with many details and much dialogue and he emphasizes
the seriousness of the affair by mentioning that there was a
(77) - -
fear of fitna. The story is also confirmed by al-Bukhari
— (78 )
who gives several traditions with different isnads. In
his commentary on the incident al-Suhayli emphasizes the fear
of disunity which the incident provoked. Muhammad, having
e
heard the cries for help, denounces them and declares that the
believers are brothers and members of one party. These shouts
were forbidden by Islam and the incident is linked to the legal
(79)
punishments for the act.
The incident is referred to in the Qur'an in Sura LXIII,
which is entitled "al-Munafiqun". Although the first eight
verses are traditionally associated with the expedition to
al-Muraysi*, Bell in his study of the chronological order of
the verses states that only verse eight is actually concerned
with the affair and was added to the others which had been
composed earlier.
a
They say: Surely, if we return to al-Madinah
the mightier will soon drive out the weaker:
(76) IS, ii, 65.
(77) Waq, ii, 415 ff. Fitna: civil discord or civil strife,
among other meanings. A fear of this is found throughout
Islamic history as one of the greatest of civil disasters.
(78) Bukh, vi, 189-193.
(79) al-Suhayli, op,cit., iv, 17.
(80) Bell, ii, 581.
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when might belongeth to Allah and to His
messenger and the believers; but the
hypocrites know not.^^
The commentators, by the way in which each verse is handled,
tend to support the statement of Bell about the sending down
of this verse. Although the preceding verses are attributed
to the actions of Ibn Ubayy and the Munafiqun, the details of
the incident are narrated in the section dealing with the
verse above and the earlier verses are rather summarily dealt
( 82 ^
with. Although all three commentaries link the saying in
verse seven
... Spend not on behalf of those (who
dwell) with Allah's messenger that they
may disperse (and go away from you) ...
to ' Abd Allah b. Ubayy only al-Baydawi and al-Wahidi link it
to the incident at al-Kuraysi' and the threat to expel the
Muhajirun from Medina and al-Tabarl does not mention this
possibility.The final tradition in al-Tabari's commentary
on verse seven would tend to indicate that it was the verse
that exonerated Zayd b. Arqam from the charges that were being
made on him.^his is, however, almost certainly a
confusion with verse eight due to the similarity of their
(81) Qur'an, 63/8
(82) Tab, Taf, xxviii. 106 ff; Bay, v, 133-134.
(83) Qur'an, 63/7
(84) Bay, v, 134; al-Wahidi, op.cit.,287; Tab, Taf. xxviii. 111-112.
• •
(85) Tab, Taf. xxviii, 112.
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opening words and would tend to support Bell's supposition
(86 ^
that verse eight was a later replacement for verse seven.
This incident would be seen as lessening the aura which
surrounded the Companions and there is some evidence that
attempts were made to change the image of the incident. Both
al-Baydawi and al-Wahidi record versions which would indicate
• •
that the fight was begun by a bedouin, and neither version
mentions that this man was working for 'Umar and called upon
(87) — —
the Muhajirun to support him. Al-Wahidi includes the
more common version with the additional details in a second
tradition, however al-Baydawi does not mention it. It would
seem probable that this account, which omits rather than changes,
certain pertinent facts, was a later attempt to transmit the
incident as it was believed that it would have been.
It can readily be seen that this incident might have
finally involved all the citizens of Idedina if the warriors
had returned still incensed by the words of Ibn Ubayy. Had
Ibn Ubayy been killed as 'Umar suggested, and even Ibn Ubayy's
son offered to perform the act, this would probably have created
a martyr about whose memory the Ansar could have gathered.
Muhammad wisely refrained from this assassination and chose to
ezhaust the two parties with a forced march. Muhammad was
conscious of the political implications that the killing of
Ibn Ubayy would involve, or at least a later transmitter
believed that he was. This may be seen in the statement
(86) Bell, ii, 581.
(87) Bay, v, 134; al-Wahldi, op.cit., 287.
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Muhammad, is said to have made to 'Umar at some later time when
discussing the incident:
Now what do you think, 'Umar? Had I killed
him on the day you wanted me to kill him
the leading men would have trembled with
rage. If I ordered them to kill him today
they would kill him.^^
Although dialogue is notoriously unreliable, this statement is
certainly an accurate representation of Muhammad's reason for
reacting as he did.
Upon the return to Medina the so-called 'Affair of the Lie*
broke out which further distracted the populace from the
incident. It has even been suggested that the outbreak of
the rivalry between the Aws and the Khazraj which, as will be
seen below, protected Ibn Ubayy from punishment, may have been
deliberately provoked in an effort to make the Ansar forget
their quarrel with the Muhajirun and to provide time for the
statements of Ibn Ubayy to be forgotten. Although this is
certainly possible, it is more likely that the distraction
offered by the scandal had already achieved this purpose.
Prom this time forward the rivalry of the Ansar and the
Muhajirun only appears as a minor irritant for the Muslim state.
The siege of the Trench in March and April, 627 AD (Dhu
al- Qa'da, 5AH) was not the occasion for a major outbreak of
the rivalry between the Ansar and the Muhajirun, however it
(88) II, 492; Tab, ii, 608-609.
(89) Muh/Med, 186.
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does give evidence as to the day-to-day bickering which may
have gone on between these two parties.
When word reached Medina of the coming of the Confederates,
Muhammad took counsel as to the best means of defending the city
against attack. The idea of digging a trench to ward off the
enemy cavalry is reported to have been that of Salman al-Parsi,
a freedman of Medina.^0) This fact is not reported by Ibn
Ishaq. Upon the advice being taken, the entire community
began to work on the defences, albeit as shall be seen later
the Munafiqun were shirkers and lax in fulfilling their duty.
Several fabulous incidents are reported during the progress
of the work, all of which can be accepted as later additions.
During this period the Ansar began to argue over the
•
question of to which party Salman, the hero of the moment,
belonged. Being a Persian, he did not readily fall into either
category and the Ansar were claiming him as one of theirs by
virtue of the fact that he was working with them in digging
the trench. Muhammad put an end to the debate by declaring
that Salman was above these questions and a member of his party,
(91)
or family, the ahl al-bayt. It is of interest to point
out that Ibn Sa'd lists Salman among the Muhajirun from B.
Hashim b. *Abd Manaf.
A1 Waqidi records that as the people were working on the
(90) Waq, ii, 444-445; Kamil. ii, 178.
(91) Tab, ii, 568-569; Waq. ii. 446; Kamil. ii. 179;
IS, iv, 82-83; Ibn Kathir, op.cit., iv, 99.
al-Suhayli, op.cit. , iii, 278-279.
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trench the Ansar made up the following verse to work by:
We are those who gave the oath to Muhammad-
for the Jihad, we never hang back.
Muhammad responded with a verse of his own:
0 God! There is no good except the good
of the life to come
Forgive the sins of the Ansar and the
(92)
Muhajirun.
These verses are appended to a tradition concerning certain
miraculous happenings which occured while working on the ditch
and which may be disregarded. There seems to be no connection
between the preceding tradition and the verses except that the
same isnad does for both. The preceding tradition is given
with the same initial transmitter by Ibn Ishaq although the
verses are not given.
Ibn Ishaq does, however, preserve a verse which is so
similar to the one given above that it must be seen as a
variant tradition stemming from the same original verse. As
the Muslims were working to build the Prophet's mosque, shortly
after his arrival in Medina, they sang:
There's no life but the life of the next
world
0 God! have mercy on the Ansar and the
Muhajira.
(92) Waq, ii, 452-453.
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Muhammad responded by saying:
©
There's no life but the life of the next
world
0 God, have mercy on the Muhajirln and the
Ansar.
The reason for the change of word order in the version
supposedly recited by Muhammad is to show, by loss of the
rhyme and the metre, that he was not a poet and hence it would
act as proof that the Qur'an was divinely inspired and not
written by the Prophet who was so obviously incapable. In this
context it would seem to support the Qur'anic verse:
And we have not taught him (Muhammad)
•
(94)
poetry, nor is it meet for him.
Yet there is no reference to the poetry in the commentary of
al-Tabari. The reason for the change of situation from the
digging of the trench to the building of the mosque is less
clear and it may merely have been a desire to locate the event
in a more religiously oriented situation. There is another
description of a similar verse also on the occasion of the
building of the mosque. In this version the point of the
version of Ibn Ishaq is lost because two verses are given",
however,the first bears no relationship to the verse in question
although the second seems to be yet another variant:
There is no care if the remuneration is the
remuneration of the next world
So have mercy on the Ansar and the Muhajira.
(93) II, 229; II, i, 496 (Arabic text).
(94) Qur'an. 36/68; Qur'an 36/69 (Arabic text).
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Here, rather than showing Muhammad reciting a defective verse,
Ibn Shihab states that the two verses given are the only ones
(95)
that Muhammad ever used, as far as he knew.
Despite the references to the building of the mosque the
majority of the reports relate the verses, or the variations
upon it, to the digging of the trench. Ibn Kathlr gives several
more versions of the story and the verse, with varying isnads
although most of them he has taken from al-Bukhari and similar
works of a religious nature.^6) ibn Sa'd also gives three
versions of the verse with varying isnads, two of which stem
(97)
from Anas b. Malik who is also the original transmitter
for several of the versions presented by Ibn Kathir. One
version, which is from al-Bukhari and originated with Anas, is
almost identical with that of al-Waqidi with only the most
minor differences in the verses themselves, although the first
was sung by the Muslims rather than the Ansar^^. Ibn Sa*d,
in a tradition from Anas, but with a different isnad gives
versions of the verses which are even closer to those given by
al-WaqidT and attributes the first of the two to the Companions
(99)
of the Prophet. Al-Suhayli, while commenting on the three
good Muslims who abstained from the raid on Tabuk, points out
that the Ansar had sworn an oath to the Prophet and quotes
(95) Ibn Kathir, op .cit., iii, 187.
(96) ibid, iv, 95-97.
(97) IS, ii, 70.
(98) Ibn Kathir, op .cit. . iv, 96.
(99) IS, ii, 70.
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the verse of the Ansar given by al-Waqidi as proof of this,
thus giving further support to the belief that the Ansar were
the reciters of the original verse, rather than the Muslims in
general. He attributes the occasion of the verse to the day
of al-Khandaq.it should be pointed out that none of
the versions given by Ibn Kathir have the same chain of
transmission or original source as that of al-Waqidi. Also
those of Ibn Sa'd, although similar at certain stages, are
different. The versions of the verse, and the circumstances
under which it was recited, which are preserved by al-Bukhari
add nothing to its understanding.^^ In al-Samhudi both
occasions are mentioned with varying accounts of the verse
itself. In two of the traditions it is pointed out that
Muhammad was reciting verse composed by someone else.^^^
The verse, or some version of it, would seem to be
authentic, confirmed as it is from three separate sources, and
the version of al-Waqidi would seem to be more authentic than
the others. It is free of the religious overtones which seem
to indicate a later tampering and indeed it would seem to give
evidence of the rivalry between the Ansar and the Ivluhajirun.
The Ansar composed a verse extolling their own merits; surely
the Muhajirun would have responded in kind had not Muhammad
interposed his own verse. The very uniqueness of the verse
would argue for the possible seriousness of the incident. This
(100) al-Suhayli, op.cit., iv, 198
(101) Bukh, viii, 109.
(102) al-Samhudi, op.cit., i, 234, 240-241.
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would seem to be the only example of his poetry to which
there is a reference and it must have been a serious situation
which stimulated him to create it. It was originally preserved
because of this uniqueness and it was later transmitters who
altered its circumstances in order to give it a more acceptable
venue and meaning.
The distribution, at al-Ji'rana, of the booty is of
interest for several reasons, not the least or which is the
fact Muhammad is reported to have given back the women and
children who had been captured. He did this upon request from
the Hawazin and the other defeated tribeSjbut he limited himself
to presenting and to supporting their request before his
victorious army. This he did and only a few of the Arab tribes
are said to have held to the letter of the tradition and
insisted upon receiving either the women or compensation for
them. It is strange that it is also recorded that
Muhammad gave girls from among the captives to 'All, 'Uthman
and 'Umar. ^®4) The account is transmitted from Yazid b.
'Ubayd Abu Wajza al-Sa'dl al-Madani who may represent a desire
to further indicate the injustice done to the Ansar by showing
Muhammad giving gifts to those men who later helped to remove
the Ansar from any role in the government. ^
(103) II, 592-593; Kamil. ii, 269; Bukh, iv, 108-109.
(104) II, 593; Tab, iii , 87-88.
(105) Ibn Hajar, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib, (Hyderabad, 1325-1327 AH)
xi, 349; al-Dhahabi, Kizan al-I* tidal fi Naqd al-Ri.ial. Ed.
'Ali Muhammad al-Bajawi, (Cairo, 1963), iv, 434.
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This was also the occasion for the distribution of gifts
to those who have come to be known as 'those whose hearts
are to be reconciled.' As Watt has pointed out these men were
probably being paid because of their positions as chieftains
of allied tribes rather than in an attempt to confirm their
faith in God and His prophet although with some of them this
u (106)
may have been the case.
A reaction to this generosity was immediate among the
Ansar. Having seen the gifts to the Qurashi leaders, who
until recently had been violently opposed to Muhammad and
Islam, to their Arab allies, and seemingly to certain highly
placed Muhajirun, the Ansar, led by Sa'd b. 'Ubada, complained
to Muhammad and were given a hearing. It is probable that this
group was not, in actual fact, all of the Ansar. Ibn Ishaq
• •
refers to it as "this tribe of the Ansar" and only Sa'd b.
'Ubada of the B. Sa'ida b. Ka'b b. al-Khazraj is named as
their leader; therefore it is likely that only members of the
Khazraj were involved, along with certain of the Muhajirun
who were allowed to join them.
Muhammad made a speech to them in which he outlined the
benefits which he had brought to them and the benefits they had
given to him. He showed them how deep his love for them was
and they were satisfied. ^
A distinctive contrast can be seen here between this
(106) Kuh/Med. 73-75.
(107) II, 596-597; Tab, iii, 93; al-Ya'qubi, op.cit., ii, 63-64;
Ibn Kathlr, op.cit., iv, 355 ff; Bukh, v, 38, 201-202.
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incident and the earlier one after the raid on the B. al-Nadir.
«
On this occasion record has been kept of the affair, probably
because the words of Muhammad were so charged with pro-AnsarT
*
•
sentiment. Indeed his words are recorded by Musa b. 'Uqba as
being used after so many of the Ansar and their descendents
were killed on the day of al-Harra.^The incident and
its accompanying speech is also used by a later writer in a
(109)
section devoted to glorifying the Ansar. It is of
interest to note that al-Suhayli, commenting upon the incident,
describes Muhammad "reproving" the Ansar although the later
• •
usage of the affair ignores this view of the speech.^^
The incidents given above are the only samples that have
remained of the rivalry between the Ansar and the Muhajirun.
There are other references which have not been included because
they are found in the poetry of the sira literature. In
this poetry are found some of the strongest attacks, especially
from the Ansar and in opposition to the Muhajirun, yet modern
scholarship has shown that a sufficiently large quantity of
this poetry was forged, often to use in later conflicts, that
doubt must be cast upon the whole.^^^^ Other citizens, or
(108) II, xlv.
(109) Ibn Qudama, al-Istibsar fi Nasab al-Sahaba min al-Ansar.
• • • •
Ed. 'All Yusuf Nuwayhid, (Beirut, 1971), 25-26.
(110) al-Suhayli, op.cit, , iv, 169.
(111) Walid 'Arafat, A Critical Introduction to the Study of the
Poems Ascribed to Hassan Ibn Thabit, (University of
London, 1954), 560. M.A. 'Azzam, A Critical Study of the
Poetry Content of the Sira of Ibn Kisham. (University
of London, 1953), 365.
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groups of citizens, of Medina were opposed to the new power
structure of the community. Such persons as Abu 'Amir al-
Rahib and Abu Qays b. al-Aslat were not even nominally Muslim
and were opposing the community from the outside.
The election of Abu Bakr shows that even by the time of
the death of Muhammad the Ansar were not reconciled to their
• •
fate. An attempt was made to have Sa'd b. 'Ubada, the leading
man of the Ansar, elected as the successor to the Prophet
but it was foiled by the party of Abu Bakr, 'Umar and Abu
'Ubayda. The opposition of the Aws to the election of the
Khazraji leader completed his failure and allowed the Quraysh
to retain their control. Sa'd so objected to the failure, and
the final loss of power, that he went into exile and died in
Syria.^^^ A modern commentator has speculated that this
defeat was avenged by the murder of the Caliph 'Uthman^^^;
a crime that was in itself avenged by the bloodshed of
al-Harra. Despite conclusions drawn from these later incidents
the opposition to the election of Abu Bakr was the last gasp
of the Ansar and they were destined to remain as supporters
«
to other, more viable political forces and never again were
they to be the prime movers in the political life of Islam
and its far flung empire.
(112)
(113)
Ibn Hajar, al-Isaba fi Tamyiz al-Sahaba. (Cairo,
• • • •




THE MUNAFIQPN AND THE MUSLIMS
What is a Munafiq?
The usage of the English word 'hypocrite' to describe a
'Munafiq' is common and yet does not seem to accurately describe
such a person as seen in the historical texts.
The root N*F*Q in the fa* ala form which is relevant to this
topic occurs thirty seven times in the Qur'an, for the most part
in the active participle shape munafiq and its plurals. It is this
word which is most commonly translated as 'hypocrite'. Izutsu has
attempted to describe the usage of nifaq and munafiq as they
appear in the Qur'an and hence their technical religious meaning.
He points out that "roughly speaking, nifaq consists in professing
"(1)
faith with the tongue while secretly disbelieving in the heart.
There can be, however, some elaboration upon this rather general
statement. The Munafiq can be paralleled with the disbeliever:
0 Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers
(al-Kuffar) and the hypocrites (al-^unafiqin),
and be stern with them. Hell will be their
(2)
home, a hapless journey's end.
The Munafiq is also described in terms of fisq:
Lo! the hypocrites, they are the transgressors
(al-fasiquna)
(1) Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the




As they are described in Sura IX, 49-60, it is obvious that the
Fasiq is almost synonymous with the Munafiq.
As far as we can gather from this description,
a fasiq is not a down-right kafir, for,
nominally at least, he is in the camp of
the Muslims. Only, he is a wavering, very
unreliable kind of Muslim who tends to
(4)
reveal his nifaq-nature on every occasion.
This religious view of the relationship between fasiq and
munafiq is not seen in the historical texts referring to the
time of the Prophet. Abu 'Amir al-Rahib was named by Muhammad
al-Fasiq yet was definitely not a member of the Muslim community.
As has been seen above, he left Medina in opposition to Muhammad,
fought against his own people and finally died in exile. It
would seem that he was, indeed, much more of a kafir than a
munafiq. Despite this it was this theoretical relationship
between kufr, fisq and nifaq which led some later commentators
to include the Munafiq with the Mu'min and the Kafir as one of
(5)
the three main categories of mankind.
It is this religious aspect of nifaq which is stressed by
the dictionaries. The Lisan al-'Arab derives the word munafiq
from the word nafiqa' which is one of the many words for the
burrow of the jerboa. A Munafiq enters (nafaoa) Islam as a
jerboa enters (nafaaa) his burrow (nafiqa*) and yet neither
remains there for long and leaves the sanctuary at any tine.
Ibn Kanzur points out that this derivation of the word took place
(4) Izutsu, op.cit. , 159.
(5) ibid, 179 quoting Hasan al-Basri and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.
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during the Islamic period and that the pre-Islamic Arabs did
not have this specialized use of the word. In actual definition
of the word munafiq he says, "he it was who concealed his
(6)
disbelief and gave the appearance of belief." It is from
this derivation that Watt suggests that I,!unafiq might be more
(7)
accurately translated as 'creeper* or 'mole'. Such a
translation would suggest the animal involved but would not
imply the action which is contained in the verb. Using this
method they might be more accurately described as 'those who
dart in and out', but this phrase is far too unwieldy to be
useable.
The modern bi-lingual dictionaries have continued, for the
most part, to translate nafaqa in the sense of 'to play the
hypocrite' and hence are in accordance with the Qur'anic usage
of the word. Dozy, however, gives it the meaning of 'to be a
traitor' with the sense of duplicity and falsehood. Nafaqa
*ala he gives as meaning 'to revolt against' and hence nifaq
(8)
means 'rebellion*. Although this dictionary is largely
devoted to the Arabic of Islamic Spain this definition adds a
sense to the word which is not altogether lacking in its earlier
Arabian usage.
A western scholar, Arthur Jeffery, has stated that munafiq
is a direct borrowing from the Ethiopic and cites several other
(6) Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'Arab. (Cairo, 1300-1307), xii, 235-238.
(7) Muh/Med. 184; Bell, i, 6ln.




western scholars who agree with this derivation. Such a
borrowing would seem possible, especially in the light of the
fact that Ibn Manzur, as mentioned above, admits that the
word only appeared during the Islamic period when the need for
such a word arose.
Yet another derivation of the word is that proposed by
R.B. Serjeant. In studying the 'Constitution of Medina' he
noted that nafaqa was a term used for some sort of a tax which
was paid by the members of the umma and those allied to it
such as the Jews. It is from this sense of the word that he
believes that munafiq was derived:
That is to say, it refers to those who shared
in paying nafaqah, but did so with a very bad
grace, and while they could not but submit to
the will of the majority of Medinans, they
were in actual fact opposed to the Prophet. ^
Al-Bukhari preserves for us more definite descriptions of
a Munafiq. In a tradition traced back through Abu Hurayra to
the Prophet, it is said:
Three things characterize the Munafiq: when
he speaks, he lies; if he makes a promise,
he does not hold to it; when one places
one's confidence in him, he betrays it.^^
(9) Arthur Jeffery, The Foreign Vocabulary of the Cur'an.(Baroda.1938)
272
(10) R.B. Serjeant, 'The "Constituion of Medina"', Islamic
Quarterly, viii (1964), 14.
(11) Bukh, i, 15.
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In another tradition, four indicators of a Kuriafiq are given:
he betrays one's confidence, he lies when he speaks, he breaks
a compact, and he acts immorally when in contention. It is pointed
(12)
out that any one of these is sufficient to indicate a Kunafiq.
There are other descriptions of this sort in al-Bukhari but they
add little to the basic statement. A similar description, but
more detailed,is to be found in the history of al-Ya'qubi. This
states that a Kunafiq performs his religious duties in an impious
way but it ends by returning to the same subject as above, the
(13)
basic dishonesty of the Munafiq in all his dealings. These
definitions add a sense to the word Kunafiq which is not to be
found in the more religiously oriented books and seem to define
the word in what can only be described as a legal sense. It is
of interest, at this point, to note that al-Bukharl also records
a tradition in which nifaq is equated with hatred of the Ansar.
Abu al-Walid told us, he said Shu'ba told us,
he said 'Abd Allah b. *Abd Allah b. Jahr informed
me, he said I heard Anas (report) from the
Prophet, he said:
The sign of faith is love of the Ansar and
- -(14)
the sign of nifaq is hatred of the Ansar.
This must certainly be a later creation as almost all those who
fall into the ranks of the Munafiqun were also listed among
the Ansar. Traditions of this sort are quite common and their
(12) ibid, i, 15.
(13) al-Ya'qubi, op.cit. , ii, 93.
(14) Bukh, i, 11.
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emphasis upon love of the Ansar being a part of the faith in
God and His Prophet, which is often placed in opposition to
- (15')
the attitude of the Munafiqun, confirm their later creation.
Al-Tabari, in his tafsir on certain verses dealing with
the Munafiqun, adds to an understanding of the position of
these people. He makes the point that the Munafiqun believed
that they were the "peacemakers" or "mediators" between the
Jews and the Muslims. The use of this term implies a
degree of sincerity in their activities which is not present
in the English word 'hypocrite'. He also points out that the
term Munafiq was not the only way in which these persons were
referred to in the Qur'an. The phrase 'those whose hearts were
(17)
diseased' is a synonym for the Munafiqun. This point is
also made in a tradition preserved in another commentary on
"• (18 }
the Qur'an. A modern scholar has suggested that this
phrase was used for the waverers among the Muslims until about
the time of Uhud when it was replaced, almost completely, by
(19)
the use of the word Munafiq. Al-Suhayli's comment that
it refers to the Muslims who refused to leave Mecca and were
killed fighting with the Quraysh^^ may be disregarded as it
does not seem to take into account certain references in the Qur'an.
(15) Ibn Qudama, op.cit., 23-25.
(16) Tab, Taf. i, 126-127.
(17) ibid, i, 121-122.
(18) al-Wahidl, op.cit., 167.
(19) Richard Bell, Introduction to the Qur'an. (Edinburgh 1953), 109.
(20) al-Suhayli, oo.cit., iii, 82.
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There remains the problem of what the specific 'disease*
was, with which these people were afflicted. Al-Tabari quotes
many different authorities on this problem but there is no
definite solution to the question. Among the several possibilities,
the following terms are used: hypocrisy (nifaq), doubt (shakk),
suspicion (rlba) . perplexity (hayra) . unbelief (ri,js) , evil
•
(21)
(sharr), confusion (dalala) and denial (takdhib). Many of
the terms are not applicable to a word which is commonly
translated as 'hypocrite1. They would be more applicable to
a terra such as 'agnostic' and yet this term is not acceptable.
The vast majority of the descriptions of the Kunafiqun indicate
the hypocritical aspects of their nature and it seems certain
that these people had accepted Islam as their faith. However,
once this commitment had been made they seem to have lacked
the firmness of belief which characterised the Muslims at this
time.
Yet these definitions of a Munafiq are all in a religious
context. Despite this, the role played by the Munafiqun in the
historical texts is political rather than religious. During
this period religious authority and political authority were
almost synonymous, yet the religious activities of these people
have been ignored by the historians, possibly through lack of
information. It would be this sort of information which would
be edited out by later transmitters as detrimental to the
position of the Prophet. Because of this it is the political
meaning of the term Munafiq which is the most difficult to
(21) Tab, Taf, i, 118-123.
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understand.
This problem is acknowledged by Guillaume in his trans¬
lation of the Sira of Ibn Ishaq. At times he refers to the
Munafiqun as the 'disaffected' and at other times he uses the
more common word 'hypocrite'. In a reference to the use of the
verb nafaqa he says:
Clearly it includes the meaning of a rebel
against the prophet's authority; perhaps
(?2)
the underlying idea is feigned obedience.
It is obvious that Guillaume faced the problem of how to
translate this word, or idea, into an acceptable form and that
he discerned the underlying political meaning. However, he
would seem to be inaccurate with his use of the word 'feigned*
in reference to the obedience of the Munafiqun. Their
activities, as reported in the historical texts, are blatant
disobedience of the spirit of the Prophet's orders if not the
letter of them. It is certain that the Munafiqun were considered
to be believing Muslims and yet they continued to disobey
Muhammad. Later collectors of information could not comprehend
how this could occur and hence developed the religious side of
their activities at the expense of the more serious incidents
which were inspired by their reactionary attitude toward the
changes that Muhammad was instituting. The problems that the
historians had in relating religious theory to political
reality may be seen in reference to Mu'attib b. Qushayr. His
career certainly classes him among the leaders of the Munafiqun;
(22) II, 301 n.
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despite this^Ibn Hishara suggests that he was not, by virtue
(23)
of the fact that he may have been at Badr.
At this point it may be profitable to indicate another
use of the word Munafiq and this is as a term of abuse. It is
used as an insult to be hurled at an enemy or anyone who opposes
the orders of the Prophet or the authority of the state.
Incidents of this sort are not common', however^ they occur
throughout the period of the Prophet's life in Medina and,
indeed, after his death. Before the battle of Badr, Muhammad
ordered his men not to kill men in the army of Quraysh who were
related to him, saying, as the reason for this order, that
they were being forced to fight. Abu Hudhayfa objected to this
saying that other men also had relatives among the enemy. When
word of this reached 'Umar, he accused him of playing the
Munafiq. (laqad nafaqa).^^
During the so-called 'affair of the lie' Sa'd b. 'Ubada
- (25)
was called a Munafiq arguing on behalf of other Munafiqun.
This term was used because he led his tribe's opposition to
Muhammad's request to punish a man from his people. Interestingly
enough, Sa'd was again accused of being a Munafiq. This
occurred during the uproar after his bid to be chosen as the
successor to Muhammad and the name was hurled at him by 'Umar
(26)
while he was roughly handling him.
(23) II, 731-732,#297 from Ibn Hisham.
(24) II, 301; II, i, 629 (Arabic text).
(25) II, 496; II, ii, 300 (Arabic text).
(26) Tab, iii, 223.
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Prom the above it can be seen that there are varying
meanings which may be given to the word Munafiq and associated
terms. The word can be seen to have a religious, a political
(or anti-authoritarian), and an abusive use. The religious
meaning of the word is that which is given the greatest use
in the texts and in the secondary literature and yet in those
incidents which have been recorded for us the activities of
the Munafiqun are against the authority of the Prophet rather
than his religion. The symbiotic relationship of religion
and politics at this time in the Middle East must be re-
emphasized for it was this relationship which helped to shape
the history of this period. The later transmitters and collectors
of the historical anecdotes of this period were unable to
picture people who would oppose the authoritarian regime of
Islam without opposing the religion itself. Hence they built
upon the idea of hypocrisy which was already present, a fact
which must be accepted as it is amply indicated in the Qur'an.
Nevertheless the anti-authoritarian aspects of their activities
were played down. The words used by al-Tabari to describe
the manifestations of their 'disease' intensify the doubt as
to the correctness of the word 'hypocrite' to translate
Munafiq and it may be that Guillaume's choice of 'disaffected'
would more suitably indicate the varying aspects of their
relationship with Muhammad and Islam.
•
Incidents of the rivalry
The battle of Baar is the first event in the course of
which a reference to the Munafiqun may be found. Al-Waqidl
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records that after the battle Zayd b. Haritha was sent to bring
the news of the victory to the people of Medina. A Munafiq
is described as trying to spread the opposite news and claiming
that Zayd was only saying these things because of the state
which he was in. As evidence the Munafiq pointed out that
Zayd v/as riding the camel of the Prophet and he implied that
Zayd had taken it in his panic. Usama b. Zayd was so frightened
by the news that he went to his father to have it denied. This
being done, he threatened the Munafiq with beheading upon the
(27)arrival of Muhammad and the army.
Even before the battle when Muhammad gave the order that
his uncle al-'Abbas should be spared, Abu Hudhayfa b. 'Utba
b. Rabi'a complained and was threatened with execution by
*Umar who said that he had become a Munafiq. The action was
never carried out although it is said that Abu Hudhayfa worried
about 'Umar from that time until he was killed as a martyr at
v " (28)Yamama.
The victory of the Muslims at Badr allowed God to force the
polytheists, Kunafiqun, and Jews to submit. The Jews even
(29)conceded that Muhammad was the one described in their texts.
In summarizing the events of the second year after the Hijra,
Ibn Kathir declares that large numbers of the polytheists and
Jews of Medina submitted in that year. A large portion of
them, however, were secretly Munafiqun v/ho opposed Islam and
(27) Waq, i, 115.
(28) II, 301; Tab, ii, 450.
(29) Waq, i, 121.
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they strove to seduce the Muslims from their faith.
Despite these statements there is no concrete evidence to
certify that the process of conversion picked up significantly
among these people, although this may be the occasion for the
conversion of *Abd Allah b. Ubayy.
With these few references the historical rivalry between
the Munafiqun and the Muslims may be said to begin. These
reports are, in actual fact, quite trivial and of little
importance. There is, however, one point of interest. In the
first tradition reported above, the term Munafiq seems to be
equated with the word Yahud. The relationship between these
two groups will be dealt with below.
Ibn Ishaq records that *Abd Allah the son ; of *Abd Allah
b. Ubayy, the leader of the Kunafiqun, was present at the
(31)
battle. There is nothing inconsistent in this as he was
always reported to be a pious Muslim and in opposition to his
father. However, the issue is confused when Ibn al-Athir
records that Ibn Ubayy's shirt was given to al-'Abbas after his
(32)
capture. Is this a confusion between the father and the
son or is it possible that the father was present at the battle
and this honour was later given to his son? There would seem,
at present, no way of determining the truth of the report;
however, an alteration of the texts as would be required by
the latter of the two possibilities would be plausible in
(30) Ibn Kathir, op.cit.. iii, 347.
(31) II, 332.
(32) Usd. iii, 167.
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light of the way Ibn Ubayy and his followers have been treated
by the historians.
The attack on the B. Qaynuqa* was provoked by an incident
in the market place but the actual reason for the attack and
their expulsion was more probably, as the Arab historians point
out, the refusal of the Qaynuqa' to accept the teaching and
(33)
leadership of Muhammad. This Jewish tribe was allied to
the Ghatafan, Khazraj and Qurayza but the only person who was
• •
willing to support them was 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy and his own
personal body of supporters, the Munafiqun. It is at this
point that Ibn Ubayy comes to the fore as the leader of the
•Muslim' opposition to Muhammad.
The actual details of Ibn Ubayy's pleading for the
Qaynuqa' vary. In certain cases it seems that Ibn Ubayy went
so far as to grab hold of Muhammad's clothing and to refuse to
/ j \
leave him until he gave him what he wanted. Ibn Sa'd and
(35)
al-Tabari only describe him arguing for them. Al-Suhayli
emphasizes how angry the Prophet became at the words of Ibn
Ubay£?^It is implied that Ibn Ubayy was willing to take such
violent action as is given in the first accounts because moves
were already under way for the total destruction of this tribe
in a manner like to that in which the B. Qurayza was handled at
a later time. It would seem unlikely that Muhammad contemplated
(33) II, 363; Tab, ii, 479.
(34) II, 363; Waq, i, 177; Kamil. ii, 138.
(35) IS, ii, 29; Tab, ii, 480.
(36) al-Suhayli, op.cit., iii, 143.
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the extermination of the tribe at this time. It would have been
unlikely that he would have had sufficient support. It is also
so similar to his later actions that it would seem probable
that the later story has been projected backwards to explain
his actions. If he v/as willing to lay hands on Muhammad then
later historians felt it necessary to provide a suitably
desperate reason for this. It is more plausible that Muhammad,
despite his recent success, was not yet able to find sufficient
support to deny a meeting or to stop the actions of Ibn Ubayy.
Nevertheless Muhammad did have the tacit agreement of the
other allies of the Qaynuqa' for the action which he was about
to take. 'Ubada b. al-Samit was allied to the Jews in the same
manner as Ibn Ubayy; however, he submitted and renounced his
(37)
alliance. Had Muhammad been bent on killing the tribe
it would be unlikely that this man and his followers would be
willing to forgo the alliance. The new ideals of Islam could
not yet have sunk so deeply as to completely eliminate the
feelings of loyalty so strong in the pre-Islaraic period.
The entire incident, and the unstated but definite
comparison between Ibn Ubayy and 'Ubada b. al-Samit, is certainly
«
only preserved in order to explain the relevant Qur'anic verses.
0 ye who believe! Take not the Jews and
Christians for friends. They are friends one
*
to another. He among you who taketh them for
friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth
not wrongdoing folk.
(37) II, 363; Waq, i, 179.
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And thou seest those in whose heart is a
disease race toward them, saying: We fear
lest a change of fortune befall us. And
it may happen that Allah will vouchsafe
(unto thee) the victory, or a commandment
from His presence. Then will they repent
of their secret thoughts.
Then will the believers say (unto the
people of the Scripture): Are these they
who swore by Allah their most binding oaths
that they were surely with you? Their
works have failed, and they have become
the losers.
Bell, although grouping these verses as a unit, does not
relate them to any specific incident, but rather to the period
in which Islam was drawing away from the earlier monotheistic
(39)
faiths. Al-Tabari gives several occasions on which the
first of the above verses may have been delivered, one of which
is the comparison of the actions of Ibn Ubayy and 'Ubada b.
al-Samit; however, he is unable to specify which is the more
correct. He does state that he is in no doubt that it does
involve the Kunafiqun. This is similar to his commentary
on the second verse where he admits that it relates to the
Munafiqun but is unable to say whether or not it is Ibn Ubayy
(38) Qur'an, 5/51-53.
(39) Bell, i, 101-102.
(40) Tab, Taf. vi, 276.
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(41) - -
who is meant. Al-Baydawi states quite specifically that
"those in whose hearts is a disease" refers to Ibn Ubayy and
(42)
his like* The phrase "we fear lest a change of fortune
befall us" is a reference to a statement of Ibn Ubayy "I fear
a change of fortune" when he heard of 'Ubada renouncing his
(43)
alliance with the Jews in favour of Muhammad and Islam.
The comparison between the two men is made by al-Wahidi in his
(44) - -
commentary on the first two verses above. Al-Baydawi states
e
that the final verse refers to the promises of aid given to
the beleaguered Jewish tribe by the Munafiqun and it necessitates
the recounting of the tale of the Munafiqun vis a vis the
B. Qaynuqa' in explanation of it. Al-Tabari relates the
*
verse to the Munafiqun although not to any specific incident.
Verse fifty-five in the same chapter is related to the breaking
of the alliance by 'Ubada in two traditions preserved by al-
- (47)
Tabari, although other references are also made. The
•
verses following those given above refer to the Munafiqun yet
they seem to be a warning against apostasy in general rather
than to a specific incident, although reference to such an
occasion may have been lost since the verses are able to stand
(41) ibid, vi, 278-280.
(42) Bay, ii, 154.
(43) Bay, ii, 154; II, 364.
(44) al-Wahidi, op.cit.. 132-133.
(45) Bay, ii, 154-155.
(46) Tab, Taf. vi, 280-281.
(47) ibid, vi, 287-288.
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on their own.
The battle of Uhud is surrounded by such a mass of
©
confusing tradition that "it is not possible to give a full or
clear account of the battle. This confusion carries over
into the activities of Ibn Ubayy and his followers at this
time. Their action of withdrawing from the army may have led
to the Muslim defeat as the battle seems only to have been
barely won by the Quraysh.
When Muhammad received the news that the Quraysh were
advancing upon Medina, he summoned a council in order to ask
their advice on the matter. Al-Tabari records that he summoned
Ibn Ubayy to this council and "this was something he had never
(49)
done before." It is probable that this was added later
to show that Muhammad was not in the habit of consulting a man
who, throughout this period, was Muhammad's most implacable
enemy in Medina. The sources are agreed about the outcome of
this meeting. Muhammad and Ibn Ubayy were agreed, on this one
occasion, in a decision to remain in the fortresses and houses
of Medina, thus forcing the Quraysh to attack the city itself
where the Ansar, with their long experience of internecine
warfare, would be in an advantageous position. Unfortunately,
a group of young men who had not been at Badr and others who
were eager for martyrdom convinced Muhammad to go into the
field. Although those who had pressed him into giving
(48) Huh/Med. 21.
(49) Tab, ii, 503.
(50) II, 371; Tab, ii. 502-503; Xamil. ii. 150; Waq. i. 209-211;
IS, ii, 38; al-Ya'qubi, op.cit. , ii, 47.
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battle now worried about the consequences, Muhammad refused
to change again. This charge that Muhammad was pressured,
against his will, into giving battle is only a portion of the
story. That the men were eager to fight is certainly true, but
rather than a desire for martyrdom, it is more probable that
they were concerned with saving their crops which were near
to harvest and which were being consumed, or destroyed, by the
Quraysh.
Al-Waqidi and Ibn Sa'd record that while en route to Uhud
from Medina, Muhammad refused the help of a large party of
Jews because he did not want to have polytheists fighting with
( 51 )
him against polytheists. In another tradition Ibn Sa'd is
more detailed and says that Muhammad ordered Ibn Ubajry and six
hundred of his allies from the B. Qaynuqa' to return to
(52)
Medina. These reports would seem to be a confusion with,
or a re-writing of, the more commonly accepted version. All
the sources agree that during this same period, Ibn Ubayy and
his followers, comprising about 300 men or a third of the total
(53)
force, left the army of Muhammad and returned to Medina.
The implication in the sources is that Ibn Ubayy left because
he was still upset over Muhammad's change of heart over the
best way to defend Medina. Watt suggests that either Ibn Ubayy
had made an agreement with Muhammad that he would return and
•
defend Medina or he may have been trying to increase his power
(51) Waq, i, 215-216; IS, ii, 39.
(52) IS, ii, 48.
(53) II, 372; Tab, ii, 504; Kamil, ii, 150; Waq, i, 219, IS, ii, 39.
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and influence by a show of neutrality toward both parties. A
ploy he seems to have used with success oh the day of Bu'ath.^"^
By painting the actions of Ibn Ubayy in the darkest possible
shades the later historians were obviously trying to shift some
of the blame for the defeat unto Ibn Ubayy. In this context
the traditions given above where Muhammad refused the aid of
the large Jewish contingent, or even ordered them to return,
seem strange. These would seem to be an attempt to add glory
to Muhammad by having him order Ibn Ubayy away, rather than
standing helpless to stop him.
It would seem impossible to determine the true motives
behind Ibn Ubayy's withdrawal* however, it did accomplish the
purpose set forward by Watt as the first of his two alternate
reasons. In a tradition recorded by al-V/aqidi, {Amr b. al-JAs
says that one of the reasons why the Quraysh did not press home
their advantage in Medina was that they had heard that Ibn
Ubayy was in Medina with one third of the Muslim force and some
(55)
of the Aws and Khazraj who had not gone out to Uhud.
Although the Arab texts make great play of the fact that following
the battle Muhammad led his exhausted warriors out in pursuit
of Quraysh in order to regain some of his lost prestige and
also to keep the Quraysh from returning to Medina, much more
important for this latter purpose was his sending of a non-
Muslim ally to follow the retreating enemy. His tale of the
large force led by Muhammad and made up of those men who had
(54) Muh/Med. 22.
(55) Waq, i, 299.
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not been present at the battle but had remained in Medina
was certainly instrumental in convincing Quraysh to continue
on to Mecca.^ ^^
The entire affair of the battle of Uhud is surrounded by
#
references to the activities of persons called Munafiqun.
As Muhammad received information that the Quraysh were
going to attack Medina, it is recorded that the Jews and the
(57)
Munafiqun were spreading alarming news in the city, yet
there is no further mention of this fact.
On the way to Uhud, Muhammad and his followers were not
• •
permitted to pass through the garden of al-Mirba* b. Qayzi
who is described as a blind man and a Munafiq.^"^
When Muhammad had been wounded during the battle itself,
it is said that it was the Munafiqun who claimed that he was
(59)
killed. It was also a Munafiq who told the people to
return to their families because Muhammad had been killed and
they entered their houses.'
There is also a report that some of the Companions, having
heard that Muhammad was dead, suggested that they approach Abu
C 61}
Sufyan for a safe conduct, using Ibn Ubayy as the intermediary.
The implication is that Ibn Ubayy had some sort of connection
(56) II, 390-391; Tab, ii, 535; Waq, i, 338-339.
(57) Waq, i, 204; IS, ii, 37.
(58) Tab, ii, 506; Kamil, ii, 151.
• "*
(59) al-Ya'qubi, op,cit. , ii, 47.
(60) Waq, i. 280.
(61) Tab, ii, 520; Kamil, ii, 156-157; Ibn Kathir, op.cit.,iv, 23.
- 65 -
with Abu Sufyan.
After the battle Ibn Ubayy and the Munafiqun rejoiced at
(6 2) - -
what had happened to Muhammad and his followers, Al-Waqidi
records the same event but adds a description of Ibn Ubayy
upbraiding his son for fighting with Muhammad. He also states
that the Jews and the Kunafiqun were trying to turn the Muslims
away from their religion. When 'Umar b. al-Khattab heard of
• •
this he requested permission to kill them but Muhammad declared
that the Jews were protected by their status as dhimma and that
the Munafiqun had pronounced the shahadatayn and hence were
also safe.^"^
Ibn. Ubayy is recorded as being roughly handled in the mosque
when, on the Friday following the battle, he arose to make his
usual speech of praise. He was forced to leave the mosque and
when advised to return and seek forgiveness from the Prophet and
God he refused to do so. The reason given for this ejection was
his action on the day of the battle. Al-Waqidi indicates
that it was because of this affair that the Qur'anic verse
And when it is said unto them: Come! The
Messenger of Allah will ask forgiveness for
you! They avert their faces and thou seest
them turning away, disdainful.
( fif) ^
was sent down, A statement which is not borne out by the
(62) IS, ii, 44.
(63) Waq, i, 317-318.
(64) II, 391.
(65) Qur * an, 63/5.
(66) Viaq, i, 318-319.
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commentaries.
With these and even more minor references the accounts of
the battle of Uhud are studded. The question arises as to why
this should be. Two reasons may be found. The first is an
attempt to shift the blame for the defeat unto Ibn Ubayy and
his followers. The second is as a partial explanation of
the Qur'anic verses which have to do with this battle,
A proper understanding of the battle of Uhud can only
be obtained through a comparison of the historical texts and
the relevant verses in the Qur'an. Certain verses are
described as relating to the battle and the actions of the
Munafiqun at this time.
Abu Muhammad 4Abd al-Malik b. Hisham told us
from Ziyad b. *Abd Allah al~Bakka'i from Muhammad
b. Ishaq al-Muttalibi: There are sixty verses
• • •
in the "Family of Imran" which God sent down
concerning the day of Uhud in which there is
a description of what happened on that day
/ r rt \
and the blame of those who merited His rebuke. '
Ibn Ishaq then spends a considerable amount of time explaining
those verses. The verses in question are numbers 120 to 188
and these make up the majority of the verses dealing with the
battle. There is, however, one other verse which is often
related to the activities of the Munafiqun at this battle.
Muhammad b. Bashshar told me (he said)
Ghundar and 'Abd al-Rahman told us they
(67) II, 391-392.
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said Shu'ba told us from *Addi from *Abd
Allah b. Yazid from Zayd b. Thabit (may God
be pleased with him) - What aileth you that
ye are become two parties regarding the
(68^
hypocrites - (refers to the fact that)
a group of people from the Companions of
the Prophet returned from Uhud and the
c
people were divided into two parties because
of them. A party said kill them and a
party said no and (therefore) - What aileth
you that ye are become two parties regarding
the hypocrites - was sent down. He
(Muhammad) said: It (Medina) is a perfumed
(city), it expels the dross as fire expels
the dross in silver (or iron).
This same tradition, with only minor variants and stemming from
Zayd b. Thabit, is given by al-Bukhari in two other places.
Al-Tabari says that the following verse referred to the departure
of the Munafiqun from the army on its way to Uhud.^^
When two parties of you almost fell away,
and Allah was their protecting friend.
(71)
In Allah do believers put their trust.
(68) Qur'an, 4/88
(69) Bukh, vi, 59.
(70) Tab, ii, 504.
(71) Qur'an, 3/122.
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Most of the incidents surrounding the activities of the
Munafiqun at the battle of Uhud are referred to in the Qur'an.
The fact that Muhammad asked the advice of some of his followers,
and then did not follow it, is obliquely mentioned in the
following verse, where it also seems as if he is being
warned about making the same mistake again.
... So pardon them and ask forgiveness for
them and consult with them upon the conduct
of affairs. And when thou art resolved,
then put thy trust in Allah. Lo! Allah
(72)
loveth those who put their trust (in Him).
The commentaries do not specifically relate this verse to
Uhud, however, al-Tabari and ai-Baydawi both indicate that
• • •
Muhammad was being instructed to seek advice in matters relating
(73)
to military affairs. Despite what may be seen as a
reprimand to Muhammad from God, the final phrase of the verse
would seem to be a commendation for having been firm in his
trust once he had made the decision to give battle to Quraysh.
This would seem to be supported by Bell's contention that this
(74)
was a private verse for Muhammad himself. '
Those young men who are said to have urged Muhammad to go
e
out to Uhud are referred to in a verse which would seem to be
(75)
a scathing attack on their actions.
(72) Qur'an, 3/159.
(73) Tab, Taf, iv. 152; Bay, ii, 50.
(74) Bell, i, 60.
(75) cf. Tab, Taf. iv, 108-110; Bay, ii, 45.
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And verily ye used to wish for death before
ye met it (in the field). Now ye have seen
(76)
it with your own eyes.
_ -(77)
According to al-Baydawi , the following verse refers
to the actions of the Kunafiqun when the word spread that
Muhammad had been killed. They supposedly urged the believers
to return to their homes and their old religion, arguing that
if Muhammad had been a Prophet he was now dead and things
could return to normal. It was also at this time that the idea
of obtaining a safe conduct from Abu Sufyan was mooted.
0 ye who believe! If ye obey those who
disbelieve, they will make you turn back
( 78 )
on your heels, and ye turn back as losers.
Al~Tabari, interestingly enough, makes no reference to a
specific incident and rather than the Munafiqun accuses the
(79)
Jews and the Christians of attempting to subvert the Muslims.
In verse 154 there are two statements made by the opponents
of Muhammad after the battle.
... They said: Have we any part in the
cause? Say (0 Muhammad): The cause
belongeth wholly to Allah. They hide
within themselves (a thought) which they
reveal not unto thee, saying: Had we any
(76) Qur'an, 3/143.
(77) Bay, ii, 47.
(78) Qur'an, 3/149.
(79) Tab. Taf, iv, 122-123.
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part in the cause we should not have
been slain here. Say: Even though ye
■ had been in your houses, those appointed
to be slain would have gone forth to the
places where they were to lie. (All this
hath been) in order that Allah might try
what is in your breasts and prove what is
in your hearts. Allah is Aware of what
is hidden in the breasts (of men).
Both the statements are attributed to Ibn Ubayy; the first
supposedly having been said when he heard the news of the losses
(81) —
among the Khazraj. The traditions preserved by al-Tabari
agree that both statements were made by the Munafiqun', however,
they indicate that Ibn Ubayy made the first and Mu'attib b.
„ . (82)Qushayr the second.
These then are the major references to the Munafiqun and
their actions during the battle. Yet there is one outstanding
omission. There is no mention made of the withdrawal of the
followers of Ibn Ubayy from the Muslim army. This should be
amended to read, there is no acceptable reference to the
incident, for there are, indeed, references. The most specific
reference is that made in the tradition quoted above and coming
from Zayd b. Thabit. Yet when discussing this verse al-
Baydawi gives four separate and possible reasons for the descent
(8°) Qur'an, 3/154.
(81) Bay, ii, 48-49.
(82) Tab, Taf. iv, 142-143.
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of the verse. The first was the dissension raised among the
Muslims by certain Arab tribes who inhabited the area around
Medina and about the quality of whose Islam the people were
arguing. This is the version accepted by Pickthall in his
— (8 3 }
translation of the Qur'an. The second is to those who
remained behind on the day of Uhud. The third mentions a
group who made the Hijra and then returned to their original
homes. The fourth possibility was a group who became Muslim
but abstained from making the Hijra to Medina. A.l-Tabari
also gives these possible causes and adds to them a tradition
which relates the verse to the 'affair of the lie' and the
activities of Ibn Ubayy.^"^ However, he does make a comment
upon the merits of the various versions and, although vague,
indicates a preference for the story of the people of Mecca
/o£\
_ _
who apostatized after their conversion. Al-Wahidi also
gives three possible incidents but makes no judgement upon
their merits.
This lack of clarity would argue against accepting this
verse as a reference to the incident of the withdrawal. The
_ / QQ \
verse quoted by al-Tabari, and given above , cannot be
(83) Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning; of the
Glorious Koran, (New York, nd), 87n.
(84) Bay, ii, 106.
(85) Tab, Taf. v, 192-195.
(86) ibid, v, 194-195.
(87) al-Wahidi, op.cit., 112-113.
(88) Qur'an, 3/122.
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accepted for a similar reason. The verse is not specific in
its reference to the incident. Al-Baydawi, in his commentary
on the verse, does describe the withdrawal, however he points
out that the tv/o parties mentioned were the B. Salima b. Jusham
b. al-Khazraj and the B. Haritha b. al-Nablt of al-Aws.^"^
This is confirmed by Ibn Ishaq^^. Al-Tabari bears out this
• •
basic account and also records several traditions which
indicate that the two clans were intending to follow Ibn Ubayy
(91)
and his supporters back to Medina and this is supported
by al-Baydawi. These stories are almost certainly later
interpretations of the events and one tradition goes so far
(92)
as to say that Ibn Ubayy was the leader of these two clans.
A statement which casts more doubt on the incident.
When one considers the fact that for every other major
incident involving the two rivalries under question there is a
Qur'anic quotation, only one conclusion can be reached. It
would seem likely that Ibn Ubayy and his followers did not
withdraw from the army of Muhammad, rather they were never a
part of it and remained behind in Medina rather than venturing
forth. This conclusion is supported by certain other facts.
And that He might know the hypocrites, unto
whom it was said: Come, fight in the way
of Allah, or defend yourselves. They
(89) Bay, ii, 41.
(90) II, 392.
(91) Tab, Taf. iv, 72-74.
(92) ibid, iv, 73.
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answered: If we knew aught of fighting we
would follow you. On that day they were
nearer disbelief than faith. They utter
with their mouths a thing which is not in
their hearts. Allah is best aware of what
they hide.
The only interpretation that can be placed on the phrase "If
we knew aught of fighting we would follow you" is that they did
not follow him. This idea is supported by various statements
which are recorded as having been said by Ibn Ubayy or his
followers:
If we knew that you will be fighting we would
go out with you to them
If we knew that you will be fighting we would
not betray you, but we do not think that
there will be fighting.
Even al-Baydawi indicates that the Munafiqun did not join the
Muslims as he refers to them in terms which support the statement
made above. The phrase "yukhawwifu awiliya' ahu" meaning "fear
(95) - -
his partisans" is described by al-Baydawi as referring to
those who refused to go out with the Prophet, "al-qa'idin 'an
al-khuruj ma'a al-rusuli". ^6) in his discussion of the
following verse, number 176, al-Baydawi refers to the Munafiqun
(93) Qur'an, 3/167.
(94) Tab, Taf. iv, 167-168.
(95) Qur'an, 3/175.
(96) Bay, ii, 54.
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as being among those who remained behind, "wahum al-munafiqina
(97)
min al-mutakhallifina." That this verse refers to the
Munafiqun is confirmed by al-Tabari but he does not qualify
this statement in any way.^y^
The only verse in the Qur'an which would seem to relate
to the withdrawal on first reading is:
Lo! Those of you who turned back on the
day the two hosts met, Satan alone it was
who caused them to backslide, because of
some of what they have earned. Nov/ Allah
hath forgiven them. Lo! Allah is Forgiving.
- Clement.(99)
Al-Baydawl specifically describes it as having been sent down
in relation to the ones who were defeated on the day of Uhud
because they disobeyed the order of the Prophet when Satan
tempted them with the prospect of the booty, i.e., the archers.^
Al-Tabarl offers several alternatives Cot those who failed
Muhammad at this time, but there is no reference to the
Munafiqun.^ ^ This would seem to be confirmed by the text
of the verse itself, where in the final phrases these persons
are forgiven by God for their actions. Had the reference been
to the Munafiqun, it is unlikely that this would have been done.
(97) ibid, ii, 55.
(98) Tab, Taf, iv, 174-175.
(99) Qur'an, 3/155.
(100) Bay, ii, 49.
(101) Tab, Taf. iv, 144-145.
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The question arises as to why this deliberate falsehood
was included in the texts. Even in the period immediately
following the battle the concept of the Prophet having suffered
a defeat was difficult for the Muslims to understand. Even
the problem of the fact that Muhammad changed his mind would
seem to have been difficult to accept despite the verse quoted
above. Ibn Ishaq, in his section on the poetry concerning the
battle, gives a long composition by Ka'b b, Malik in a portion
of which he seems to indicate that Muhammad urged his
followers to fight from tne beginning:
When they made their home in 'ird our leader said,
•Why do we plant grain if we do not protect it?'
Among us was God's apostle whose command we obey.
When he gives an order we do not examine it.
The spirit descends on his from his Lord
Brought down from the midst of heaven and
taken up again.
Y/e consult him on our wishes, and our desire
Is to obey him in all he wants.
The apostle said when they appeared,
•Cast off the fear of death and desire it
Be like one who sells his life
To draw near to a King by Whom he will be
restored to life.
Take your swords and trust in God
To Whom belongs the disposal of all things.'^
(102) II, 406.
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As with all poetry purporting to be authentic from the period
of the Prophet it is unlikely that it is authentic. Nevertheless
this poem indicates that some people, in the century and a half
after the death of Muhammad, found his change of mind difficult
to accept and hence this poem shows him urging his followers
on. It also indicates that it was believed that the crops were
the deciding factor in this decision.
The problem of the explanation of the defeat is seen even
in the Qur'an v/here several verses seem to be attempts to give
excuses and reasons for the defeat.
Allah had already given you the victory at Eadr,
when ye were contemptible. So observe your duty
to Allah in order that ye may be thankful
And when thou didst say unto the believers: Is
it not sufficient for jrou that your Lord should
support you with three thousand angels sent
down (to your help)?
Nay, but if ye persevere, and keep from evil
and (the enemy) attack you suddenly, your Lord
will help you with five thousand angels sweeping on.
Allah ordained this only as a message of good
cheer, and that thereby your hearts might be
(103) A better translation of this word, tattaqu. would
be '... act piously.'
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at rest - Victory cometh only from Allah,
the Mighty, the Wise
Bell believes that the first of the above verses is part
of an address made by Muhammad before the battle and therefore
not really applicable to the problem in question. ^^5) However,
if it is considered to have been sent down after the battle,
then it would seem to be recalling to the believers the glory
of their first victory in an attempt to overshadow their
defeat. The final verses are an attempt to explain the absence
of the angelic hordes who aided the believers at Badr but were
noticeably absent on this occasion despite the fact that their
help had been promised by Muhammad. This would seem to be
supported by one group of traditions preserved by al-Tabari.
Although one theory is that verses 124 and 125 only refer to
the help the Muslims received at Badr, the second theory is that
there was indeed a promise of angelic help. This was, however,
conditional upon perseverance and pious actions. The Muslims
did not measure up to the required standards and the help was
withheld.^The theory that help was promised but not
received is quite plainly seen in the final verse above.
If ye have received a blow, the (disbelieving)
people have received a blow the like thereof.
These are (only) the vicissitudes which We
cause to follow one another for mankind, to
(104) Qur'an. 3/123-126.
(105) Bell, i, 57.
(106) Tab. Taf. iv, 76-81.
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the end that Allah may know those who
believe and may choose witnesses from
among you; and Allah loveth not the
wrongdoers.
And that Allah may prove those who believe,
and may blight the disbelievers.
Again Bell believes that these verses are part of the
address made before the battle and which was later repeated with
certain amendments. However, he does not indicate that these
verses were altered in any way.^^®^ Despite this it would
seem that they refer to the battle in a past sense rather than
a future and are an attempt to explain to the believers that
the Quraysh had suffered to an equal extent and that it was
all part of God's plan to separate the believers from the
unbelievers in any case. A view which is supported by the
Muslim commentators. ^®^)
Lo! those of you who turned back on the day
the two hosts met, Satan alone it was who
caused them to backslide, because of what
they earned. Nov; Allah hath forgiven them.
Lo! Allah is Forgiving. Clement.^^
In this verse, which is definitely after the battle, Satan is
given as the prime mover of the defeat, having tempted persons
(107) Our'an. 3/140-141.
(108) Bell, i, 58.
(109) Tab, Taf. iv, 103-108; Bay, ii, 44-45.
(110) Qur'an. 3/155.
» 79 -
who were otherwise good believers.v^^^^
And was it so, when a disaster smote you, though
, ye had smitten (thein with a disaster) twice (as
great), that ye said: How is this? Say (unto
them, 0 Muhammad): It is from yourselves. Lo!
Allah is able to do all things.
That which befell you on the day when the two
parties met, was by the permission of Allah;
that He might know the true believers;
And that he might know the hypocrites, unto
whom it was said: Come, fight in the way of
Allah, or defend yourselves. They answered:
If we knew aught of fighting we would follow
you. On that day they were nearer disbelief
than faith. They utter with their mouths a
thing which is not in their hearts. Allah
is best aware of what they hide.
Those who, while they sat at home, said of
their brethren (who were fighting for the
cause of Allah): If they had been guided by
us they would not have been slain. Say:(unto
them, 0 Muhammad): Then avert death from
(112)




These verses, which again are definitely from the post-
Uhud period, begin by placing the defeat into relation with the
victory of Badr and then explain, yet again, that God caused
the defeat for His own reasons. The reason, very carefully
laid out, is to distinguish between the faithful and the
Munafiqun who are strongly criticized for the actions and
statements on that day. It is interesting to note that in the
first of the verses above the answer given to those who ask
how the defeat was possible was: "It is from yourselves".
Unless those who were asking were from the Munafiqun, it would
seem as if this verse were an earlier one in which the Muslims
themselves were blamed and that this was later amended by the
following verses where the blame was shifted to a more accept-
v-i (113)able group.
The number of verses relating to the problem and the
varying reasons given for the defeat indicate the seriousness
of the problem to Muhammad and his followers. Nevertheless,
some sort of explanation must have been found acceptable,
probably the idea that God caused the defeat so as to distinguish
the Munafiqun. It was this idea that was later expanded into
the tale of the withdrawal of Ibn Ubayy. There are sufficient
Qur'anic references to the Munafiqun and Uhud to make it seem
plausible and therefore the story was created. The blame had
to be shifted from what can otherwise only be seen as a
tactical error on the part of Muhammad and they were the most
obvious choice as a scapegoat.
(113) cf. Tab, Taf. iv, 164-170.
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The story of the withdrawal is a perfect example of the
cultural values of a later period necessitating the re-writing
of an incident so that it conforms to the beliefs and ideals of
the later age.
The details of the expulsion of the B. al-Nadir from
Medina are well known and are confirmed by the major texts.
t
After the initial demand for their departure the B. al-Nadir
seemed willing to comply! however^ Ibn Ubayy offered to support
them with his own followers and his allies from among the
Arabs. Muhammad and the Muslims laid siege to the Jews who
capitulated after Muhammad ordered the cutting down of their
palm trees and they realized that Ibn Ubayy was either unable
or unwilling to make good his pledge.
Of more interest are the details that this incident gives
us about the position of Ibn Ubayy at this time. Ibn Ishaq
tells us that the group who had offered their support was made
up of men from the B. *Awf b. al-Khazraj including Ibn Ubayy,
Wadi'a, Malik b. Abi Qawqal, Suwayd and Da'is. ^Although
it is possible that Ibn Ubayy was only speaking as the leader
of those people who followed him as the head of the Munafiqun,
especially in the light of the fact that he was unable to follow
up his words, he, and Huyayy b. Akhtab who believed him, must
• •
have felt that he was speaking on behalf of the entire tribe
of al-Khazraj. This is evident from the fact that he promised
to deliver the help of 2,000 men from his own people and others
from their allies, the B. Qurayza and the B. Ghatafan.^1^
(114) II, 437; Tab, ii, 554.
(115) Tab, ii, 553; IS, ii, 57.
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It would seem that Sa'd b. 'Ubada had not yet replaced him as
leader of the Khazraj although he was making an effort in this
direction.^ Although they did nothing to help them, the
Kunafiqun are recorded as grieving greatly over the loss of the
tribe, which was certainly the loss of a major portion of
their support.^^
The Qur'anic references to the incident are as follows:
Hast thou not observed those who are hypocrites,
(how) they tell their brethren who disbelieve
among the People of the Scripture: If ye are
driven out, we surely will go out with you, and
we will never obey anyone against you, and if
ye are attacked we verily will help you. And
Allah beareth witness that they verily are liars.
(For) indeed if they are driven out they go not
out with them, and indeed if they are attacked
they help not, and indeed if they had helped
them they would have turned and fled, and then
they would not have been victorious.
In quite graphic detail the activities of the Kunafiqun are laid
out and condemned. Bell would date these verses from immediately
before the attack on the B. al-Nadir and states that they "show
(119)
how well Muhammad gauged the situation beforehand". The
(116) Muh/Ked. 212.
(117) Waq, i, 376; IS, ii, 58.
(118) Qur'an. 59/11-12.
(119) Bell, ii, 568.
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closeness of the details to the events as recorded in the texts
would argue that the verses were sent down after the event
rather than before it. This is supported by the commentators
who specifically relate these verses to the actions of Ibn
(1 20)
Ubayy and his followers toward the B. al-Nadir. If the
o
earlier dating is accepted then one would seem to be granting
Muhammad the gift of precognition or be accepting the possibility
that later historians altered the facts so as to make there
conform with the Qur'anic quotation. That Muhammad v/as truly
c
able to judge the situation that closely, although possible,
is unlikely.
The raid on the B. al-Mustaliq at al-Murays!' was the
• •
occasion for two incidents involving the Munafiqun and Ibn
Ubayy. The first incident was the dispute between a member of
the Ansar and a man representing the Muharijun which Ibn Ubayy
and his followers tried to use as an excuse to expel the
Qurashi emigrants from Medina, as has been described above. The
second incident was the so-called 'affair of the lie' in which
Ibn Ubayy played a leading role and which is more important
for the information which it gives about him than for any
political reason.
As has been said the dispute which occured on this
expedition falls into both categories and must be examined in
both sections. As has been mentioned above, the role of the
Ansar is of vital importance. It is, however, now necessary
to examine the part played by Ibn Ubayy and his followers in
(120) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 45-46; Bay, v, 126.
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this affair. The initial argument which began the affair was
of minimal importance but it is indicative of the feelings of
the period that Ibn Ubayy was able to use it to whip up the
fervour as he was able to do. The account in al-Waqidi is by
far the longest and the most detailed. So detailed is it that
much of it becomes suspect. Nevertheless it follows the
outline of the account as it is recorded in Ibn Ishaq and al~
e
Tabari. One particular detail which he gives must be mentioned
•
here. Al-Waqidi records that Ibn Ubayy was sitting in a group
of Munafiqun made up of: Ibn Ubayy, Malik, Da*is, Suwayd, Aws
b. Qayzi, Ku'attib b. Qushayr, Zayd b. al-Lusayt, and *Abd
• ®
(121)
Allah b. Nabtal. That a list of names such as this should
be accepted whereas other details are not is difficult to
explain. However, in this case each name on the list is
confirmed as a follower of Ibn Ubayy in reference to other events
and hence can be accepted on this occasion. It is of interest
to note that al-Waqidi, and following him Ibn Sa'd, record that
Muhammad was accompanied on this raid by more of the Kunafiqun
©
(122)
than had ever done so before. It would seem likely that
this was the body of support upon which Ibn Ubayy drew when he
began to agitate. It is unlikely that all those who have on
this occasion been grouped together as Munafiqun were hard-core
members of this group (if there even were any permanent members
of the group) but rather were members of the Ansar who, for
one reason or another, were at this time susceptible to the
(121) V/aq, ii, 416.
(122) Waq, i, 405; IS, ii, 63.
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influence of Ibn Ubayy. It is almost certain that the phrase
recording the large numbers of the Munafiqun is a later addition
attempting to distract the attention from the fact that at this
time a large portion of the Ansar were willing to consider at
least the idea of expelling Muhammad from Medina.
♦
It is on this occasion that the story of the crown being
prepared for Ibn Ubayy is recorded. The story in its simplest
form can be seen in Ibn Ishaq, whereas in al-Waqidi it is
embellished with additional dialogue and detail. The Prophet
was very disturbed by the sayings and actions of Ibn Ubayy',
however^he avoided a direct confrontation by the utilization of
a forced march which exhausted all the men and consequently
took their minds off the words of Ibn Ubayy. Usayd b. Hudayr
• •
spoke to Muhammad asking him to be gentle with Ibn Ubayy,
possibly out of a fear of the consequences if he were to be
punished for expressing a sentiment that many of the Ansar felt.
In explanation of the hostility shown by Ibn Ubayy, Usayd told
Muhammad that his arrival in Medina came at a time when the
people of Medina were actually preparing a crown with which to
make Ibn Ubayy their king. His arrival at that time had caused
this to be put off and now Ibn Ubayy felt that Muhammad had
(1 23)
deprived him of a kingdom. It is unlikely that there is
any truth to the details of this story. Kings were not unknown
to the Arabs of the peninsula; however^ they were a foreign
implantation and had never really succeeded in establishing a
stable and long-lived base of power. Al-Suhayll obviously
(123) II, 491; wSq, ii, 419.
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recognized the problem inherent in the statement that Ibn
Ubayy was to be crowned. Therefore he carefully points out
that the Ansar were of southern extraction and hence had had
(1 241
the experience of kings while they were in the Yemen. It
is much more probable that Ibn Ubayy was becoming accepted as
the paramount chieftain in Medina, a position of first among
equals, a function which was much more acceptable in the society
of the time and one that may be seen in Mecca and, indeed, in
the role of Muhammad himself in his middle and later years at
Medina. The story of the crown is a later elaboration of the
facts which is aimed at further defiling the character of Ibn
Ubayy by picturing him as a man who would contemplate the
establishment of a kingdom, despite the traditional Arab hatred
of such a state.
Since it is certain that this tradition was collected, if
not actually created, at a time when the 'Abbasids were ruling
the Islamic empire, it is possible that this story is a subtle
attack on their predecessors, the Umayyads. The major charge
levelled against the Umayyads was that they converted the
theocracy established by Muhammad and his successors into a
kingdom. The implication therefore would be a comparison of
the Umayyads with Ibn Ubayy, a man known to have been the most
persistent enemy of the Prophet and a man whose plans for a
kingdom were thwarted by Muhammad as the 'Abbasids, by their
revolution and subsequent changes to the Caliphate, thwarted
the endeavours of the Umayyads.
(124) al-Suhayll, op.cit. , iii, 14.
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Despite the amendments and later additions the incident
did occur and is referred to in the Qur'an. Al-Bukhari, in
several traditions all stemming from Zayd b. Arqam, who was
personally involved in the affair, implies that the first eight
verses of sura LXIII (al-Munafiqun) were sent down in relation
C1 2 5}
to the activities of Ibn Ubayy on the occasion in question.
Bell, in his study, states that only verse eight is directly
related to this affair and the preceding verses are of an
earlier date, although they may not have been published until
verse eight was sent down as a replacement for number seven.
This would seem to be confirmed by the commentary of al-Baydawi
in which only the eighth verse is specifically described as
belonging to this event and the earlier ones are only indefinitely
(127)
related to the Munafiqun. This pattern is also seen in
the commentary of al-Tabari. The major description of the.
incident at al-Muraysi' is placed in the commentary on the
/ ^ 2Q \
eighth verse. However, under the fifth verse it is stated
(129)
that the entire chapter was sent down about this incident.
This is contrasted by a statement in the portion dealing with
verse six which claims that this verse came down in relation to
another incident and a verse in the ninth chapter. ^^0) ^
(125) Bukh, vi, 189-193.
(126) Bell, ii, 581.
(127) Bay, v, 133-134.
(128) Tab, Taf. xxviii, 112-117.
(129) ibid. xxviii, 109.
(130) ibid, xxviii, 111.
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including the description of the incident under the eighth
verse, al-Tabarl seems to be supporting the above view, although
he includes the other references.
This is also supported by the Qur'an itself. The first
seven verses are a general condemnation of the Munafiqun; however
the eighth verse is very specific in its detail
A
They say: Surely, if we return to al-Madinah
the mightier will soon drive out the weaker;
when might belongeth to Allah and to Kis
messenger and the believers; but the
hypocrites know not.
This verse, by quoting what are probably the words of Ibn
Ubayy himself, confirms that the incident did indeed take place
and probably in the form which is described in the texts.
Perhaps the most complete account of the so-called
(1 32)
•affair of the lie' is that of Nabia Abbott in which she
declares that this incident indicates the state of the political
factions inside the umma as they were at this point in time.
It is also from this event that she derives the later political
hostility which 'A'isha showed toward *Ali. This may be
reading rather more into the affair than there actually is*
however the role played by Ibn Ubayy is deserving of some
examination.
The details of this incident are well known. It began
when 'A'isha was accidentally left behind on the return from
(131) Qur'an, 63/8.
(132) Nabia Abbott, The Beloved of Mohammed, (Chicago, 1942) 29
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the raid. She later appeared riding the camel of a young
warrior, Safwan b. Mu'attal al-Sulaml al-Dhakawanl. Immediately
• • ♦
rumours began to circulate and they reached such a proportion
that 'A'isha was forced to leave her home and return to that
of her father, Abu Bakr. This matter, which is largely a
personal attack on Muhammad through members of his own family,
carried on for over a month as he waited for a revelation
(1 33)
which would clarify the issue.
Pour persons are associated with the spreading of the
scandal about 'A'isha: Ibn Ubayy, Mistah b. Uthatha, Hamna d.
• • •
/ «J O A \
Jahsh and Hassan b. Thabit. After eA'isha had been cleared
• •
by a revelation, Muhammad had three of the major culprits
flogged with the prescribed punishment. ^^5) ^
that this punishment was the eighty lashes which became the
statutory penalty for an offence of this type. Despite this,
it is likely that this implication is a later justification of
the law. A point which would seem to be substantiated by al~
Suhayli's discussion of the amount of punishment prescribed.^
In this mention of the punishment there is a problem. It is
generally agreed that Ibn Ubayy was the one who escaped. Al-
Waqidi, in a tradition stemming from 'A'isha herself, indicates
that it was Hamna who was the lucky one. He then immediately
follows this with a report from Abu *Abd Allah thatnone of them
(133) V.'aq, ii, 432; Tab, Taf, xviii, 91.
(134) II, 494, 497; Tab, ii, 614, 616; Waq, ii, 434.
(135) II, 497; Waq, ii, 434.
(136) Al-Suhayli, iv, 24.
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were punished and he states that this is the report which he
(137) ~ ~
considers most trustworthy. Al-Ya'qubi reports that all
(13Q)
four of them were flogged. Yet an incident which is well
recorded in the texts would seem to indicate that Ibn Ubayy
was never punished.
Muhammad went before a meeting of the Ansar and asked for
• •
their permission and help in punishing a man who had been
maligning members of his family. As it is described by Ibn
Ishaq, and confirmed by other sources with only minor differences
of detail, Usayd b. Hudayr immediately offered Muhammad the
• • •
help of the people of al-Aws if the man proved to be from them
or from "al-Khazraj. Sa'd b.'Ubada leapt to his feet and
declared that Aws had only made this offer because they knew
that the man was from Khazraj, i.e., Ibn Ubayy. At this point
a major dispute broke out; a reviving of the pre-Hijra rivalry
between the two tribes. The situation deteriorated at once and
name calling, if not actual violence, broke out. Sa'd b. 'Ubada
was accused of being a "Munafiq arguing on behalf of the
Munafiqun". Such was the reaction to his request that
(1 39)
Muhammad gave up the idea and Ibn Ubayy escaped punishment.
Thus Ibn Ubayy, the major spreader of the scandal, was protected
not by the strength of his personal following but rather by the
existence of yet another rivalry inside the umma; in this case
(137) Waq, ii, 434.
(138) al-Ya'qubi, op.cit., ii, 53.
(139) II, 495-496; Tab, ii, 614—615; Kamil, ii, 197;
Waq, ii, 431-432.
- 91 -
the conflict which was one of the reasons why Muhammad had
been accepted as easily as he was in Medina. It has been stated,
with some justification, that Muhammad had been expected to
play the role of an arbiter in this dispute. If this is the
case then he can only have been moderately successful as the
outbreak under examination would indicate. Using this case as
an example it would seem probable that Ibn Ubayy was protected
throughout his career as the major opponent of Muhammad by the
continuing feud between these two tribes.
The 'affair of the lie' is referred to in the Qur'an in
verses eleven to twenty of Surat al-Kur (XXIV). Of these
verses the first is a direct mention of the incident.
Lo! They who spread the scandal are a gang
among you. Deem it not a bad thing among
you; nay, it is good for you. Unto every
man of them (will be paid) that which he
hath earned of the sin; and as for him among
them who had the greatest share therein,
his will be an awful doom.^^^
Also in this verse is the threat of punishment for the person
most closely involved in the scandal, Ibn Ubayy. The remaining
verses are for the most part an admonition of the believers
for giving any credence to the story. Al-Baydawi, in his
commentary on the verse above, defines the word 'usba as a group
of between ten and forty persons. He gives us a list of five
persons who were included in this group, the person not
(140) Qur'an, 24/11.
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included, in the other lists being Zayd b. Rifa'a, a man
(1 41)
commonly described as a Munafiq. Al-Tabari does not
include Zayd as one of those who spread the scandal and recounts
the traditional version of the event. Although he discounts
them, he includes several traditions which indicate that Hassan
(142)
b. Thabit was the chief spreader of the lie.
Prom this point on the actions of the Munafiqun are of
the most minor nature. It would seem that the events surrounding
the raid on the B. al-Kustaliq were a final chance for Ibn
• •
Ubayy and his followers. They were not supported by the
majority of the population and when they failed to supplant
Muhammad and his Qurashi emigrants they were defeated. They
were never again able to gain the type of support which they
seem to have had before.
The siege of Medina was the final attempt of the Quraysh
of Mecca to defeat the growing power of Muhammad. When it
failed, despite the overwhelming size of the Keccan army, which
included all those tribal allies who could be persuaded to join,
the victory of Muhammad was assured. It was now only a matter
of time.
The activities of the Munafiqun were minor at this time
and had only an irritant value at best. While Muhammad and the
Muslims were digging the trench, after word had been received
of the approach of the Quraysh, the Munafiqun
...held back from them and began to hide their
(141) Bay, iv, 75.
(142) Tab, Taf, xviii, 86-95.
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real object by working slackly and by
stealing away to their families without
the apostle's permission or knowledge.
This incident would seem to be confirmed by the Qur'an in the
following verses:
They only are the true believers who believe
in Allah and His messenger and, when they
are with him on some common errand, go not
away until they have asked leave of him.
Lo! those who ask leave of thee, those are
they who believe in Allah and His messenger.
So, if they ask thy leave for some affair
of theirs, give leave to v/hom thou wilt of
them, and ask for them forgiveness of Allah.
Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.
Make not your calling of the messenger among
you as your calling one of another. Allah
knowest those of you who steal away, hiding
themselves. And let those who conspire to
evade orders beware lest grief and painful
(144)
punishment befall them.
Although Bell says that these verses are commonly
associated with the siege of Medina and that they suit this
(143) II, 450-451; similar reports may be found in Tab, ii, 566-567
and Kamil, ii, 178.
(144) Qur'an, 24/62-63.
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(145) - - -
occasion , neither al-Tabari nor al-Baydawi give any
• *>
support to this. Both discuss the meaning of the verses without
relating them to any specifically historical incident.^^
Despite this, Ibn Ishaq cites the verse as having been sent
on this occasion. ^1 ^
During the course of the siege the Munafiqun were scornful
of the promises, or prophecies, which Muhammad had made to
them. Ibn Ishaq reports that Ku'attib b. Qushayr complained
that whereas Muhammad had promised them that they would capture
e
the great cities of the world they were unable to go outside
the community to attend to their personal needs. ^^8)
prophecy which Muhammad made, and to which these comments
refer, was made during the digging of the trench,^^^' however
the story seems to give Muhammad the power of precognition, a
power which he never claimed for himself. It is much more
probable that the story was written after the fact of the
Muslim conquests in order to provide the basis for the
explanation of the following verse:
And when the hypocrites, and those in whose
hearts is a disease, were saying: Allah and
his messenger promised us naught but delusion.^^
(145) Bell, i, 335-336.
(146) Tab, Taf, xviii, 175-178; Bay, iv, 87.
(147) II, 451; Tab, ii, 567.
(148) II, 454; Tab, ii, 572; Kamil, ii, 179; Waq, ii, 459-460;
al-Ya'qubl, op. cit., ii, 51.
(149) Tab, ii, 570.
(150) Qur'an, 33/12.
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Bell confirms that this verse and those connected to it
are concerned with the siege of Medina^^ ^ and al-Tabari and
♦
al-Baydawi are even more specific in relating this verse to
/ -j p* rp \
the saying of Mu'attib b. Qushayr at the time of the siege.
It is pointed out that nifaq grew among the people during
the siege and that this was a cause of Mu'attib speaking as
openly as he did.^1*^ Such was the despair of the Muslims,
and it is implied that this was due to the activities of the
Munafiqun, that even Muhammad was affected and he began
negotiations to bribe the Arab allies of Quraysh to break off
the siege. When he consulted with the two Sa'ds, as leaders
(15A)
of the Ansar, they convinced him to continue the fight.
This incident does not seem to be confirmed by a Qur'anic
quotation; however, the fact that it shows Muhammad in a less
*
than perfect light argues for its veracity. It has probably
been preserved because it adds glory to the role of the Ansar
who are seen as remaining steadfast, even when Muhammad was
beginning to despair.
The expedition to Tabuk is one of the most confusing of
all the raids for the purpose of this study and is replete with
references to the activities of the Eunafiqun. A cursory
reading would indicate that the umma, as seen on this expedition,
(151) Bell, ii, 409.
(152) Tab, Taf, xxi. 133-134; Bay, iv, 159.
(153) II, 454; Tab, ii, 572; Kamil. ii, 180; Waq, ii, 459.
al-Ya'qubi, ii, 51.
(154) II. 454; Tab. ii. 542-543; Kamil. ii. 180-181: Waq. ii.477-460;
• """
Ibn Kathir, op.cit.. iv, 104-105.
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was rife with dissension. However a more careful reading shows
that these were all trifling incidents and were an expression
of the feelings current in Medina at that time.
When Muhammad ordered the men to prepare for the raid on
Tabuk it would seem that he had great difficulty in getting
them to respond to his request. Ibn al-Athir reports that the
weather was hot, the enemy strong, the country barren, and the
(155)
date crop good. But the usual report is that the Munafiqun
urged the people not to join because the heat was so intense.^^
This is confirmed in the Qur'an in the following verse:
Those who were left behind rejoiced at
sitting still behind the messenger of
Allah, and were averse to striving with
their wealth and their lives in Allah'3
way. And they said: Go not forth in the
heat! Say: The heat of hell is more
intense of heat, if they but understood. ^
Bell admits that this verse is usually related to the raid
on Tabuk but suggests, from a textual study, that it, with
others connected to it, may refer to the expedition to HudaybiyaP
— — (159) __
Although al-Baydawi is rather vaguev , al-Tabari is quite
• •
(155) Kamil. ii, 277.
(156) II, 603; Tab, iii, 101-102; Kamil. ii, 277.
(157) Qur'an. 9/81.
(158) Bell, i, 172.
(159) Bay, iii, 76.
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specific and relates it to the activities of those who were
opposed to joining Muhammad on the raid to Tabuk.^^^
The.problems that Muhammad had in raising his army for
«■
this raid are emphasized in the texts as the stories concerning
them are repeated. A group of eighty odd persons, described
as Arabs or Munafiqun, who may or may not have been from the
B. Ghifar, came to Muhammad and asked permission to be excused
from the raid. Muhammad gave them this permission but he did
not accept their excuses. They became known as the 'excuse-
makers' (al-mu*adhdhirun)^^^^. Specific mention is made of
one man, al-Jadd b. Qays of B. Salima, who requested permission
to remain behind on the grounds that because of his strong
attachment to women, he would be sorely tempted by the
Byzantine women and might not be able to control himself.
C16 2 ^
Muhammad gave him the requisite permission. It was because
of him that the following verse was sent down:
Of them is he who saith: Grant me leave
(to stay at home) and tempt me not. Surely
it is into temptation that they (thus) have
fallen. Lo! Hell is all around the
disbelievers.^
The traditions preserved by al-Tabari support the view that
(160) Tab, Taf. x. 200-201.
(161) II, 603, 610-612; Tab, iii, 103; Waq, iii, 995;
IS, ii, 165; Kamil. ii, 278,282.




al-Jadd was the cause of the descent of this verse. Al-
Baydawl confirms this as one of the possible reasons for the
sending of this verse J however he does give several other
(165)
reasons.
Another man who attempted to cause trouble on this raid
was al-Julas b. Suwayd b. al-Samit who attempted to draw people
away from Muhammad. His step-son reacted against him and
when the following verse came down he repented although later
his nifaq-nature returned. ^ ^
They swear by Allah that they said nothing
(wrong), yet they did say the word of disbelief,
and they did disbelieve after their Surrender
(to Allah). And they purposed that which
they could not attain, and they sought
revenge only that Allah by His messenger
should enrich them of His bounty. If they
repent it will be better for them; and if
they turn away, Allah will afflict them
with a painful doom in the world and the
Hereafter, and they have no protecting
friend nor helper in the earth.
Al-Baydawi agrees that the opening phrase of this verse
refers to the sayings of al-Julas although he says that after
repenting he remained a good Muslim.^The traditions
(164) Tab, Taf. x, 148-149.
(165) Bay, iii, 70.
(166) Usd. i, 346-347; Usd, iv, 292-293.
(167) Qur'an, 9/74.
(168) Bay, iii, '74-75; cf. II, 622.
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preserved by al-TabarT give other possibilities^; however, the
largest proportion of them also relate the verse to al-Julas.
He says that he is unable to determine the truth J however the
weight of the issue would seem to fall on the side of al-
Julas being the cause of the descent of the verse. (^9)
It is interesting to note that al-Baydawi breaks the
verse down into its component parts, as is his usual practice,
and gives varying reasons for the descent of various parts.
The phrase "And they purposed that which they could not
attain" may refer to an attempted assassination of Muhammad on
the return from Tabuk which failed. Al-Tabari is much less
definite and transmits several possible reasons for this phrase
although not the story of the attempt to kill Muhammad. ^
Al-V/ahidi, in contrast, is quite definite in assigning this as
(171)
the explanation of the descent of the verse. Almost nothing
is known about this attempt beyond the fact that a group of
Munafiqun planned to assault the Prophet at night on a
particularly treacherous part of the route and to make his death
look accidental. The plot was foiled when their approach was
(172)
heard. If this incident actually occured it would be
probable that there would be more definite reference to it in
the Qur'an as it would certainly be seen as more serious than
other incidents which are much better known. Despite this, an
(169) Tab, Taf. x, 184 ff.
(170) ibid, x, 186-187.
(171) al-'iVahidi, op,cit. , 170.
(172) Vi'aq, iii, 1042-1045; al-V.'ahidi, op.cit. , 170
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attempt on his life may be the reason why Muhammad's attitude
toward the Munafiqun underwent a change and he was soon ordered
to treat them harshly, as will be seen below.
Yet it was not only those persons who were opposed to
Muhammad who abstained from the raid. Three men about whom
there was no suspicion about the sincerity of their beliefs,
Ka'b b. Malik, Hilal b. Umayya and Kurara b. al-Rabi*, remained
behind and they were excommunicated for fifty days as a
punishment. They were later forgiven and their punishment
(173)
lifted by a revelation referred to in surat al-Tauba .verse 118.
These problems would seem to be in addition to, or perhaps
confused with, the problems imposed by the men more commonly
referred to as the Munafiqun. Al-Waqidi reports that Muhammad
was accompanied on this occasion by a very large number of
Munafiqun, but only from a desire for booty rather than a
(174)
desire to fight in the way of God. It is recorded that
when Muhammad and his party set out, Ibn Ubayy and his followers
made a separate camp, which was not the smaller of the two, and
then remained behind when Muhammad and the Muslim army moved on.^^'
In this passage Ibn Ishaq states that the leaders of the
Munafiqun were Ibn Ubayy, 'Abd Allah b. Nabtal of the B. *Amr
b. *Awf and Rifa'a b. Zayd b. al-Tabut of B. Qaynuqa* and that
it was because of them that the following verse was sent down:
Aforetime they sought to cause sedition
(173) II, 603-604,610; Tab, iii, 103, 111; Kamil. ii. 278, 282.
(174) IrVaq, iii, 995-996.
(175) II, 604; Tab, iii, 103; Waq, iii, 995, IS, ii, 165.
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and raised difficulties for thee until
the Truth came and the decree of Allah
was made manifest, though they were loth.^1^ ^
The commentators agree that this verse refers to the actions
of Ibn Ubayy and his followers at the time of the Tabuk raid
as they tried to restrain the Muslims from going with Muhammad.
•
(177)
Their actions are compared to their earlier ones at Uhud.
Ibn Ishaq confuses the matter by stating that Ibn Ubayy and
al-Jadd b. Qays were given permission to remain at home because
they were influential men among their own people and there
(1 78)
was a fear of their influence among the men of the army.
The verse given above would seem to refer to this possibility
as much as to the idea of the second camp, which sounds
suspiciously like the story of Uhud which has already been
discounted. That Ibn Ubayy and a group of people remained
behind is certain^ however^the other details must be suspect
as later additions attempting to further blacken the name of the
Munafiqun. It is probable that Ibn Ubayy was able to plead
(179)
ill-health as his excuse, especially in the light or the
fact that he died shortly after this expedition. Nevertheless
Muhammad was accompanied by some of the men accepted as
Munafiqun. Al-V/aqidi includes in his account of the expedition
the following list of names: Wadi'a b. Thabit of B. *Amr b. *Awf,
(176) Qur'an, 9/48.




al-Julas b. Suwayd b. al-Sarait, Kakhshi b. Humayyir of Ashja*,
• o
an ally of B. Salima, and Tha'laba b. Hatib. ^
• *
Even, after the army was on the march it would seem as if
Muhammad was plagued by problems. He had left his son-in-law,
'All, in charge of his family during his absence, but the
Kunafiqun taunted 'Ali with the idea that Muhammad must have
been displeased with him or felt that he would have been of no
use because he had left him behind. Finally 'Ali was so moved
that he gathered his weapons and joined Muhammad whereupon he
was reassured of the Prophet's regard for him. It is
interesting to note that Ibn Sa'd, when recounting the same
story, says that it was 'the people* who taunted 'Ali.^^^
This story can, however, be discounted. There is no Qur'anic
verse to support it and the words used by Muhammad sound
suspiciously like a designation as an heir and hence the
incident is probably an early Shi'ite creation.
During the journey Muhammad's camel strayed and men went
out looking for it. Zayd b. Lusayt (or Lusayb) began to mock
6 •
Muhammad as a man who claimed the gift of prophecy and to
receive revelations and yet was unable to find a lost camel.
Finally Muhammad received a revelation which indicated the
whereabouts of the camel and the men sent to find it were able
to go directly to it. This demonstration of his ability as
a prophet may, or may not, have converted Zayd into a good
(180) Weiq, iii, 1003.
(181) II, 604; Tab, iii, 103-104; KamiI. ii, 278.
(182) IS, iii, 24-25.
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A group of Munafiqun who were with Muhammad, including
Wadi'a b. Thabit and Mukhashshin (or Mukhshi) b. Humayyir,
were attempting to discourage the Muslims by stressing the
difficulties involved in fighting with the Byzantines.
Muhammad received a revelation telling him what they were
saying and when they were confronted with their statements they
tried to talk their way out of the trouble which they had
caused for themselves. Because of this the following verses
were sent down:
The hypocrites fear lest a surah should be
revealed concerning them, proclaiming what
is in their hearts. Say: Scoff (your
fill)! Lo! Allah is disclosing what you
fear.
And if you ask them (0 Muhammad) they will
say: Vv'e did but talk and jest. Say: Was
it at Allah and His messenger that ye did
scoff?
Make no excuse. Ye have disbelieved after
your (confession of) belief. If We forgive a
party of you We shall punish because they
have been guilty. ^ ^
(183)
(184)
11,605-606; Waq.iii,1009-1010; Kamil.ii.279: Usd.ii.298-299.
Qur'an, 9/64-66.
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These verses converted Mukhashshin and he died as a martyr at
al-Yamama.^^Al-Baydawi does not seem to confirm the story
of the descent of these verses. Pie attributes them to the raid
on Tabuk and though some of the details are the same, no names
are given. But also it must be said that he does not
deny the story. Al-Tabari preserves a tradition which names
Mukhashshin only in relation to the last verse, although a
tradition referring to the second describes an unnamed man who
is almost certainly the same person. The verses are, however,
quite definitely related to an incident, or incidents, on the
raid to Tabuk. (^7)
On the return to Medina from Tabuk, Muhammad ordered that
no-one was to drink from a certain spring until he himself
arrived, probably so that he could arrange for the distribution
of the small amount of water available. When he arrived the
water had been used so he cursed those responsible and then
performed a miracle by bringing forth water from the rock for
(188} — —
his men to drink. ' Al-Waqidi lists those men who disobeyed
the order as: Mu'attib b. Qushayr, al-Harith b. Yazid al-Ta'i
(an ally of B. *Amr b. 'Awf), Wadi'a b. Thabit and Zayd b. Lusayt.
Earlier on the way to Tabuk, Muhammad ordered that no-one
was to leave the camp except with a companion. This was obeyed
except for two men of B. Sa'ida who went out for separate
(185) 11,606-607; Tab, iii, 108.
(186) Bay, iii, 73.
(187) Tab, Taf, x, 171-174.
(188) II,608; Tab, iii, 109; Waq, iii, 1039; Kamil, ii, 281.
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reasons. One was almost choked to death, but recovered when
Muhammad prayed for him, and the other was picked up by a strong
wind and transported to the mountains of the B. Tayyi'^^9^.
It is obvious that the problem of the Kunafiqun was preying
on the mind of the Prophet for as they were travelling he asked
one of his Companions if the people knew who the Munafiqun were.
The man replied that they did but that their families protected
(190)them.
Ibn Ishaq records several references to men dropping out
while on the march and he records a plaintive cry from
Muhammad: "The most painful thing to me is that Muhajirun
from Quraysh and the Ansar and Ghifar and Aslam should stay
behind."^191^
These incidents, taken as a group, give a picture of massive
unrest and dissension in the ranks of the Muslims. Yet the
picture could not have been as bleak as would seem from this.
The raid on Tabuk, even if not especially successful, was the
most massive of the efforts of the Muslims and in consideration
of the large numbers that took part the incidents which are re¬
corded seem to be miniscule. The view taken by Watt that the
problems were due to the fact that many of the Muslims, especially
among the Ansar, felt that now that they had won their victory
they could begin a life of ease and comfort, would seem to be
(189) II, 605; Kamil, ii, 279; Ibn Sallam, Kitab al-Amwal.
Ed. Muhammad Hamid al-Faqa, (Cairo, 1353 AH), 483n.
• •





It is at this time that Muhammad seems to have put an
end to the Munafiqun in his community. In a verse that is
repeated a second time Muhammad is ordered to deal with them:
0 Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers
and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them.
Their ultimate abode is hell, a hapless
(193)
journey's-end.
These verses, which are not dated by the commentators, could
quite easily come from the period of the raid on Tabuk, for in
the only remaining incident which involved the Munafiqun they
were dealt with harshly.
The story of the so-called 'mosque of opposition' can be
told very easily. As Muhammad was preparing for his departure
for Tabuk a group of men came to him and informed him that they
had built a mosque and they wanted him to come and pray with
them in it. He said that he would do so upon his return from
the raid. However, as he was returning he received a warning
about the true purpose of the mosque and therefore he sent two
men to burn it down. This was done and the following verses
(194)
came down about the incident:
And as for those who chose a place of
worship out of opposition and disbelief,
mid in order to cause dissent among the
(192) Huh/Med. 190-191.
(193) Qur'an, 9/73; Qur'an. 66/9.
(194) II, 609; Tab, iii, 110; Kamil. ii, 281-282;
Y/aq, iii, 1045-1049.
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believers, and as an outpost for those
who warred against Allah and His messenger
aforetime, they will surely swear: We
purposed naught save good. Allah beareth
witness that they verily are liars.
Never stand (to pray) there. A place of
worship founded upon duty (to Allah) from
the first day is more worthy that thou
shouldst stand (to pray) therein, wherein
are men who love to purify themselves.
Allah loveth the purifiers.
Is he who founded his buildings upon duty
(to Allah) and His good pleasure better;
or he who founded his building on the brink
of a crumbling, over-hanging precipice so
that it toppled with him into the fire of
hell? Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk.
The building which they built will never
cease to be a misgiving in their hearts
unless their hearts be torn to pieces.
Allah is Knower, Wise.^^*^




in reference to the incident but in this, as in other
accounts, there are many confusing details. Ibn Ishaq states
that Muhammad sent two men, Malik b. al-Dukhshum and Ma'a b.
• *
— - (197)
'Adiy (or his brother 'Asim) . Another source states that
three men, 'Amir b. Qays, 'Asim b. 'Adiy and Suwayd b. 'Ayyash
(al-Ansari), were sent.^ly^ Al-Baydawi includes four men in
• •
the party1 Malik b. al-Dukhsham, Ma'n b. 'Adiy, 'Amir b, al-
- (199)
Sakan and al-Wahshi. He also lays stress on the role of
e
Abu 'Amir al-Rahib whom he indicates was the person "who warred
against Allah and His messenger aforetime". He states that it
was in hope that Abu 'Amir would join them in worship whenever
he passed by that the B. Ghanm b. 'Awf built the mosque. This
point is also made by al-Waqidi, although he makes no mention
of the clan involved. Ibn Ishaq makes no mention of Abu 'Amir
in this affair. The strongest support for the role of Abu 'Amir
in the affair is to be found in the traditions preserved in
al-Tabari's commentary on the first of these verses. Not only
is he implicated in the building of the mosque, he actually
wrote to these people ordering them to build it while he was
(200)
seeking help from Caesar in his conflict with Muhammad,
a statement which is supported by a later writer. Al-Samhudi,
in a tradition supposedly originating from al-'Abbas., transmits
(196) Tab, Taf, xi, 22-35; Bay, iii, 80-2
(197) II, 609.
(198) Usd, ii, 492.
(199) Bay, iii, 80.
(200) Tab, Taf. xi, 23-24.
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(201 )
the same story. Despite these references the account
would seem to be a later addition to the story in order to
further blacken the name of Abu 'Amir and to increase the
seriousness of the affair in justification of the descent of
the verse.
There remains the problem of who was actually involved in
the building of the mosque. As seen above al-BaydawI attributes
the mosque to the B. Ghanm b. 'Awf, a statement which is also
-(202) - (203)
found in al-Baladhuri and the commentary of al-Tabari.
In none of these cases is a number given, nor any names. Ibn
Ishaq says that the number of men was twelve and gives their
names. Al-Waqidi gives the number as fifteen but only lists
twelve names, the majority of whom are in the list of Ibn
Ishaq.
This confusion, the resolution of which is impossible, is
found among the western commentators on this incident. Watt
connects the plot against Muhammad's life, mentioned above in
connection with the Tabuk raid, and the building of this mosque.
It was to act as a centre for future plots and therefore had
to be eliminated. This was done secretly, by night, and the
affair was closed. Blachere emphasizes the role of Abu
'Amir, whom he describes as a Christian missionary, and
(201) al-Samhudi, op.cit., ii, 28.
(202) Bal, 2j 16*
(203) Tab, Taf, xi, 25.
(204) William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought.
(Edinburgh, 1968), 25.
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postulates that under the influence of this man a schism had
broken out in Medina and this is what Muhammad was eliminating. ^®^)
Another interpretation is that of Kargoliouth. He suggests that
having realized from the example of Muhammad that a religious
movement must, in the circumstances of the time, precede any
political movement a group was beginning a revolution by
establishing a rival religion. it would seem likely that
the interpretation of Watt is the most probable. The mosque
would act as a centre for those persons who were disenchanted
with the rule of Muhammad and it is possible that the
destruction of the mosque was sparked off by the assassination
attempt.
The Kunafiqun and the Jews
The relationship between the ffiunafiqun and the Jews of
Medina as it is reported in the historical texts is one that
needs to be mentioned. The major incidents have been dealt
with above and yet the two groups seem to be mingled in a way
that confuses rather than clarifies.
One of the largest passages in the Qur'an which deals with
these groups is the first hundred verses from the second sura.
Yet here passages which refer to the Jews and the Munafiqun are
mixed to the extent that it is impossible to determine to which
(205) Regis Blachere, Le Probleme de Mahomet. (Paris, 1952),
122.
(206) D.S. Margoliouth, Mohammed and the Rise of Islam.
(New York and London, 1905), 425.
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group certain verses refer. This would seem to have been
confusing to some of the early commentators.
And when they fall in with those who believe,
they say: We believe; but when they go apart
to their devils they declare: Lo! v/e are with
(207)
you; verily v/e did but mock.
This verse v/ould seem to refer to the Munafiqun who are
often accused of acting in this manner and, indeed, several
traditions say that this verse describes the Munafiqun. There
is, however, a tradition stemming from Ibn 'Abbas in which he
specifically states that these men were from among the
( ?0Pi ^
Jews.
. This confusion continues with this verse in the
explanation of the v/ord 'devils' which is taken as a reference
to their leaders. Among descriptions of these leaders as
'unbelievers' or 'polytheists' is the statement of Ibn Ishaq
that these'devils' were "the Jews v/ho order them to deny the
(209)
truth and contradict v/hat the apostle brought." The
confusion between the Jews and the Munafiqun is seen in the
(210)
verses relating to the change of the Qibla; "The foolish
of the people" may have been the Jews or the Munafiqun but which
(211)
of the two groups was originally meant can no longer be discerned;
(207) Qur'an. 2/14.
(208) Tab, Taf, i, 129-130.
(209) II, 248; this is also recorded in Tab, Taf. i. 130
from the same source but with different words.
(210) Qur'an, 2/142-144.
(211) Tab, Taf. ii, 1-2.
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There are lists of both Munafiqun and the Jewish opponents
of Muhammad in the Sira of Ibn Ishaq? however they are mixed
• «
and confused one with the other. Ibn Ishaq includes a
definition of the Munafiqun in his section on the Jewish
adversaries of Muhammad and he ends the definition by saying:
But in secret they were hypocrites whose
inclination was toward the Jews because
they considered the apostle a liar and
(21 2)
strove against Islam.
There is also the record of a man who "was suspected of
(213)
hypocrisy and love of the Jews." Hassan b. Thabit recited
some verses reviling hira, not for his nifaq but only for the
(214)
preference which he showed to the Jews over Muhammad.
Even Ibn Ubayy is linked with 'love of the Jews'. As he lay
dying Muhammad came to him and said: "I prohibited you from
* •
love of the Jews" to which Ibn Ubayy responded: "Sa'd b.
(21 5}
Zurara hated them and he did not profit by it." In a
similar scene Muhammad's first words to Ibn Ubayy were: "Love
(2l6)
of the Jews destroyed you." In these references is a very
clear indication of the confusion between these two parties
which seemed to prevail.




(215) v.'aq, iii , 1057.
(216) Tab, Taf, x, 206.
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(217")
the Jews, before his final break with them, is that of 7/att.
Throughout this it is obvious that Muhammad was attempting to
be reconciled with the Jews and yet very early on the break
occured and the physical attack on the major Jewish clans
began.
It is possible that the community in Medina was divided
into pro-Jewish and pro-Arab factions and that Muhammad began
by trying to ally himself with the former. In addition to the
religious impetus behind this attempt he was claiming that his
new faith was a continuation and a rejuvenation of the original
faith of Abraham and Moses there was also a political impetus.
Many of the clans of Aws were kept from conversion by their
relationship with the Jews and this represented the most
powerful of the two factions as a result of the victory for Aws
at Bu'ath. The Khazraj, for the most part of pro-Arab leaning,
were the losers at Bu'ath and also more readily accepted the
leadership of Muhammad. This may be supported by the story of
al-Bara' b. Ma'rur of B. Salima (Khazraj) who refused to pray
toward Jerusalem, preferring the Ka'ba in Mecca, until ordered
( 218}
to do so by Muhammad.'' This man may be representative of
the faction which refused to ally themselves with the Jews,
thus forming a pro-Arab group. The change of the Gibla from
Jerusalem to the Ka'ba and the institution of the fast of
Ramadan rather than that of 'Ashura mark the switch from the
pro-Jewish to the pro-Arab faction. These changes occured
(217) !.'uh/?'ed, 198 ff.
(218) II, 202; Tab, ii, 360.
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before and after the battle of Badr and it is at the time of the
expulsion of the B. Qaynuqa' that the first solid references to
Ibn Ubayy and the Munafiqun appear. They probably represent
the pro-Jewish group among the Ansar and they disappear as
their Jewish allies were expelled or destroyed. This would
seem to be confirmed by references which state that Muhammad
was praying toward Jerusalem, the Qibla of the Jews, in an
attempt to draw them into his community. When he realized
that he was failing he changed the direction of prayer to
Mecca.(219)
To describe this as a faction implies that there was a
solid body of support which remained loyal throughout this
period. This is almost certainly untrue. The supporters of
the Munafiqun were fickle and men drifted in and out of their
ranks as they willed. This made it difficult for later writers
to clearly identify the group and led to the confusion in the
sources.
Ibn Ubayy
In any study which touches on the Munafiqun the person of
Ibn Ubayy looms large. Through the centuries he has been
vilified as the chief, or leader of the Munafiqun and only
rarely does any vestige of his actual personality appear. As
the 'enemy of God and His Prophet' Ibn Ubayy was neglected by
the historians except in cases where it could not be avoided
and his name is not included among the lists of the Companions
(219) Tab, Taf, ii, 4; al-Samhudi, op.cit,, i, 259.
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except under his son's name, where a large part of each listing
deals with the father rather than the son.
He is commonly known as Ibn Ubayy in order to lessen the
confusion stemming from the fact that both he and his son had
the name of 'Abd Allah. His full name was 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy
b. Malik (this name is usually replaced by Salul, a woman of
Khuza'a, who was the mother of Ubayy) b. al-Harith b. 'Ubayd
*
b. Malik b. Salim b. Ghanm b. 'Awf b. al-Khazraj_,and his
(220)
Icun.ya was Abu al-Hubab. He was the cousin of another
•
— — — (221)
famous opponent of Muhammad, Abu 'Amir al-Rahib. It is
also reported that Jamila, the daughter of Ibn Ubayy, was
— - (222)
married to Hanzala, the son of Abu 'Amir. Another report
• •
(223)
says that Jamila was the sister of Ibn Ubayy.
In the days before the coming of Muhammad he was one of
the nobles of his people and he was known as a 'forbearing'
(224)
leader. Ibn Ubayy is recorded as one of those who was able
to ride a corpulent mare and his two great toes would draw
/ppc> _
lines on the ground. Anas b. Malik commented on the height
(220) Usd, iii, 296.
(221) IS, iii, 540.
(222) Waq, i, 273.
(223) al-Suhayli, op.cit., iii, 164.
(224) Muhammad Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim, et al., Ay.vam al-'Arab fi-
>1-Islam. (Cairo, 1968), 74. 'Forbearing' is not a good
translation of halim, however no better one suggests itself.
— — t»
(225) Ibn Habib, Kitab al-Muhabbir, Ed., Use Lichtenstadter,
• •
(Beirut, 1361 AH), 233.
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of Ibn Ubayy after seeing his feet extending beyond the end of
.. . . (226)the bed.
Little is known about the activities of Ibn Ubayy during
the Jahillya period but that which v/e do know indicates the
position which he held. During the battle known as the first
(227)
day of Pijar he led the contingent from the B. al-Khazraj.
He was not present at the day of Muzahim because he was ill and
— (228)
his people were led by Sa'd b. 'Ubada. Nor did he and
those people who would follow him go out to the battle of
— (229)Bu'ath. The result of this latter action, in addition to
the damaging of his home fortress, was the high position v/hich
he held when Muhammad came to Medina. During this battle the
«
leaders of the two tribal groups were killed and Ibn Ubayy was
able to make use of the resulting lack of leadership to
establish himself as the paramount chieftain of the community.
It was this position which has led to the story of the
crown v/hich was being prepared for Ibn Ubayy v/hen Muhammad
arrived in Medina. This story is very commonly repeated in the
texts to explain Ibn Ubayy's hostility toward Muhammad.
Hamidullah indicates that he feels that the idea of crowning
Ibn Ubayy was purely instigated by the Khazraj and was resented
by the Aws and probably the Jews. Hence the idea v/as given up
(226) Waq, iii, 1058.
(227) Kamil, i, 676.
(228) Abu al-Paraj, op.cit. , xviii, 6460.
(229) Kamil. i, 681.
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(230)
when the arrival of Muhammad offered an alternative plan.
This theory, unfortunately, fails to tahe into account the fact
that the.sources agree that both Aws and Khazraj followed Ibn
Ubayy. This would seem to be confirmed by the fact that the
majority of the followers of Ibn Ubayy during his time as
leader of the 'opposition' were from the Aws.
The arrival of Muhammad placed Ibn Ubayy in a difficult
position for he now had a rival to his role as leader of the
Madinese. He was an ambitious man and he did not give up his
claim on the leadership although he found it difficult to
compete with Muhammad who had the advantage of being the Prophet
of God and hence was able to call upon a higher authority
for his judgements.
A tradition from Musa b. 4Uqba reports that Muhammad was
rebuffed by Ibn Ubayy and it is implied that this occured
(231)
shortly after Muhammad's arrival in Medina, A similar
tradition on the same incident is even more definite. When
Muhammad arrived in Medina he wished to stay with Ibn Ubayy but
(232)
he v/as told to go to those persons who had invited him.
Both traditions include a reference to the story of the crown
and hence are suspect; however3they may indicate the attitude
of Ibn Ubayy to Muhammad upon his arrival.
There is no definite information as to when Ibn Ubayy
(230) Muhammad Hamidullah, Le Prophete de 1'Islam. (Paris,
1959), i, 120-121.
(231) Ibn Kathir, op.cit., iii, 199.
(232) al-Samhudi, op.cit. , i, 183-184.
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became a Muslim, however al-BukharT records that he did so
after the Muslim victory at Badr which was seen as a judgement
(233)
of God upon the destiny of the Muslims. This would seem
to be a likely date for his conversion and it is unlikely that
he was prompted to this out of personal conviction. Throughout
his life Ibn Ubayy was aware of the popular feeling in his
community and almost certainly it was this instinct which led
him to make his conversion. As one of the most respected
leaders of the Madinese he would be in a position, as a convert,
to agitate from inside the community to regain his position as
leader.
As has been seen above, Ibn Ubayy continually harrassed
Muhammad and the Muslims in his attempts to regain a place of
some power and influence. Although these incidents all seem to
have taken place after his conversion, it is recorded that as
early as the first year after the Hijra he attempted to keep
Abu Qays b. al-Aslat from converting to Islam.^^4) Would
seem indicative of anti-Islamic activities even before his own
conversion and, indeed, this would seem.probable. These
activities weighed very heavily on his son *Abd Allah, who is
always mentioned as one of the most excellent of the Muslims and
who took part with the Prophet on all his major raids. Ibn
Hisham records that when Muhammad led his men out to meet the
•
(233) Bukh, viii, 66-67.
(234) Tab, ii, 406; Bal, i, 274; Kamil, ii, 112; al-Samhudi,
op.cit,, i, 194.
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Quraysh at the appointed place of Badr in the fourth year of
the Hijra, he placed 'Abd Allah in charge of Medina.
*Abd Allah was so affected by the subversive activities of his
father that, on at least one occasion, he offered to kill his
father himself so that there would be no further bloodshed from
an ensuing blood feud.
Ibn Ubayy fell ill in the last nights of Shawwal of 9 AH
and died in Dhu al-Qa'da after having been ill for twenty
f n
nights. His absence from the Tabuk raid, which occured at
this time, may indicate that his final illness actually began
earlier than this. His death has preserved yet another
incident of the re-writing of history so that it conforms with
the beliefs of a later age. The basic story is as follows:
when Ibn Ubayy died, Muhammad prayed for him despite the protests
of 'Umar who listed the occasions on which he had opposed the
will of the Prophet. Shortly after he had prayed for Ibn Ubayy
the following verse was sent down:
And never (0 Muhammad) pray for one of them
who dieth, nor stand by his grave. Lo! they
disbelieved in Allah and His messenger, and
(237)
they died while they were evil-doers.
As a result of this admonition from God, Muhammad never
— — ( ? ^
again prayed for one of the Munafiqun. The fact that
(235) II, 763,"$692 from Ibn Hisham.
(236) Tab, iii, 120; Waq, iii, 1057.
(237) Qur'an, 9/84.
(238) II, 623; Bukh, viii, 121.
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Muhammad prayed on behalf of Ibn Ubayy is confirmed by the
quotation from the Qur'an but there are several variants on
the basic story.
It is recorded that *Abd Allah, the son of Ibn Ubayy,
asked Muhammad to pray on behalf of his father, to give one of
his own shirts to be used as a shroud and to ask God for
forgiveness for Ibn Ubayy. Muhammad did these things despite
f 239)
the protests of 'Umar and then was reprimanded. In another
version it was Ibn Ubayy himself who made these requests of
Muhammad as he lay dying. ^^0) a]_B0 suggested that Ibn
(241)
Ubayy asked in his will for this to be done. Yet another
tradition reports that the angel Gabriel warned Muhammad not to
(242)
do these things. Al-Waqidi records that Muhammad consoled
*Abd Allah upon the death of his father.
These variants may be seen as later additions to the story
in an attempt to justify the action of the Prophet toward an
opponent. Sufficient excuses are made for Muhammad's giving
of one of his shirts to be used as a shroud that it may be
accepted as true. The reason that is given for this action is
that after the battle of Badr^al-fAbbas, who had been captured,
was in need of a shirt and the only one that could be found to
(239) Ka.mil, ii,292; Tab,Taf^x,204-206; al-Wahidi, op.cit. .173-174.
(240) Tab, Taf, x, 206; Waq, iii, 1057.
(241) Tab, Taf. x, 205.
(242) Tab, Taf. x, 205; Bal, A^ i, 274.
(243) Waq, iii, 1059; IS, iii, 541-542.
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fit him belonged to Ibn Ubayy and this was given to al-'Abbas.^2^4)
(245)
This reason has been accepted by at least one modern scholar.
Ibn Ubayy is not included in any of the lists of the participants
in the battle and, as stated above, it seems likely that he
did not convert to Islam until after the battle. Nevertheless
it is possible that he was present at the battle. In a similar
manner it is possible that he was present at the negotiations
referred to as the second pledge at al-'Aqaba although he
certainly didn't play a leading part,^^^
The picture of Ibn Ubayy that has been preserved for us
in the texts has been prejudiced by the later collectors and
writers.of history with their preconceived ideas about him.
Pew indications of his true nature have been kept for us. On
the expedition to al-Hudaybiya the Quraysh offered to him the
opportunity of circumambulating the Ka'ba if he wished. His
son urged him that it would be a disgrace to do so if the
Prophet himself did not and Ibn Ubayy rejected the offer.
Abu Qatada quotes Ibn Ubayy commenting on the strangeness of
the rain which fell on that same expedition.in the first
tradition an honourable action (according to the tenets of
Islam) is due to the influence of his son. Yet in the light
(244) Usd, iii, 167.
(245) Hamidullah, op.cit,, i, 158-159.
(246) II, 205-206; IS, i, 222-223; Tab, ii, 364-367;
Kamil, ii, 100.
(247) Waq, ii, 605.
(248) ibid, ii, 590.
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of the vast amount of re-writing which took place in relation
to the history of Ibn Ubayy is it not possible that Ibn Ubayy
refused on his own accord and the name of his son was added
later in order to deny Ibn Ubayy the honour! The second
tradition is of interest because he is quoted as would be any
other Companion and this leads to the speculation that he was
not considered as extraordinary by his contemporaries and that
other traditions transmitted on his authority have been
forgotten.
Throughout his life Ibn Ubayy acted in a manner which was
faithful to those ideals in which he believed. He attempted
to support his Jewish allies when they were being attacked by
ffiuha-mmad. His opposition to the Muslims seems not to have
stemmed from his personal ambition but rather from his fear that
his people, the citizens of Medina, were being supplanted in
their own homes by the emigrants of Quraysh, a fear that was
completely justified by later events. It is unfortunate that
there are only Muslim sources to describe his career as leader
of the opposition. A more neutral source would certainly
confirm that Ibn Ubayy was, within the moral values of the
Jahiliya, an honourable man. The fact that Muhammad prayed
for his forgiveness indicates that he, at least, agreed with
this.
The failure of the Munafiqun
The failure of Ibn Ubayy and his followers was seen, by
themselves, as the failure to repel the invaders from Mecca,
yet it was more than their inability to expel physically the
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Muslims. As Watt has pointed out, they were unable "to move
(2491
v/ith the times" . Although they recognized the problems,
they tried to solve them along lines which were traditional
and failed to take into account the fact that their society
itself was changing. There was a basic disregard for the
ideological needs of the people of the community as can be
seen by the fact that, although they were opposed to the growing
power of the Muslims, they rapidly became Muslims themselves.
Their continuing opposition was then seen as evidence of the
insincerity of their conversion. It may be that they would
have been more successful had they remained firmly aligned
with the old religion since it was rooted in the traditional
values of the community which they felt they were trying to
protect.
The Munafiqun also suffered from a basic lack of unity
and continuity in their support from the people. There was
a small hard-core of men who were in opposition but they were
joined by the other people of the community only on those
occasions when they felt personally involved in the incident
or when they were disgruntled with the policies of Muhammad or
with his apparent lack of success. An example would be the
refusal of a third of the army to go out to Uhud with
Muhammad. This very large group was certainly made up of men
who believed with Ibn Ubayy, and even Muhammad originally, that
the Madinese could better face their enemies from the fortresses
in a type of fighting which they understood better than the
(249) Muh/Med, 187.
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formal battle which took place at Uhud. Yet there seems to
have been no indication that this large number of men were
in firm support of the Kunafiqun. This ability of the people
to change from one side to the other would work to the
advantage of Muhammad who was continually proving himself
during the early period. As his power and influence grew, more
people would hesitate to oppose him and would remain loyal
rather than join the Munafiqun. A source of support upon
which Ibn Ubayy could draw was the major Jewish tribes and
they were eliminated as obstacles to the growing strength of
the Muslims. Gradually the hard-core would be isolated and
then they too must have finally been won over as evidence of
their activities becomes rarer after the siege of al-Khandaq
when it finally became apparent that Muhammad would be the
victor in his struggle with the Quraysh. By the time of the
expedition against Tabuk they were only of irritant value.
Those persons referred to as Munafiqun at this time were
Muslim malcontents rather than a 'Muslim opposition'.
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CHAPTER III
MUHAT'."MAD' S COKTROL OP THE RIVALRIES
In order to establish the methods whereby Muhammad controlled
the two rivalries described above it is necessary to determine
the underlying causes for them. This is not as difficult as
it might seem, despite the problems engendered by the subtle
editing of the texts undertaken by the later historians. Three
basic causes may be discerned at work among the people. It
may be suggested that the unrest was anti-Islamic, anti-
Muhammad, or anti-Quraysh in its nature.
The most serious charge is that the rivalries were
prompted by a basic dislike, or distrust, of Islam itself by
the citizens of Medina. This is implicit in the charges
levelled against the Munafiqun in the texts and the commentaries.
Yet, as demonstrated above, throughout the period of their
activities they were considered as Muslims. They did not
advocate a return to the traditional religion of the area.
Their activities were political in their nature rather than
religious.
The actions of Ibn Ubayy can be seen as anti-Muhammad in
their direction. This was brought to the fore with the story
of the crown which was being prepared for him before Muhammad's
arrival in Medina. This story suggests that Ibn Ubayy was
opposed to Muhammad, and not the political reforms which he was
instituting, because he had been denied a kingdom which he
felt was his by right. It would seem probable that there was
an element of personal animosity in the position taken by Ibn
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Ubayy which was exposed during the 'affair of the lie', a
personal attack on the Prophet through his family. Nevertheless
most of the actions of Ibn Ubayy were on a more honourable
plane than this incident.
It is the third cause that must be seen as the under¬
lying grievance of the Madinese. They were opposed to the
position of the Muhajirun from Quraysh who were seen as imposing
themselves upon the people who were helping them. In some
ways Muhammad was seen not only as the leader of the Muslims
I
but as the leader of the Qurashi Muhajirun. As the Quraysh
became increasingly dominant the reaction grew and was
focused through the two rivalries. It was by playing upon this
grievance that Ibn Ubayy was able to threaten the stability
of the community. Eventually they were controlled and the
dominance of the Quraysh was assured.
The position of Muhammad in the community of Medina was
that of leader of his people combined with the religious
aspects of his unique role as the Prophet of God. The Islamic
community is to be considered as a pre-Islamic tribe in its
political activity and therefore the role of Muhammad was, in
many ways, that of a tribal chieftain. As the Prophet,
Muhammad received the revelations from God which governed the
religious life of the community. As some of these revelations
were of a legal nature he was, to some extent, a law-giver.
As the chieftain he was the supreme arbiter of the laws,
whether they were the new ones sent from God or the traditional
ones of the community. He also acted as the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, was the head of the state and hence
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responsible for all external relations, and he also supervised
the finances of the state both incoming and outgoing. Although
these powers would seem to make him omnipotent he was
restricted by the traditions of the age in all his dealings
which were beyond his role as a Prophet. Even here he was
bounded by what his followers would accept. It was within the
bounds of his position that Muhammad sought to control the
two rivalries which have been described above.
In his daily activities as ruler of the community
Muhammad, acting in the manner of a traditional leader, would
not have used his position as a Prophet to enforce his policies
or decisions. He would have had to consult the other leaders
of the community and, indeed, the mosque seems to have acted
as the site for regular meetings of the ma,jlis of Medina. Yet
most references to such a body, advising the Prophet and
speaking with the voice of the people, have been removed from
the historical texts. A desire to represent the Prophet as a
ruler advised only by God and always instinctively aware of the
feelings of his people is certainly the cause of this. There
would also be a desire to forget that Muhammad ever made use
of the traditional forms of government from the Jahiliya period,
a way of life with which he claimed he was leading the break.
Yet it is not only a process of rational thought which proves
that he must have regularly sought and received advice from his
fellows in the community.
Al-V/aqidi reports from Abu Hurayra that he never saw
anyone who consulted his companions more often than Muhammad.
He then, however, qualifies this statement by saying that he only
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(1)
ever consulted them on matters having to do with warfare.
Ibn Sa*d reports that the Prophet said that if he did not have
a council of the Muslims to advise him he would invest 'Abd
(?)
Allah b. Kas'ud with power. The implication from a state¬
ment of this kind is that there was a council (shura) advising
the Prophet. There are other traditions of this type, all
stating that the Prophet used to take counsel from his
Companions. Indeed, it would seem that such an action is
enjoined upon the Muslims in the Qur'an as one of the marks
of a true believer.
And those who answer the call of their
Lord and establish worship, and whose
affairs are a matter of counsel (shura),
and those who spend of what we have
(3)
bestowed on them.
Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, writing for the edification and education
of the rulers of his time, was in no doubt that Muhammad sought
advice from his Companions. The only question that was to be
answered was why he did this. After outlining the various
theories that had been put forth, he states that he believes
that Muhammad was ordered to take advice so as to act as an
example for those people who were to follow him in the position
(4)
of power. Interestingly enough, a modern Arab scholar,
(1) Waq, ii, 580.
(2) IS, iii, 154.
(3) Qur'an. 42/38.
(4) Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, al-Pakhri, English translation by
• •
C.E.J. Whitting, (London, 1947), 22.
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points out that Muhammad always made a point of consulting
his Companions as a lesson to thern of his humanity and the
(5)
need for consultation on all affairs.
Despite the agreement on the fact that Muhammad held
regular meetings with his Companions and the other tribal
leaders of Medina there are few references in the historical
texts to give support to this fact. The most famous incident
of this type is the meeting which occured before the battle
of Uhud. This meeting is important because it indicates that
Muhammad was acting exactly as a tribal leader of the time.
The major leaders of the various tribal groupings of Medina
were present in the mosque and they agreed that they would
remain in the city. Included in this group was Ibn Ubayy
although it is carefully pointed out that he had never before
been invited to such a gathering.When Muhammad was
convinced that he should face the Quraysh in a set battle
Ibn Ubayy exercised his right as an equal and did not lead his
party out. Muhammad was attempting to follow public opinion
in this matter but having changed his mind he also was
exercising the right of a leader to lead all those who would
follow him. That Ibn Ubayy was able to run counter to the
decision of the Prophet indicates that at this time Muhammad
had no more power or influence than any other leader of a
tribe or tribal grouping. This power came much later in his
(5) Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Hayat Muhammad. 9th edition,
• • • •
(Cairo, 1965), 261.
(6) Tab, ii, 503.
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life although he probably never gave up the traditions which
he had been following.
On occasion, when Muhammad contemplated an action which
one or other of the parties might not approve, he would speak
to the relevant persons to get their approval or their advice.
During the siege of al-Khandaq Muhammad entered into negotiations
with 'Uyayna b. Hisn in an attempt to bribe him to lift the
• •
siege. When they were asked the two Sa'ds both refused to
allow him to give away the dates which were the property of the
Ansar. This may be seen as Muhammad making use of the
consultative role of the ma.ilis when thinking of an action
which might bring about an unwanted reaction from a group in
the community.
The meeting with the Ansar after their complaints about
the distribution of the booty at al-Ji'rana may be seen as
a type of ma.i lis in which Muhammad was forced to explain his
actions to the satisfaction of his followers.
These incidents would seem to indicate that Muhammad used
the institution of the ma.i lis in an attempt to gain an idea of
the consensus of opinion in the community or to control public
opinion. This was perfectly in line v/ith the traditions of
government in the area and would help him to forestall outbreaks
of the two rivalries. That it was not" always successful may
be seen from the incident before Uhud but it was perfectly
in line with common usage.
Another traditional form of the guaranteeing of obedience
was the swearing of an oath. In a society in which tribal
and personal honour played a major role, an oath would act as
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an effective bond on a man's conduct once he had agreed to the
subject. The oath, or oaths, at 'Aqaba may be seen as the
method that Muhammad used to guarantee the security of his
followers and himself upon arrival at Medina. Throughout his
life at Medina Muhammad resorted to the oath when he felt in
doubt as to the loyalty of his people in the face of a difficult
situation. As has been described above, the pledge which
Muhammad received before the battle of Badr was of this nature.
He had to be certain that the Ansar would stand by him in the
face of the Qurashi army. Their attendance in the raiding party
demonstrates that they were not opposed to fighting per se but
when the odds had changed in favour of the enemy their
steadfastness had to be guaranteed. A similar pledge was made
on the expedition to al-Hudaybiya, the pledge of al-Ridwan,
• e
when Muhammad had the men swear either to fight unto death, or
not to run away in the face of a threat from Quraysh. That
these oaths were of an individual nature is shown at this time
when al-Jadd b. Qays refused. He was mocked for not coming
(7)
forth but he was not forced to do so.
The covenant which Muhammad wrote in Medina, the so-called
'Constitution of Medina' is another method which Muhammad used
to regularize his position in the community and hence increase
his control over the factions. This document, the authenticity
of which is not challenged, is actually made up of portions
which were agreed upon at different dates and were probably
(7) II, 503-504.
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altered as the situation changed in the community. The
major stress in the Constitution is upon the unity of the umma.
Repeatedly throughout the document there is an emphasis upon
unity and the need for solidarity. The first clause "They are
(9)
a single community distinct from (other) people" is perhaps
the most straightforward expression of the desire for unity and
the remaining clauses referring to it do so by laying down
guide-lines or legislation to create or enforce it.
The God-fearing believers are against whoever
of them acts wrongfully or seeks an act that
is unjust or treacherous or hostile or corrupt
among the believers; their hands are all
against him, even if he is the son of one
of them.^""^
No idolater gives 'neighbourly protection'
for goods or person to Quraysh, nor intervenes
in his (a Qurashi' s) favour against a
believer.
Between them (the people of this document)








These and other portions of the document are concerned
with the maintenance of the unity once it had been declared
in the community. As Ibn Ishaq pointed out this document
included the Muhajirun, the Ansar, and the Jews. The preamble
of the document itself speaks of "those who followed them
(1 "*)
(the Muslims) and joined them and laboured with them".
Within these limits fall almost the entire community of Medina
including all those persons involved in the two rivalries
under discussion. Hence this 'Constitution' although not
probably designed as such, would act as a controlling factor
on the rivalries between the factions.
Soon after he came to Medina Muhammad established a pact
of brotherhood between individuals of the Ansar and the
«
(14)
Muhajirun. This was an attempt to prove that a religion
would be a better binding force than the traditional reliance
on blood relationship for the formation of a community. He
was attempting to create a unity which would deny all the
(15)
ancient customs and rules of blood relationship. Yet
Muhammad was making use of a traditional form of relationship
common to the era.
The idea of the brotherhood was that of the alliance
(hilf) between tribes reduced to the individual level. A
unity based on this concept would have made inconceivable the
rivalry between the Ansar and the Muha.jirun yet it failed
(13) II, 231-232.
(14) ibid, 234-235.
(15) Izutsu, op.cit., 61.
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as the continued existence of the rivalry proves. The fact
that this was an alliance between individuals is specifically
made in one tradition which explains how this was possible
in the face of the famous tradition of Euhammad: "There is
no alliance in Islam. It is probable that the word hilf
was dropped from the accounts of the pact of brotherhood
because of this tradition.
The pact was finally abrogated by a revelation:
The Prophet is closer to the believers than
their selves, and his wives are (as) their
mothers. And the owners of kinship are
closer to one another in the ordinance of
Allah than (other) believers and the
fugitives (who fled from Mecca), except
that ye should do kindness to your friends.
(17)
This is written in the Book (of nature). '
It is traditionally accepted that this verse reinstated the
older rules as regards inheritance, hence ending a major facet
of the 'brotherhood', that a brother would inherit a man's
goods rather than his blood relations. This view is supported
by the relevant traditions in the t afsir of al-Tabarl. Al-
Bukhari records a tradition from Ibn 'Abbas that another verse
(19)
was the one which ended this arrangement.
(16) al-Samhudl, op.cit., i. 191.
(17) Qur'an, 33/6.
(18) Tab, Taf, xxi, 121-125.
(19) Bukh, iii, 125.
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And unto each We appointed heirs of that
which parents and hear kindred leave; and
as for those with whom your right hands
have made a covenant, give them their due.
Lo! Allah is ever Witness over all things.
Although there are a few references to the pact of
brotherhood in the relevant portions of the tafsir of al-
Tabari, the largest number of the traditions relate this ve.rse
to a form of alliance which was practised in the pre-Islamic
(21 )
period and which was abrogated by this verse. Bell dates
the first of the two verses as sometime before the marriage
(22)
of Muhammad to Zaynab d. Jahsh in the year five. The
• •
second verse Bell says is early Madinese; however it was
revised later and the portion of interest for this study was
added at that time, probably in the fourth or fifth years of
(23)
the Hijra. It seems probable that the first of the two
verses is the one which abrogated the pact as the second is
much more involved with the problem of inheritance itself.
The Prophet had another method of pleading for unity
among his community and this was his recourse to revelations
from God. As Watt has pointed out:
The words 'obey God and Kis messenger' and
the various equivalents occur about forty
(20) Qur'an, 4/33.
(21) Tab, Taf. v, 50-57.
(22) Bell, ii, 411.
(23) ibid, i, 66, 73.
- 136 -
times in the Qur'an, and are to be dated
mostly before and after the battle of
Uhud/24^
These verses are either exhortations in general
Say: Obey Allah and the messenger. But
if they turn away, lo! Allah loveth not
(25)
the disbelievers (in His guidance),
or in particular
0 ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey
the messenger and those of you who are
in authority; and if ye have a dispute
concerning any matter, refer it to
Allah and the messenger if ye are (in
truth) believers in Allah and the Last
Day. That is better and more seemly
• , (26)m the end.
By the revelation of phrases such as these Muhammad was
appealing to the growing belief in his prophetic mission; a
belief which developed in conjunction with his ability to
control politically hi3 followers. This appeal to an
authority higher than any earthly power and, to the believers,
more certain of final retribution, was an innovative technique
which could not have been applied by any of the pre-Islamic





who combined leadership in the religious and political
fields and who was able to wield these two joint power bases
in an effective way. In these passages Muhammad used his
position as a religious leader to increase his political
control.
Although he always emphasized that his appeal was to all
the Arabs and despite the fact that he made war against his
own people, Muhammad seems to have taken care of his fellow
tribesmen after they had converted and agreed to follow him.
Al-Ya'qubi records two instances in which B. Hashim were
given the first portion of the booty before it was distributed
(27)
among the other people. There are other traditions that
Muhammad kept his revenues from the settlements at Khaybar
and Padak for his own purposes which included the support of
members of his immediate family and members of the B. Hashim
— (28 }
and the B. al-Muttalib b. 'Abd Manaf. On other occasions
• •
he seems to have distinguished between these two clans
although he still gave them preference over other clans
(29)
from Quraysh.
During the conquest of Mecca Muhammad gave security of
life and property to the members of the Quraysh despite their
opposition to him. The Ansar seem to have protested saying
that he was doing this because he was still held by his
love for his family and clan. When Muhammad heard of this
(27) al-Ya'qubi, op.cit., ii, 52-53, 56.
(28) Bal, P^ 49, 53.
(29) Ibn Sallam, op.cit.. 331; Bukh, v, 174.
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he spoke to the Ansar and having spoken of his closeness
e
to the Ansar convinced them that he was acting for the
best.^"^ There are other traditions in which Muhammad seems
to be giving the Quraysh a position of importance which would
go against the equality which he had been preaching as a
basic tenet of Islam. By far the majority of these references
would seem to be later creations attempting to give a
prophetic sanction to the rule of the Umayyad or 'Abbasid
dynasties. Such statements as
... Those who were the best in the pre-
Islamic times are the best in the Islamic
(31)
period when they have been instructed.
would seem too biased to be accepted.
It is, however, obvious that Muhammad made use of some
of the men of Quraysh very shortly after they had converted
to Islam. This can be seen in the case of *Amr b. al-'As who
seems to have converted sometime after al-Hudaybiya and
(32)
before the conquest of Mecca but within a year and a
half led the Muslim army on the raid to Dhat al-Salasil.
Reinforcements under Abu 'Ubayda b. al-Jarrah and including
such luminaries as Abu Bakr and 'Umar were sent out and *Amr
was able to dispute the leadership with Abu 'Ubayda and to
(30) Bal, Pj_ 65-66.
(31) Bukh, iv, 217.
(32) cf. Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri
IiHistorical Texts. (Chicago, 1957), 85.
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(33)
succeed in retaining command. Ibn Ishaq indicates that
Muhammad gave 'Amr the command because he was related to the
(34)
people of the area, however this does seem to have been
a very important position to be held by a new convert.
Other members of the ruling families of Quraysh also seem
to have received commands soon after their conversion despite
the fact that many of them had long been leaders of the
opposition to Muhammad. 'ikrima b. Abi Jahl was one of those
who was proscribed at the time of the conquest of Mecca;
however, after fleeing to the Yemen he returned, converted,
and by the year of the pilgrimage had been placed in charge
(35)
of the sadaqa of the B. Hawazin. Shortly after his
conversion Muhammad threatened to send Abu Sufyan b. Harb
*
•
to destroy an idol when its people requested that it be
(1 _
allowed to remain. Abu Sufyan was actually sent to act
(37)
as the representative of the Prophet in Jurash or Najran.
Yazid b. Abi Sufyan was also given a governorship although
(38") —
his conversion was very late. 'Attab b. Usayd was placed
in charge of Mecca shortly after its conquest despite the
fact that he had not converted until the conquest of the city.
(33) II, 668; Tab, iii, 31; Kamil. ii. 230-232; IS, ii, 132.
(34) II, 668.
(35) Usd. iv, 70-72.
(36) Tab, iii, 99.
(37) Bal, 91; Usd. iii, 10.
(38) Bal, P^ 58.
(39) Ibn Hajar, al-Isaba fi Tamviz al-Sahaba. (Cairo,
• • • •
1328 AH), ii, 451; Usd. iii, 556.
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This usage of the members of the ruling families may
have been for any of several reasons. Their positions in the
pre-Islamic period would have accustomed them to command and
this is a facility worth utilizing. It is also possible that
this was a form of nepotism with Muhammad able to distribute
favours to those persons of the Quraysh whose co-operation
he wished to cultivate. It may also be that by giving these
people these positions he was avoiding antagonism among the
rivalries of Medina. These new-comers would be outside the
feuds and he would be able to trust their loyalty in the face
of an outbreak of the older enmities. Their usage in these
roles sealed the fate of the Ansar who were now completely
superceded by the Quraysh.
It is by the use of these various concepts that Muhammad
attempted to control the rivalries in the Muslim community
of Medina. Some of them were traditional forms of government
in Arabia at that time, such as the majlis. or the taking of
oaths and pledges of support. Others were innovative such as
the 'Constitution' or the use of the Qur'anic revelations to
support his control. Despite the fact that some of these
failed in their objective of reinforcing the unity of mutually
antagonistic forces, notably the pact of brotherhood, the
continuation of the umma after the death of Muhammad says as
much for the statesmanship of the Prophet as it does for the
ideal of unity so strongly expressed in the tenets of Islam.
The concept of the unity of the Islamic community and
the ideal of the brotherhood of all Muslims owes a great deal
to the rivalries which were found in Medina during the lifetime
-141-
of Muhammad. Although the idea of this unity was present in
the doctrines of Islam as promulgated at Mecca, it was the
emphasis placed on it in Medina, where the issue was much
more in doubt, that installed it as one of the major ideals
of Islam. The great emphasis upon unity was due to the lack
of unity and at this time began the fear of fitna, which later
became an important concept in political theory. The Qur'anic
references and the traditions of the sunna gave the basic
arguments on which the later theorists based their arguments
for the unity of the umma.
The unity of Islam was to dissolve the pre-Islamic bonds
which had proved so disruptive of society, especially in Medina,
and were already beginning to break apart under the pressure of
the changes in society. Eventually Muhammad was successful
in destroying these bonds, especially in the case of the Aws
and the Khazraj who finally came to be known as the Ansar,
although this did not finally occur until after Muhammad's death
and during the period of the conquests. Despite this these
tribal affiliations were kept alive by the rivalries between
the groups especially during the early years of Muhammad's
life in Medina. The execution of the B. Qurayza indicates the
success that Muhammad was having in his policies. They had
been the traditional allies of the Aws and yet it was the
leader of the Aws, Sa'd b. Mu'adh, who declared the judgement
upon them.
By the time of the election of Abu Bakr to the caliphate
of Islam the two rivalries under study had disappeared. The
Munafiqun were no more; the word was only used as a term of
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abuse. The Ansar were still considered as a separate groups
however, they had been completely superceded by the Qurashi
Muhajirun and the recent converts from the same tribe. The
pre-Islamic feud between the Aws and the Khazraj was almost
gone although it did play a part in the election of Abu Bakr.
When the Khazraj tried to effect a fait accompli by electing
Sa'd b. 'Ubada the Aws reacted and gave their support to the
party of Abu Bakr, 'Umar and Abu 'Ubada. This guaranteed the
election of Abu Bakr as the Qurashi Muhajirun were divided
with some supporting the claim of 'Ali to the position.
By finally overcoming the Ansar, the Quraysh, led by
the early Muhajirun and supported by the later converts,
guaranteed for themselves and their descendents the continuation
of the role of their tribe in the position of power. The
antagonism of the Ansar,although no longer politically
effective, led them to play the role of an opposition party
to the ruling dynasty from the city of Medina.
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CHAPTER IV
HISTORIC GRAPHICAL IMPLICATIONS DRAWN PROI-l
THE STUDY OP THE TWO RIVALRIES
The Bias in the Material: the Islamic Bias
The type of historical writing commonly referred to as
slra literature is the basis for the study of the early history
of Islam, meaning by this the biography of Muhammad and the
early development of the religion. Modern scholarship has
taken various attitudes toward this literature. Perhaps the
most cynical has been that evidenced by H. Lammens. He
believed that it was of very little use for the study of the
history of the period. It was nothing more than traditions
transmitted or invented for exegetical purposes or to serve the
legal and judicial purposes of a later age. The historical
material found in the sira was a later development v/hich was
created in the face of the well-established position of the
Christians who were met after the beginnings of the Islamic
conquests in Syria and Iraq.^^ This attitude reduces the
study of early Islamic history to an examination of the Qur'an
and the beliefs of later Muslims about the period in question.
It would be necessary to approach all the historical material
from the early period with a sceptical eye searching for those
few items which were not introduced at a later date and to
discard the largest portion of the available material.
(1) cf. C.H. Becker, 'Prinzipielles zu Lammen's Sirastudien',
Per Islam, iv (1913), 263-269.
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Fortunately this attitude has been discounted by almost all
the more recent scholars. Foremost in this regard is the
concept put forward by W.M. Watt in which his basic argument is
that there is, in all the material, a basic 'core of fact'. It
can be extracted if one takes care to observe certain basic
rules governing the material at the disposal of the historian.
... the traditional accounts are in general to
be accepted, are to be received with care and
as far as possible corrected where 'tendential
shaping' is suspected, and are only to be
rejected outright where there is internal
(2)
contradiction.
With this method of approach it is possible to accept and to
utilize a much larger proportion of the material.
Yet have the incidents involved in the two rivalries
suffered from any 'tendential shaping' of which we are av/are?
Rosenthal states:
In certain cases, as in the treatment of
early Muslim history, every bit of
(3)
historical writing is strictly partisan.
This statement would indicate that Rosenthal trusts none of the
records of the early period of Islamic history, hence the life
of Muhammad, to be without a bias of some kind. The only
(2) William Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca. (Oxford,
1968), xiv.
(3) Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography.
2nd edition, (Leiden, 1968), 63.
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prejudice that can be accepted to have had as wide a scope as
this would be a religious one. A Muslim scholar would shape
the material upon which he was working in a manner which would
be dictated by his faith and hence the report would be biased
toward the glorification of Islam.
Rosenthal has also shown the importance of religion to
historical study at this time and the importance of history to
the religious man.
As a concrete indication for the primary
importance of the religious factor, it may
be noted that the early historians, without
exception, were representatives of 'knowledge*
(4)
in its widest sense.
In the light of this it would seem that one must be
sceptical of the Arab historians by virtue of their religion.
Indeed they were guilty of trying to present the early history
of Islam in the best possible light and this provokes a
question. Why, therefore, was so much of the material about
the rivalries preserved? Surely it cannot be argued that
information describing the internal disunity of the umir.a was
preserved out of a sense of pride in the community. The
opposite is much more likely; that material of this sort would
be forgotten when it conflicted with the ideal picture of early
Islam or, at least, with the image that the historian was
trying to convey.
This type of distortion is as present as is the type which
was done for less noble, political or legal reasons. Ibn
(4) ibid. 130.
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Hisham removed a name from the text as he received it from Ibn
Ishaq because it mentioned a Companion of the Prophet in rather
(5)discreditable circumstances. He also admitted to changing
words in a poem because they cast aspersions on the Prophet
(61
himself. It has been suggested that the reason why al-
Waqidl and al-Baladhurl do not mention the 'Constitution of
Medina* was because they failed to see how Muhammad could have
(7)considered pagans and Jews as the equals of the believers.
Watt has suggested that one version of tlie story of the
arbitration of Sa'd b. Mu'adh over the fate of the B. Qurayza
may have been prompted by a desire "to magnify the position of
(81
the Prophet and his successors." This type of 'shaping',
the result of a sincere belief in Islam, has definitely coloured
the material which we have received.
It can be questioned as to whether or not this was a
conscious process by the historians. Rosenthal would seem to
indicate that it was.
The historian did not keep his personal
convictions out of his work. His main
weapon was his freedom to omit material
from his sources or to add material from
(5) II, 229n; al-Suhayli, op.cit., ii, 247.
(6) II, 749, 538 from Ibn Hisham.
(7) A.J. Wensinck, Mohammad en de Joden te Medina. (Leiden,
1928), 85, 93.
(8) William Montgomery Watt, 'The Condemnation of the Jews of
Banu Qurayza', Muslim World, xliv (1952). 164.
• "" " ~ ' '
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other sources which must not always have
been historical in the proper sense, and
(9)
this was expected of him.
Yet it must not be forgotten that in the earliest stages this
record was kept and transmitted in an oral form.
Although the writing of notes and the actual creation of
books certainly began at an earlier period than the Arabs,
out of a reverence for the traditions of the past, cared to
admit, there was a stage at which this information was passed
from person to person as an oral tradition. During this period
a great deal of the 'shaping' would have taken place.
Cultural values colour testimonies in three
main ways. Through the medium of the first
informant, they determine the choice of what
events to record and the significance
attached to them. Through the medium of
certain cultural concepts, chiefly those
concerning time and historical development,
they distort chronology and the historical
perspective. Lastly they make testimonies
conform to cultural ideals, thus turning
them into examples to be followed. All
,, . (10)these are unconscious processes.
(9) Rosenthal, op.cit., 64.
(10) Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical
Methodology, English translation by H.M. Wright,
(London, 1965), 108.
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This statement, although derived from work done among
people far removed from Arabia, has bearing on the question.
A transmitter, even if only one or two generations removed
from the events whose history he was transmitting, would
unconsciously seek to make the history live up to the cultural
ideals which had been instilled into him. In the case of an
early Arab transmitter he would omit or change any information
that would cast a disreputable aura over the period of the
Prophet thereby giving the material an Islamic bias. This
should include the incidents of the rivalries described above.
Despite this, the accounts of the rivalries give very
little evidence of any 'shaping' whether conscious or not. In
most of the traditions there seems to be no legal reason which
would require their preservation nor any political prejudice.
By virtue of the fact that the narrative describes incidents
detrimental to the traditional view of the' umina. the working of
the Islamic bias is precluded. It would seem that the largest
portion of the information received about the rivalries is
acceptable as 'core' historical material. This is especially
true in those cases where the description of the incident is
supported by a Qur'anic reference.
Why was the material preserved?
In the light of the bias discussed above, the question
arises as to the reason why the material which concerns the
rivalries was transmitted. It would be material of this sort
which would be removed from the texts. Watt has pointed out
that in those cases where the material has not been altered by
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a group, it has probably been preserved because of a sense of
(11)
pride in the early history of the Islamic community in Medina.
Yet the Islamic bias would ensure that this pride eliminated
the material related to the rivalries.
As regards the rivalry between the Ansar and the Muhajirun,
there is a political reason for the preservation of a small
portion of the material and hence 'shaping' of the material.
The most outstanding example of this is the incident which
took place at al-Ji*rana. The protest of the Ansar, which was
probably led by one clan and attended by certain of the
Muhajirun, although these facts have been played down and the
incident expanded to include all of the Ansar, was sufficiently
serious to force Muhammad to become aware of it. By his
glowing praise of them and his statements of loyalty, Muhammad
was able to convince the Ansar to give up their protest and to
accept his presence among them in lieu of the monetary rewards
of the shares in the booty. In its broadest outlines the
story would seem to be true and is to be accepted as such. The
fact that it can be seen to have been altered by later historians
who wished to make it appear as a general protest of all the
Ansar would argue that it is a fairly accurate recounting of
the incident. It has been preserved in order to glorify, or at
least to justify, the position claimed by the Ansar in later
years.
This is evidenced by the usage to which the incident is
put in at least one later work. In the book known as al-Istibsar
(11) Materials, 29.
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fi Nasab al-Sahaba min al-Ansart attributed to Ibn Qudama, the
• • •
incident is recorded, in detail, in the opening section which
is devoted to traditions which praise the position of the Ansar
(12)
during the early years of the Islamic state in Medina.
Despite the Islamic bias, it was the religious factor which
was the most important cause for the preservation of the
material. The largest portion of the information was recorded
for two reasons allied with religion. Most of the material is
actually a tafsir of the relevant verses from the Qur'an. In
addition a further motive for the preservation of the record of
the incidents was an attempt to magnify the position of
Muhammad and his Companions.
This theological development of the
conception of Muhammad (the appearance
of the miracle stories, etc.) may be
attributed to general religious
(13)
interests, ...
Especially in the stories surrounding the Munafiqun where
there is no Qur'anic quotation, on occasion even when there is
one, Muhammad is forced to produce a miracle or to act in a
manner which would have been unacceptable in that society, in
order to stave off the intrigues of the opposition. These
stories were necessary, not only to produce in answer to the
challenge presented by the newly conquered Christians, but also
(12) Ibn Qudama, al-Istibsar fi Nasab al-Sahaba min al-Ansar.
• • • •
Ed. *Ali Yusuf Nuwayhid, (Beirut, 1971), 25-26.
(13) Materials, 24.
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to give the Muslims themselves a more acceptable picture of
their Prophet. As time passed the need grew for a more than
human founder of the religion as the average man could not
picture Muhammad as an ordinary man such as himself.
In connection with this magnification or glorification of
Muhammad it is interesting to note the work done by Lord Raglan
in his study on the hero in myth. Although his basic thesis is
largely open to dispute, especially in the Arab context, he
develops a pattern of twenty-two points which he then applies
to various mythological, biblical and traditional heroes.
Although one need not claim that Muhammad was a myth created
for ritual dramatic purposes, it is noteworthy how closely he
(14)
fits into this pattern. Raglan himself interprets his
points in a very loose manner and the characters with whom he
was dealing were not as bounded by historical fact as was the
person of Muhammad. Even allowing for the limits of historical
fact and the bounds established by the Arab society of the
time, his father was neither a king nor a god, Muhammad fits
into a sizable proportion of the points. This would seem to
indicate that unconsciously those persons who developed and
spread the later stories about the more fabulous incidents in
his life were placing him into the role of a mythological hero,
a personage quite commonly seen in the traditional literature
of the Middle East. The stimulus toward the development of
these stories was the Islamic bias of the historians.
(14) Lord Raglan (Somerset), The Hero: A Study in Tradition
Myth and Drama. (London, 1936), 179-180.
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As has been seen in the preceding chapters, a great deal
of the information in the texts about the outbreaks of hostility
between the rival groups is related to verses in the Qur'an and
forms a part of the commentary on these verses. These traditions
/
act as tafsir of the "occasions of revelation" variety. Yet
in many of these reports it goes far beyond the simple
description of the reason for the sending of a particular verse
to Muhammad. In these cases, the problems on the raid against
the B. al-Mustaliq would seem to be an example, the information
• •
is so detailed that it would be more accurately described as
anecdotal in its nature. As Watt pointed out, in material of
this type it is necessary to examine the anecdotes for any
evidence of 'tendential shaping' by a later group or party who
were using the report of the incident for their private
purposes. Very often however, there is no reason to suspect
that there has been any 'shaping' of the narrative as there
seems to be no later use to which the tradition could have been
put.
That much of the information was preserved in order to
explain a verse is easily seen in the preceding chapters where
the close relationship between the descent of the Qur'anic
verses and the recording of the incidents is indicated. On one
occasion an historian tells us that this is exactly what he is
doing. Al-Baladhuri, in describing the incident of the 'mosque
of dissension', transmits a tradition from 'Urwa b. al-Zubayr
and states quite plainly that this tradition was transmitted in
(1 5)
explanation of a verse.
(15) Bal, JF, 16; Bal, P, 2 (Arabic text).
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This is very much in accord with Rosenthal's view on the
development of Arab historiography. He shows quite clearly
that history, from a very early date, was considered as a
distinct part of the scholarly apparatus of the Muslim religious
teachers and students. To those primarily concerned with the
religious side of scholarship it was decidedly in a second
class to those subjects more closely connected to the faith
itself/16^
In the works of Ibn Ishaq and al-Waqidi the very treatment
of the material indicates a great concern with the exegesis of
the Qur'an in its historical context. After each of the major
battles and incidents of the life of the Prophet there are
large sections, which may even be called chapters, devoted to
the verses which were sent down in connection with the event.
These are the most obviously tafsir-like portions of the works
and yet material of this type can be found throughout the
texts.
There are also portions of almost purely anecdotal
material which are concerned with the rivalries in the texts.
The most obvious example of this is the chapter which al-V/aqidi
devotes to the story of Ibn Ubayy on the occasion of the
incident at al-Muraysi'. This is itself followed by a chapter
on the 'affair of the lie', an event to which it was connected
quite closely, both in chronological terms and also, perhaps,
in terms of the underlying rivalries in the umma at that time.
It must be concluded that the historical information relating
(16) Rosenthal, op.cit. t 40.
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to the rivalries was preserved for only two reasons: as
commentary on the 'occasions of revelation' or as a type of
apologetics enhancing the position of the Prophet and attributing
to him the type of role that later persons believed that he
must have played, despite his own objections to such an image
as voiced in the Qur'an. The material which illuminates a
specific verse may be accepted although care must be taken that
it does not contradict known facts. Much of the anecdotal
material must be rejected, especially that portion which is
obviously fabulous. Other parts of it, for example some of the
material surrounding the person of Ibn Ubayy, may be retained
and it adds to our knowledge of the times.
The usage of the material
It is necessary for a better understanding of the material
which records these two rivalries to examine the major accounts
of them as they appear. The basis for this examination will be
the breakdown of the sira material as outlined by Watt. He
has very carefully analysed the content of the material trans¬
mitted by Ibn Ishaq and has divided it into several categories:
expansion of the Qur'an (tafsir), Arab genealogies and pre-
Islamic events, maghazi-material. poetry, documentary material,
(17)
and anecdotal material. Into these categories falls all
the information in the sira literature, including that used in
the study of the two rivalries under question in this work.
For the purposes of this study there are only two of the
(17) Materials, 23-31.
- 155 -
six types of material which are of importance. The first of
these is the material which expanded upon the information
received in the Qur'an. The second is the anecdotal material
which is described as all the information which does not fall
into the other categories. By far the largest proportion of
the information which is relevant to this study falls into
these categories. Some small amount of it may be included
under the heading of the maghazi-material. the hard information
that was accepted by the Muslim scholars as indisputable fact:
the date, objectives, leader, numbers, etc., of the varying
raids which were led by or commissioned by the Prophet.
For the purposes of this analysis three of the raids have
been selected as being representative: Uhud, the incident on
the raid at al-Muraysi', and the raid on Tabuk. V.'ithin each
of these raids there occured incidents which are important for
this study and also are chronologically varied: early (Uhud),
middle (Muraysi'), and late (Tabuk). The material which is to
be examined largely concerns the rivalry between the Munafiqun
and the Muslims although the incident at al-Muraysi' is also
closely involved with the problems between the Ansar and the
Muhajirun. The following analysis will examine the use of this
material in the Sira of Ibn Ishaq, the Kitab al-I.laghazi of al-
Waqidi, and the Tarikh of al-Tabari. These,books are the
major sources for the information on these rivalries.
The description of the actions of Ibn Ubayy and his
followers before the battle of Uhud is the same in all three of
the texts. The basic story of his agreement with Muhammad about
the defence of the city and his later withdrawal is common to
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them all and with the lack of Qur'anic references must be
considered as anecdotal material. This category would seem to
be the one that fits the vast majority of the material
surrounding this raid.
There are several small incidents where persons are
referred to as Munafiqun: Mirba' b. Qaysi who threw dust at
the Prophet, Hatib b. Umayya b. Rafi', whose nifaq-nature
• •
appeared when he was told of the death of his son, and al-
Harith b. Suwayd b. al-Samit, who killed a man as an act of
• •
revenge. Even Quzman, whose suicide is used to illustrate the
Islamic prohibition of the act, is in one account called a
(18^
Munafiq. These are much more easily categorized as anecdotal
and in relation to them the major story of the withdrawal of
Ibn Ubayy would seem to be of the tafsir category except for
the lack of verses. It has been included as an attempt to
explain the defeat and hence is acting in conjunction with the
Qur'anic verses on the battle. The largest number of the verses
which were sent down about this battle are an attempt to explain
the defeat in terms which would have been acceptable to the
Muslims, and hence are supporting the position of Muhammad.
It is worth noting that the reports of the battle in Ibn
- - (19)
Ishaq and in al-Waqidi conform to the pattern outlined by Watt
with a separate section devoted to the verses which were sent
down. This is not the case with al-Tabari who includes the
A
Qur'anic verses into the body of his account.
(18) Waq, i, 223-234.
(19) Materials. 32.
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The version of the battle given by al-Waqidi is, as stated
above, basically the same as that in the other sources. He
does, however, add to the fundamental story details which are
not found in the other versions. These details, such as Ibn
Ubayy and his followers rejoicing at the news of the Muslim
defeatand Ibn Ubayy upbraiding his son for having gone
(21)
against his advice and following Muhammad are anecdotal in
their nature.
The incident on the raid against the B. al-Mustaliq at
• •
al-Muraysi' involved an outbreak of violence between the Ansar
and the Muhajirun which was used by Ibn Ubayy as a goad in an
attempt to provoke a civil war. This incident is, as described
in the preceding chapter, confirmed by a Qur'anic verse which
(22)
quotes the words used by Ibn Ubayy at this time.
By virtue of the fact that there is a relevant verse it
may be accepted that the incident is recorded as tafsir material
of the type described as 'occasion of revelation'. This would
seem to be a logical assumption and yet Ibn Ishaq in describing
the incident does not quote the verse but only says:
The sura came down in which God mentioned
the disaffected with Ibn Ubayy and those
like-minded with him. When it came down
the apostle took hold of Zayd b. Arqam's
ear, saying, 'This is he who devoted his
(20) Waq, i, 317.





Although this is certainly a reference to the Qur'an^it is vague
and does not specify the verse to which mention is being made.
Al-Tabari in an account drawn almost word for word from Ibn
Ishaq adds to it a specific reference to the first verse of the
surat al-Munafiqun which is the first of the ones traditionally
(24)
ascribed to this incident. He has taken the account of
Ibn Ishaq and added the verse in order to make it more
definitely an explanation of the reason for the descent of this
verse.
Al-WaqidI accords an honour to this incident by making it
the subject of a separate section. He describes the raid
against the B. al-Mustaliq mentioning only that more Munafiqun
• •
than ever before accompanied Muhammad hoping to partake in the
(25)
booty. He then begins another section entitled "Mention of
(26 )
what there was in the affair of Ibn Ubayy". In this
separate chapter is the most detailed account of the incident
and the part played by Ibn Ubayy. The section claims to deal
with Ibn Ubayy and is largely concerned with the incident on
this raid, although the story of the lost camel on the Tabuk
raid is also recounted here and would seem to be misplaced. In
narrating this incident al-Waqidi adds details and dialogue to
the story making it much more dramatic and interesting to the
(23) II, 491-492.
(24) Tab, ii, 607.
(25) V/aq, i, 405.
(26) ibid, ii, 415.
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reader, although not necessarily more accurate historically.
He uses the Qur'anic references by inserting them as they
appear in the story and they are identified by the usual method
of quoting the opening words of the verse. In toto the section
must seem to be tafsir-material; however, the largest pro¬
portion of it is more closely akin to the anecdotal material,
if only because of the style in which it is written.
The raid on Tabuk combines material that is definitely of
the tafsir type, and confirmed by verses in the Qur'an, with
information that is purely anecdotal in nature and in some cases
certainly fabulous. Such stories as the request of al-Jadd b.
(27)
Qays to be permitted to remain at home , and the Munafiqun
( 28 ^
trying to keep the people from going have been confirmed
by the Qur'an and hence are to be accepted, although such
details as the names of the persons who were involved may be
later additions. Other stories such as the mocking of 'All by
the Munafiqun until he left Medina to join Muhammad, the two
men who disobeyed the orders of the Prophet about leaving the
camp, the story of the lost camel whose location was finally
revealed to Muhammad, and the Munafiqun who drank water despite
the prohibition, are all later additions to the story serving
the purposes of later persons. The story of *Ali is certainly
an invention by the partisans of the Shi'a as an occasion to
have the Prophet praise 'Ali in a manner acceptable to, and




stories mentioned above are of the type invented in order to
foster upon the life of Muhammad those miraculous events which
were later deemed necessary for the life of a prophet. That
these stories were felt necessary after the later contact with
the more developed religions of the area is possible, and
they were designed to meet the needs of the average person who
would expect such supra-human abilities in a man who received
revelations from God.
There is also some information which may be taken as
being characteristic of the maghazi-material variety. This
includes information such as the reports that certain of the
Munafiqun came to Muhammad offering excuses to him for not
having accompanied the party and these excuses were accepted
although the men were not forgiven. Of this same genre of
material is the fact that there were more than eighty men who
remained behind from this raid. This information would seem to
serve no otner purpose than to clarify the record in conjunction
with the tafsir material and is to be accepted as probably true.
All three of the texts under consideration use the relevant
Qur'anic verses as they are required in telling the story of
the raid. Al-Tabari goes no further than that; however, Ibn
Ishaq and al-Waqidl continue and present sections devoted to
the verses which were sent down on the occasion of this raid.
Al-VYaqidi is by far the most complete as he works his way verse
by verse through all the revelations which were connected to
this raid. This is a tafsir of the simplest variety. It is
divided into two sections both entitled "Mention of what portions
of the Qur'an were sent down on the Tabuk raid" and they are
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set on either side of the description of the raid to Dumat al-
Jandal. These sections are tafsir of the 'occasions of revelation'
variety only if they are read in conjunction with the preceding
account of the raid itself. For the most part the author is
content to explain the difficult meanings and the obscure
references rather than go into the reasons behind the verses,
possibly feeling that this had already been adequately dealt
with.
Ibn Ishaq also makes use of the verses throughout his
account of the raid inserting them at the appropriate place.
Then, although he does not have a section specifically devoted
to the verses deriving from the Tabuk raid, they are included
in the sections which give the details surrounding the three
good Muslims who stayed back from the raid, and the section
which describes the pilgrimage led by Abu Bakr. The latter of
the two sections contains the largest proportion of the verses
devoted to the actions of the Munafiqun on the Tabuk raid and
despite the fact that it is entitled "Abu Bakr Leads the
Pilgrimage, 9AH" it may be considered, at least in part, as
the section which acts as the tafsir on the verses dealing with
the Munafiqun at the time of Tabuk. It seems to act as a
catch-all as it also includes the references to the death of
Ibn Ubayy and the Munafiqun among the Arabs in the territory
surrounding Medina.
Al-Tabari uses the Qur'anic verses as he did in the other
raids under discussion; they are an integral part of the story
and appear as such in the appropriate place. This would seem
to be the standard prodedure of al-Tabari. Even during his
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account of the battle of Badr, he uses the verses from the
Qur'an as a portion of the account rather than as an end in
themselves.
The material that relates to the rivalries, as it appears
in the texts under consideration, is largely of a tafsir
nature. Yet much of it is in the style associated with the
anecdotal materials. It is in the form of stories, many of
which do not have a Qur'anic verse specifically associated with
them although they further illuminate the verse in question.
The anecdotal material is largely of the variety designed to
enhance the position of the Prophet; much of it describes
miracles, and for the most part this type is to be rejected.
It is into this category that the story of the withdrawal of
Ibn Ubayy and his followers from Uhud should fall.
Thex^e is a definite progression in the handling of the
Qur'anic material and the explanatory stories to be seen in
these three texts. Ibn Ishaq (d.151AH/768AD) is the oldest
source that has been transmitted to us in almost its complete
form. His use of the tafsir material is rather sketchy,
varying from the chapters devoted to the relevant verses, as
after the account of the battle of Uhud, to the account of the
incident at al-Muraysi', in which he only i-efers to the fact
that a sura was sent down. This usage of the material seems to
indicate a confidence that the reader would know the relevant
verses and would understand that the incident being described
was the occasion for the sending down of a specific verse.
Al-Waqidi (d. 207AH/823AD) is more conscientious in his
elaboration of the verses. He makes reference to the verses
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in the text of the account but also follows this up with a
section devoted to an explanation designed to clarify the
references in the verses. This detailed form of tafsirt
although of a simplistic nature, is evident in the sections
following the raid on Tabuk. The large section after the
description of the raid on the B. Mustaliq, which is devoted to
• •
the activities of Ibn Ubayy, may be seen as an expanded form
of the tafsir clarifying the cause for the descent of the
verses. Al-WaqidI seems to be writing for a more general
audience than was Ibn Ishaq. Much more is explained and far
less is assumed as to the knowledge of the reader. The increase
in detail between the two works indicates the ongoing development
of these stories. As the period of time between the present
and the lifetime of the Prophet grew so did the legendary
material which surrounded him and his Companions. Nevertheless
the accounts of the rivalries were preserved in order to explain
the Qur'an and not because of a desire to retain historical
fact for its own sake.
It is this final stage which seems to appear in the work
of al-Tabari. His material for the two rivalries is largely
drawn from Ibn Ishaq, yet on at least one occasion, as mentioned
above, he inserted into an account a reference to a verse which
clarifies the statement of Ibn Ishaq. He makes no concession
to the study of the material for the sake of the tafsir. As
his own life and work prove, by his time the study of tafsir
had become an academic discipline that could be divorced from
the study of history, although it had formed the basis for this
work. He deals wxth the same information as did the previous
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scholars but he quotes the Qur'anic verses as a part of the
story, not as the reason for it.
The Omission of Incidents
Since we have a relatively large body of information on
these two rivalries, why does so little remain which concerns
the other rivalries or areas of political disunity in the urnma?
That there were other problems is in no doubt.
The most obviously dangerous of these other areas of
dispute was the long-standing feud between the Aws and the
Khazraj. Their 'days* in the pre-Islamic period have all been
well documented, although much of this information is linked
to poetry about the credibility of which there is much doubt.
Under the unitarian ideal being propagated by Muhammad as a
basic tenet of Islam this feuding was to have come to an end
in the brotherhood of all the Muslims. Yet, despite a scarcity
of information, it is obvious that it did not.
The first teacher whom Muhammad sent to Medina was forced
to lead the prayers himself as neither party could "bear to
(29)
see one of their rivals take the lead". How close these
feelings were to the surface can be seen in the incident
provoked by Shas b. Qays. Out of a fear that the two parties
were going to unite in an attack on the Jews he attempted to
provoke a renewal of the fighting between them. This was
accomplished by the simple expedient of having some of the old
poetry of the pre-Islamic 'days' recited before a mixed group.
(29) II, 199.
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Although he was almost successful, Muhammad was able to deal
with the outbreak before it became serious.
Islam was even able to make use of this rivalry. This is
evident in the assassinations which took place with the blessing
of the Prophet, if not at his outright instigation. The Aws
had killed Ka'b b. al-Ashraf some time before the battle of
Uhud and the Khazraj asked permission of Muhammad for them to
• •
kill Abu Rafi4 Sallam b. Abi al-Huqayq out of a fear that the
Aws would gain precedence over them in the favour of
(31)
Muhammad. Throughout the lifetime of Muhammad the Aws and
• •
the Khazraj continued to fight under separate banners,
separate leaders and on occasion with distinctive battle-cries.
At some later period after the death of Muhammad the distinction
o
between these two tribes broke down and they came to be known,
and to refer to themselves, as the Ansar. Despite the inferences
from the texts it is unlikely that the title of Ansar was in
common usage during the early period.
Another rivalry, although one about which almost nothing
is known at this time, is that between the two clans, Hashim
and Umayya, of the Quraysh. That such a rivalry did exist can
only be deduced from indirect evidence. In the years following
the death of Muhammad a rivalry along lines such as these
developed and culminated in the civil war between 4All and
Mu'awiya. That there was such rivalry in the pre-Islamic
period would seem to be indicated, or at least hinted at, in
(30) II, 261-262; Usd, i, 175-176.
(31) II, 482; Tab, ii, 495; Kamil, ii. 146.
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the varying accounts of the political and religious positions
held by the clans in Mecca. That this rivalry should have
died out during the lifetime of the Prophet is very unlikely.
It would be more probable that it continued throughout this
period, although any of the traditions which would seem to
indicate this are tainted by a political bias, usually in
favour of the 'Abbasids and hence anti-Umayyad,
Another group which would have been a source of disunity
in the state is the harem of the Prophet. There is a great
deal of information about the jealousies and intrigues,
usually centred around *A'isha, v/hich were largely concerned
with the gaining or maintaining of precedence as the favourite
wife of Muhammad. Yet of far more interest is the possibility
that the wives had a direct political influence on the Prophet
and would actively support a party or group against its
opponents.
Nabia Abbott claims that the political parties of the
(32)
early Islamic state can be seen at work in the harem.
Although this may be an overextrapolation of the available
material, the role of women in the conduct of affairs at this
time must not be disregarded. As Lichtenstadter pointed out,
in the pre-Islamic tribe the advice of women was accepted
because so vague was the system of government that the leader
(33) —
would accept good advice from any source. 'A'isha herself
(32) Nabia Abbott, The Beloved of Mohammed. (Chicago, 1942), 15.
t?
_
(33) Use Lichtenstadter, Women in the Aiyan al-*Arab.
Royal Asiatic Society Prize Publication Fund vol.xiv,
(London, 1935), 83-85.
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was able to give a judgement which influenced a legal matter
when she reminded Abu Bakr that the Prophet had forbidden the
bequeathing of any property that was sadaqa. The Caliph then
dismissed the claim of the other wives to a portion of the
(34)
properties of Muhammad. Even the evidence of the later
eras of the Islamic empire show that the harem often had a
direct and lasting effect on the conduct of state, especially
in the influencing of the ruler toward or against a group or
party.
The very fact that six of the Prophet's wives, including
his most beloved ones, came from Quraysh must have predisposed
him to look with favour on the claims of the Quraysh, even if
he were able to forget the fact that he himself was of this
tribe. It is possible, without holding the cynical views of
Lammens toward fA'isha, to believe that there must have been
some interest in politics and hence occasions threatening the
unity of the umma.
Yet the question remains as to why so little remains of
any occasions when these possibly divisive factors played a
part in the affairs of the state. Any incidents, and logic
declares that there must have been some, have been carefully
edited from the texts as we have received them. With no
verses of the Qur'an to explain and no glory to be spread over
anyone, these incidents were allowed to fade away as unnecessary
to the history of the period.
This conclusion also relates to the two rivalries under
(34) Bal, P, 51.
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study. As has been seen, each outbreak of the rivalries has
Qur'anic verses to be explained. The only exception to this
is the battle of Uhud which must be taken as a special case.
A few of the outbreaks were preserved by virtue of the desire
to glorify the position of Muhammad or the reports were created
for that purpose.
An examination of the dating of the varying outbreaks of
the rivalries shows that they occured at times when the
fortunes of the Muslims were at a low ebb. The problems at
Uhud were a year after the great victory at Badr and the
intervening period was not notable for its dramatic successes.
After the siege of al-Khandaq, when it was finally demonstrated
that the Quraysh were unable to defeat their rivals, the
incidents cease to occur with the exception of those surrounding
the raid on Tabuk. This expedition took place less than a
year after the conquest of Mecca, the battle of Hunayn, and the
resulting distribution of booty which so displeased the Ansar.
It is at times like these that Muhammad would need to
make use of the most powerful weapon in his armoury to quell
the dissatisfaction among his people, the revelation of verses
from the Qur'an. Even toward the end of his life, Muhammad
did not possess that ultimate power that would have allowed
him to act as an arbitrary ruler. His strength stemmed from
his position as the Messenger of God. It is only logical to
assume that there were other occasions when incidents occured.
These would have been dealt with in the customary fashion of
the age, through a semi-organized council dominated by
Muhammad. If the fortunes of his people were at a peak he
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would have been able to call upon the support of several
elements among his followers and the strife would have been
ended without the need of a revelation. These incidents would
have been unconsciously edited out by the transmitters of
the history of the period as being of no importance to an
understanding of the Qur'an and beneath the dignity of
Muhammad under whose leadership internal friction was unthinkable.
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SUMMATION AND CONCLUSION
This study is an attempt to clarify certain aspects of
the beginning of the Islamic umma in Medina during the lifetime
of the Prophet. The political influence of the two rivalries,
which are examined in this work, has in the past been
ignored and this factionalism has usually been examined only
in its religious aspects. All too often the traditional
Muslim views of the Ansar and the Kunafiqun have been accepted
as valid even by modern scholars. The Ansar are only seen in
their supporting role in the conflict with the Quraysh and the
activities of the Munafiqun are limited to the influence which
they had upon the religious development of Islam.
When discussing the conflict between the Ansar and the
Muhajirun it must be remembered that Muhammad was not welcomed
to Medina by all of the citizens. The stories of his reception
were intended to glorify the position of the Ansar and were,
for the most part, created at a later date. Muhammad was not
immediately accepted as the leader of Medina but was, at best,
tolerated by a large proportion of the populace. As it
became more obvious that Muhammad was going to be the victor
in his struggle against the Quraysh and as the major Jewish
tribes were removed from the community, conversion became
complete. However, the opposition of the Madinese to the
Muhajirun did not cease and the election of Abu Bakr saw a
final attempt to regain control of the community.
Throughout the period in which Muhammad lived in Medina
there were incidents which demonstrated the continuance of
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of this rivalry. The first indication of a fear of a lack
of loyalty among the Companions was the oath of loyalty
received by Muhammad before the battle of Badr, which ensured
that he would be supported when they faced the Quraysh. The
incident of the division of the booty taken from the B. al-
Nadir lacks any reference to a protest from the Ansar when
• 0
they did not receive a share of the booty. This is especially
remarkable when it may be seen that the Muhajirun were not
as devoid of fiscal support as the sources would indicate.
This lack of a protest is noticeable when it is compared to
the later incident at al-Ji'rana where a very strong protest
was registered forcing Muhammad to take some action. It is
likely that there would have been some protest on the earlier
occasion but the lack of any Qur'anic references has allowed it
to be forgotten and the generosity of those members of the
Ansar who agreed to the division of the booty has been remembered
because of the verses which commemorate the act.
Ibn Ubayy's attempt to expel the Muhajirun after an
incident on the raid against the B. al-Mustaliq was the most
• •
serious outbreak of this rivalry and the large amount of
sympathy and support which Ibn Ubayy received demonstrated how
widespread were the feelings which he expressed. Muhammad was
able to forestall the affair by the use of a forced march which
exhausted the men but the Qur'anic references leave no doubt
as to its seriousness. Later writers seem to have made a half¬
hearted effort to alter the story of the incident in an attempt
to avoid casting aspersions on Companions of the Prophet.
Following the failure of this, the major bid to expel them,
- 172 -
the Muhajirun were able to maintain their position of pre¬
eminence in the community and the following years saw incidents
of the rivalry which were of a diminished nature. These took
the form of the day-to-day bickering which might be expected
from two mutually antagonistic parties living in such close
proximity. As mentioned above, at the time when Muhammad was
0
dividing the booty taken from the Hawazin at al-Ji'rana the
Ansar complained at their exclusion from the spoils. On this
occasion the protest is recorded and preserved because later
generations of the Ansar were able to make use of the speech
of Muhammad to support their claim for a more honoured place
0
in the hierarchy of the Islamic state. Yet the very fact
that they had to protest shows that by this time the Ansar
0
were being shunted aside and their place taken by the new
converts from Quraysh.
The study of this rivalry is made more difficult by the
lack of material which has been preserved about it. Later
generations allowed the material to disappear because of their
attitude toward the founders of Islam. Only that information
which was necessary for an understanding of the Qur'an or
might be used to support the position of the Ansar has been
0
retained.
A basic problem in the study of the Munafiqun is the
meaning of the word itself. In its religious sense, as seen
in the Qur'an, it could be translated as 'hypocrite' but this
is not an accurate representation of the word as it is used
in the historical texts. In the accounts of the incidents in
which they were involved the Munafiqun are seen as disobedient
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of the orders and desires of the Prophet but they were still
considered as Muslims. The word is also used as a term of
abuse hurled at any person who seems to be running counter to
Muhammad. Due to these usages it is obvious that 'hypocrite'
is not an accurate translation, but there seems to be no
single word in English which conveys the full concept implied
in the word.
There is more information about this rivalry than there is
concerning that between the Ansar and the Muhajirun. This is
certainly due to the fact that there are more references from
the Qur'an to this rivalry and there was less fear of showing
the Companions in a bad light. The Munafiqun were cast in the
role of the villains of the umaia and therefore many stories
concerning them were invented by later historians. These make
up the many small references found throughout the life of
Muhammad but they are not supported by the Qur'an and therefore
are not acceptable. The Qur'an must be accepted as the
authoritative text and all incidents are to be judged against
it.
The expulsion of the B. Qaynuqa* was the first major
incident in which Ibn Ubayy and his followers were involved.
They offered to support the Jews but failed to do so when they
were asked to fulfil their promise.
The battle of Uhud is of major importance for the study
of the actions of the Kunafiqun because it shows how a story
would be altered to suit political purposes. The Qur'anic
references, and the lack thereof, indicate the truth of the
matter. Ibn Ubayy and his followers did not retire from the
- 174 -
Muslim army but, rather, were never a part of it. They
remained in Medina and this fact probably kept the Quraysh
from following up their victory with an attack on the city
itself. The story was later altered in an attempt to shift
the blame from Muhammad to Ibn Ubayy.
As with the study of the Ansar, the raid on the B. al-
Kustaliq is of importance to the study of the Munafiqun. This
* •
attempt, led by Ibn Ubayy, indicates how large was their
support at that time, but it must be pointed out that the
majority of the people willing to consider the ideas put forward
by Ibn Ubayy were not 'hard-core' members but Muslims and
citizens of Medina who were disgruntled with the growing power
and influence of the Muhajirun.
The 'affair of the lie' which broke out on the return
journey to Medina was the occasion for a personal attack on
Muhammad through his family. Ibn Ubayy is noted as the major
perpetrator of the scandal but of more importance is the manner
in which he was protected from the punishment which the others
received. This protection was not due to the strength of his
supporters but rather the fear that it would cause an outbreak
of the pre-Islamic feuding between the Aws and the Khazraj.
It is likely that this was the way in which he escaped punish¬
ment throughout his career as the leader of the opposition.
The events which occured on this expedition mark the end
of the major opposition to the newcomers. Prom this time on
they are of a much more minor nature, such as those which
occured during the siege of Medina. Even the events on the
raid to Tabuk which are related to the Munafiqun and the
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'mosque of opposition' which occured at about the same time are
the work of individuals or small groups who were disgruntled
with the course of events rather than the original core of
Ibn Ubayy's supporters, although some of those are still
listed as being involved in these activities.
The relationship between the Munafiqun and the Jews was
close, almost amounting to an alliance on occasion, and
because of this the references in the Qur'an and the historical
texts are confused and intermingled. Medina may have been
split into a pro-Jewish and a pro-Arab faction with Muhammad
finally, after toying with the former, coming down on the side
of the latter. As the major Jewish tribes were eliminated
as a power bloc the Munafiqun lost their power and influence.
Ibn Ubayy himself has been ignored or vilified by the
historians yet he could not have been as bad as he has been
portrayed. The position of pre-eminence which he attained
during the Jahiliya rules against that. During the period
in which he led the Muslim opposition his support was, for the
most part, drawn from the B. al-Aws although he himself was
or the Khazraj. This was because the Aws, as the victors at
the battle of Bu'ath, had the most to lose if they were
replaced as the leading party in Medina by Muhammad and the
Muhajirun. He made an early conversion to Islam, probably
following the example of his people, and finally this conversion
must have taken effect as Muhammad prayed for him upon his
death. He was probably a better Muslim than the sources have
indicated and he may have been present at Badr, a fact which
later historians equated with sincerity in the faith and thus
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his participation would have been removed. His actions as
leader of the opposition were probably instigated more by a
fear that his people were being supplanted than by personal
ambition.
The failure of the Kunafiqun was the failure to realize
that society itself was in a process of change and they would
have to change with it. They were able to offer to the people
no alternative ideology which would satisfy the requirements
of the time. There was also a lack of a continued, unified
body of support. By the terms of the society of the period
the number of their followers was determined by the feelings
and attitudes of the individual citizens of the community
rather than by following their leaders blindly.
Despite the implications in the texts the major cause
of the two rivalries was the fear of the growing power and
influence of the Qurashi emigrants. In order to control the
rivalries Muhammad was forced to use all of the powers at his
disposal. Some of these powers were the traditional usages
of a tribal chieftain and others were of an innovative nature
stemming from his unique role as the Prophet of God. The
need for unity in the umma required that Muhammad expend a
great deal of energy in its pursuit and it did not come as
easily as the texts would indicate. Not all of the methods
employed were successful but he laid the basis of the unity
which permitted the later expansion of the state and became a
basic tenet of the faith.
In the historical material which records the events of
the two rivalries there is a basic core of fact although this
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has often been overlaid by the biases of the later historians.
The major bias which is operating in this material is a
religious one. This caused an unconscious editing of material
which was considered unacceptable to the traditional view of
the period in question. This is especially true in the case
of the Munafiqun where the information was only preserved as
an explanation of the descent of verses from the Qur'an or to
glorify the role of the Prophet. Some of the material
relating to the rivalry between the Ansar and the Muhajirun
©
was preserved because it supported the claims of the Ansar
to a preferred place in the state. Other areas of disunity
were allowed to fall from memory because the material recording
them was not needed for either of these purposes and they
detracted from the accepted concept of the state of the umma
in Medina.
A study of the material relating to these rivalries adds
to an understanding of the development of the earliest
historical v/riting in Islam as it related to the biography of
Muhammad. There is an apparent development of•the Qur'anic
material as it was used in relation to these rivalries and
hence in the development of the writing itself. Ibn Ishaq,
the earliest, varies in his usage of the material sometimes
giving complete details of the descent of the relevant verses
and on other occasions only mentioning that a chapter was
sent down. Al-'.Vaqidi uses the verses in the account of the
incident and then devotes a chapter to explaining the verses.
He seems to be writing in order to provide an explanation for
the Qur'an rather than for the sake of the preservation of the
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history. It is this second attitude which can be seen in the
writings of al-Tabari. He only makes use of the verses as a
part of the account of the incident. By his time the study of
tafsir was a separate, although related, discipline.
There is also an obvious development of the fabulous
stories which are connected to the life of Muhammad. This is
seen most clearly in the works of Ibn Ishaq and al-Waqidi as
the latter's version always seems to have extra details and
added dialogue in comparison to the earlier account.
A study of the types of material and their usage makes
it obvious that there were other incidents which have not been
preserved. As they were not necessary to explain the Qur'an
and added no glory to the person of Muhammad they were dropped
as irrelevant. The later historians unconsciously created the
vision of the urnma as they believed it to be.
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APPENDIX A
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OUTBREAKS OF THE
RIVALRIES AND THE FORTUNES OP MUHAMMAD
The following table demonstrates how closely related were
the outbreaks of the rivalries to the success or failure of the
campaign being waged by Muhammad. The basic facts of the table
have been lifted in toto from Excursus B in Prof. W.M. Watt's
Muhammad at Medina. To this material, all of which is to be
found in columns A, B, C, and D, have been added references to
the major outbreaks of the two rivalries.
The battle of Badr was the first victory and the problems
which surrounded it were due to the lack of previous success.
At the time of Uhud over a year had passed since the initial
victory and the year was not notable for its successes. The most
serious of all the incidents was that on the expedition to
al-Muraysi' and was, again, after a long period without any major
triumphs. The expedition to Tabuk was plagued with the activities
of the Munafiqun and was followed by the affair of the Mosque
of Opposition. This was the only major outbreak after the
siege of Medina which assured the final supremacy of the Muslims.
The problems on the Tabuk raid were probably due to the dis¬
satisfaction felt by the Madinese after the conquest of Mecca




























16/7 Beginning of the era of the Hijra











3 Badr Oath before battle
Ansar rejected from duels
Munafiqun try to spread bad news
3 Killing of 'Asma'
4 Killing of Abu 'Afak
4 Qaynuqa' Munafiqun appear urging Jews
to resist
Ibn Ubayy pleads for the Jews
5-6 Sawiq
7 al-Kudr
8-9 Killing of Ka'b b. al-Ashraf

















































Munafiqun offer support but
fail to supply it
Ansar do not receive a share
of*the booty
Munafiqun and Jews resist
gathering of the army










Ibr. Ubayy attempts to incite
expulsion of Kuhajirun
The affair of the lie
Kunafiqun attempt to delay work


















































3 al-Hudaybiya Ibn Ubayy refuses offer to
visit Ka'ba
























































1 Various expeditions from Mecca
1 Hunayn
2 al-Ta'if




























10-12 Tabuk Many references to activities
of the Munafiqun
Affair of Mosque of Opposition
upon return from this
expedition










6 Death of the Prophet
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APPENDIX B
A LISTING OF THE MJNAFIQUN
The following list of the Munafiqun is very much of a
preliminary study. Only a limited number of sources have been
consulted and a great deal more work will have to be done before
any definite conclusions may be reached. Nevertheless support
is given to several points which have been made in the text of
this study.
The close relationship between the Munafiqun and the Jews
is clearly seen by the number of men from the Qaynuqa* who are
listed as being among the Munafiqun.
The problems which the later historians and transmitters
had in clearly identifying the Munafiqun is also demonstrated.
The confusion over names and tribal affiliations is due to
the reluctance which the historians had toward passing on this
information; in some cases it is certainly due to a copyist's
error.
Also seen is the problem which the historians had in
reconciling the fact that some of the Munafiqun had been at
Badr. This came to be seen as a mark of excellence in the
faith and caused great problems in relation to a man such as
Mu'attib b. Qushayr. His record makes it obvious that he was
one of the leaders of the Munafiqun, probably on a par with
Ibn Ubayy, yet the fact that he was a Badri prompted the
suggestion that he was not a Munafiq.
The proportion of men from the various tribes is also of
interest. The largest number of men among the Munafiqun were
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from the Aws, as were Abu 'Amir al-Rahib and his followers who
fled to Mecca. This tribe had been predominant in Medina after
their victory at the battle of Bu'ath and had the most to lose
through the rise to power of the Muslims.
In this list text notes rather than footnotes have been
used for ease of reference. In the notes abbreviations have
been used. Those which are not in the table of abbreviations
clearly identify works in the bibliography by reference to a
distinctive word in the title of the work or the name of the
author.
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Abbad b. Kunayf b. Wahab b.al-*Ukaym
B. al-Aws
Among the builders of the Mosque of Opposition (11,243
Tab,iii,111; V.'aq,iii, 1047; Muhabbir,468) and caused
• «
Qur'an 9/65 to be sent down. (Bal,A,i,277).
Abd Allah b. Nabtal b. al-Harith al-Ansari
B. *Amr b. *Awf of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (11,243).
After Badr he said that they had only gone out for
the booty. (\Vaq,i , 121)
He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble began
. at al-Kuraysi'. (Waq,ii,4l6)
At the time of Tabuk he was one of the leaders of
the Munafiqun and remained in Medina. He caused the
descent of Qur'an 9/48. (Tab^iii,103)
Among the builders of the Mosque of Opposition. (Waq,
iii,1047). He used to relate the sayings of Muhammad
to the Munafiqun. (Bal,A,i,275-276; Muhabbir,468)
Abd Allah b. Sayf
He agreed with two others to pretend to believe in
Muhammad's mission at one time and to deny it at
other times so as to confuse the Muslims. This
caused the descent of Qur'an 3/64 (II,260-261)
Abd Allah b. Ubayy b. Salul al-'Awfi
B.'Awf b. al-Khazraj of the B. al-Hubla of Khazraj.
The major references to his activities are in the
text of the study.
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Abu Hablba b. al-Az'ar b. Zayd b. al-'Attaf b. Dubay'a al-Ansari
• • • • •
B. Dubay'a b. Zayd of Aws.
He was among those involved in the building of the








He is listed as having been a Munafiq and involved




He is listed by al-Kalbi as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir,470)
Abu Rafi'
Khazraj ?
He is listed by al-Kalbi as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir,470)
'Adiy b. Rabi'a
Khazraj.
He was a blind man who threw excrement at the Prophet.
(Bal,A,i,274; Euhabbir,469-470)
'Adiy b. Zayd
He agreed with two others to pretend to believe in
Muhammad's mission at one time and to deny it at
other times so as to confuse the Muslims. This caused
the descent of Qur'an 3/64.(11,260-261) He is also
said to have caused the descent of Qur'an 4/161.
'Amir b. Khalid
Khazraj ?
He is listed by al-Kalbl as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir,470)
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#Amr b. Khidhhara
B. Dubay'a(?) of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (11,243)
*Amr b. Qays
B. Ghanm b. Malik b. al-Najjar of Khazraj
He is listed as a Munafiq. (11,245)
He was thrown out of the mosque on Muhammad's order
by Abu Ayyub Khalid b. Zayd b. Kulayb for making
fun of the Prophet's stories. (11,246-247)
'Aqaba b. Kadim b. 'Adly b. Haritha b. 'Arar b. Zayd Manat b.'Adiy
b. *Amr b. Malik b. al-Najjar al-Ansari al-Khazraji
Khazraj
He is listed as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir, 469)
He was at Uhud and those expeditions after it. Al-
Waqidi said that he was a Munafiq during the early
years and then repented. (Isaba.ii.491.no.5610)
Aws (b. al-Khawli ?)
He mocked the Muslims at al-Hudaybiya. (Waq,ii,588-589)
Aws b. Qays
Khazraj ?
He is listed by al-Kalbi as a Munafiq (Muhabbir,470).
Aws b. Qayzi/Qibti b. *Amr b. Zayd b. Jusham b. Haritha b. al-
• • •
Harith b. Aws al-Ansari al-Awsi
• •
B. Haritha b. al-Harith b. al-Khazraj b. *Amr b. Malik
• •
b. al-Aws of B. al-Nabit of Aws
During the siege of al-Khandaq his words caused Qur'an
33/13 to be sent down. (Muhabbir,469). He was involved
in the dispute between the Aws and the Khazraj provoked




B. Dubay'a (?) of Aws
He was among the builders of the Mosque of Opposition.
(11,243; Tab,iii,111)




He is listed by al-Kalbi as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir.470)




He is listed as a Munafiq. He was the brother of
Rafi'. (Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,277)
Bijad b. 'Uthman b. 'Amir
B. Dubay'a b. Zayd b. Malik b. 'Awf b. 'Amr b.'Awf of Aws
He was involved with the-Mosque of Opposition. (Tab,
iii,111; Waq,iii,1047).
He was listed as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir.467; Bal,A,i,275).
Bishr b. Zayd
B. 'Ubayd b. Zayd b. Malik of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (11,244)
He and three others caused the sending down of Qur'an
4/63. (11,245)
Bushayr b. Ubayriq Abu Tu'ma (Ubayriq's name was al-Harith b. 'Amr
• •
b. Haritha b. al-Haytham b. Zafar.)
• •
B. Zafar of Aws
He, or his brother Bishr, caused the descent of
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Qur'an 4/105-110. (Bal,A,i,277-281)
It may only have been Qur'an 4/107 which was sent
down. (11,244-245; Suhayli,ii,292-293).




He is listed among the Munafiqun. (Muhabbir,469;
Bal,A,i,281)
His first expedition with Muhammad was either Uhud
• *
or Nadir. (Usd.iii.46)
He was involved with the Mosque of Opposition. (II,




B. 'Abd al-Ashhal of Aws




He and others offered to support the B. al-Nadlr
causing the descent of Qur'an 9/11-16. (11,246,437;
Tab,ii,554)
He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble started
on the expedition to al-Muraysi* (11,246)
DurrI b. al-Harith
Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (Bal,A,i,275; Muhabbir.467)




He is listed as a Munafiq. He was thrown out of the
mosque on Muhammad's orders. (11,247)
»
al-Harith b. *Awf
He agreed with two others to pretend to believe in
Muhammad's mission at one time and to deny it at
other times so as to confuse the Muslims. This
caused the descent of Qur'an 3/64 (11,260-261)
al-Harith b. Hatib
• •
B. Umayya b. Zayd b. Malik of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (11,243)
Ibn Hisham says that he may have been at Badr and
therefore not a Munafiq. (II,731-732,no.297 from Ibn
Hisham)
Ibn Ishaq lists him among those who went out to
Badr. (11,331)
al-Harith b. Suwayd b. al-Samit
• •
Aws
He was the brother of Julas. During the battle of Uhud
he killed two men as an act of revenge and then joined
the Quraysh. This caused the descent of Qur'an 3/86.
(11,242-243; Muhabbir.467; Suhayll,ii,292; Bal,A,i,275;
Isaba,i,280,no.1423)
al-Harith b. Yazid al-Ta'i
• •
An ally of the B. 'Amr b. fAwf of Aws.
On the Tabuk raid he and three others disobeyed
Muhammad forcing him to perform a miracle. (W3Tq,ii, 1039)
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Hatib b. Umayya b. Rafi' b. Suv/ayd
• •
B. Zafar of Aws
His nifag-nature appeared when his son was wounded
at Uhud. (11,244,383; Muhabbir.469; Bal,A,i,277;
« V "
Isaba.i, 564. 565, no. 2891)
al-Humayyir b. al-Humayyir
• •
He is listed by al-Kalbl as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir,470)
He was involved in the Mosque of Opposition. (Isaba,
i,357, no.1844)
Husayn b. Numayr al-Ansari
• • •
He is listed as a Munafiq for stealing some dates
which were sadaqa. (Ma'arif,343; Isaba.i,399.no.1746)
• " •
Jariya b. fAmir/*Amr b. al-'Attaf/Mujammi'
• •
B. Tha'laba of Aws
He and his two or three sons were involved with the
building of the Mosque of Opposition. (11,243-244;
Tab,iii,111; Waq,iii,1047; Bal,A,i,276; Muhabbir,468)
• ♦
al-Jidd b. Qays b. Sakhr b. Khansa' b. Sinan b. 'Ubayd b. Ghanm
b. Ka'b b. Salima al-Ansari, Abu *Abd Allah
B. Jusham of the clan of B. Salima of Khazraj
He was the only person who hung back from the oath
of Ridwan. (11,503-504; Tab,ii,632'; Waq,ii,588-589;
• •
Isaba.i,466-467)
He requested permission to remain behind from the
Tabuk expedition causing the descent of Qur'an 9/49.
(11,245; Muhabbir.469; Isaba.i.466-467; Bal,A,i,274).
• • """
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(al-)Julas b. Suwayd b. al-Samit
B. Hubayb b. *Amr b. 1Awf of Aws
«
He is listed as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir.467; Ma'arif.343)
He and three others caused the sending down of
Qur'an 4/60. (11,245)
His actions on the expedition to Tabuk caused the
descent of Qur'an 9/74. (11,242; Waq,iii, 1003-4
Isaba,i,241,no.1176) This verse may have been sent
•»
down concerning his activities at the time of Uhud
after which he may have been executed. (Bal,A,i,275)
Khidham b. Khalid
B. 'Ubayd b. Zayd b. Malik of B. <Amr b. fAwf of Aws
It was from his house that the Mosque of Opposition






He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munafiq.
(11,246; Muhabbir,470)
Malik b. Abi Nawfal
Qaynuqa'
He was one of the most wicked of the Munafiqun.
(Y/aq, iii, 1059)
Malik b. Abi Qawqal
Khazraj
He was involved with the unfulfilled offer of aid to
the Nadir about which Qur'an 59/11-16 was sent
down. (11,246,437; Tab,ii,554)
He v/as sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble began
at al-Muraysi' and was involved in the descent of




He is listed by al-Kalbi as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir.470)
Malik b. al-Dukhshara
B. Salira b. *Awf of Khazraj ?
B. *Awf b. *Amr b. ' Awf of Aws ?
He is listed by al-Kalbi as a Munafiq. (Kuhabbir.480)
He was at Badr (11,312) and there is some debate as to




He is listed by al-Kalbi as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir, 470)
Mirba* b. Qayzi
B. Haritha b. al-Harith b. al-Khazraj b. *Amr b. Malik
• •
b. al-Aws of 8. al-Nabit of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir. 469)
• ■■ ■ —
He was a blind man who refused to allow Muhammad to
pass through his property on the way to Uhud. (11,244;
Bal,A,i,276-277).
At the time of Khandaq he may have caused the descent
of Qur'an 33/13 or it may have been his brother Aws or
Mu'attib b. Qushayr. (Bal,A,i,276-277). He may have
repented and become a faithful Muslim. (Isaba.iii.
397,no.7869)
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Mu'attib b. Qushayr b. Balil b. Zayd b. al-'Attaf b. Dubay'a b.
• • •
Zayd b. Malik b. *Awf b. 'Amr b. 'Awf b. Malik b. al-Aws al-
Ansari al-Awsi
B. Dubay'a of Aws
He may not have been a Kunafiq because he was at Badr.
(II,764,no.698 from Ibn Hisham; Isaba,iii.443.no.8119)
He and three others caused the sending down of Qur'an
4/60 (11,245; Muhabbir.468; Bal,A,i,276)
He and Tha'laba b. Hatib made a covenant with God which
• •
resulted in the sending down of Qur'an 9/75. (11,243;
Bal,A,i,276)
His comments after the battle of Uhud caused the sending
down of Qur'an 3/154. (11,243; Bal,A,i,276)
He was one of the men sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the
trouble started at al-Muraysi'. (Waq,ii,4l6)
During the siege of Medina he caused the sending down
of Qur'an 33/12 (11,243), although it may have been
al-Jidd b. Qays (Bal,A,i,276)
He mocked Muhammad about the division of booty at
al-Ji'rana (Waq,iii,949)
On the Tabuk raid he and three others disobeyed the
Prophet's orders forcing him to perform a miracle.
(Waq,iii,1039)
He was involved in the building of the Mosque of
Opposition. (Tab,iii,111; ffaq,iii,1047)
Mujammi* b. .Haritha
He is listed as a Munafiq and may have been involved in




B. Ashja', an ally of B. Salima
His activities on the Tabuk raid caused the sending
down of Qur'an 9/65. (II,606-607,622; Waq,iii,1003;
Isaba,iii,391,no.7841)
He then repented, became a Muslim and died as a
martyr at Yamama. (II,606-607; Usd,v,122)
Mullh al-Taymi
He is listed as a Munafiq and among those who attempted
to assassinate Muhammad on the Tabuk raid. (Ma/arif,343)
• " ""
Murra b. Rabi*
He is listed as a Munafiq and among those who attempted
to assassinate Muhammad on the Tabuk raid. (Ka{arif,343)
Nabtal b. al-Harith b. Qays b. Zayd b. Dubay'a b. Zayd b. Malik
• •
b. rAwf b. £Amr b. *Awf al-Ansarl al-Awsi
B. Dubay'a of Aws
He used to relate Muhammad's words to the Munafiqun
and because of one of his comments Qur'an 9/61 was
sent down. (11,243; Bal,A,i,275; Isaba.iii.549.no.8675)
He was involved in the building of the Mosque or
Opposition. (Tab,iii,111)
Nu'man b. Abi 'Amir
Qaynuqa*
He was one of the most wicked of the Munafiqun (Waq,
iii,1059)
(al-)Ku'man b. Awfa b. £Amr
Qaynuqa'
He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munafiq.
(11,246; Muhabbir.470)
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Qays b. 'Amr b. Sahl b. Tha'laba b. al-Harith b. Zayd b. Tha'laba
b. 'Ubayd b. Ghanm b. Malik b. al-Najjar al-Ansari
B. al-Najjar of Khazraj
He is listed among the Munafiqun (11,245)
Al-Waqidi said that he was a Munafiq but it seems that
he later converted and transmitted traditions. (Isaba,
iii,255-256,no.7211)
He was the only young man among the Munafiqun. (11,247)
He was thrown out of the mosque on the orders of
Muhammad. (11,247; Bal,A,i,283)
Qays b. Rifa'a al-Waqifi
B. Waqif b. Imru* al-Qays b. Malik b. al-Aws of Aws
He was a poet and is listed as a Munafiq. (Kuhabbir.
469; Bal,A,i,277; of.Isaba.iii,246-247,no.7169)
Qays b. Zayd
B. Dubay'a of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq and was killed at Uhud.
(Kuhabbir.468)




Ally of b. Zafar of Aws.
He is listed as a Munafiq because of his suicide.






He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a
Munafiq. (11,246)
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He was one of the most wicked of the Munafiqun. (Waq
iiif1059)
He and another man made impossible requests of Muhammad
«
and therefore Qur'an 2/108 was sent down. (11,257-258)




B. al-Najjar of Khazraj
He is listed as a Munafiq and he was thrown out of
the mosque on the orders of Muhammad. (11,245-247)
Rafi' b. Zayd
B. 'Ubayd b. Zayd b. Malik of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (11,244)
He and three others caused the descent of Qur'an
4/60. (11,245; Muhabbir,468, Bal,A,i,276)
Rafi' b. Ziyad
Aws
He was the brother of Bashir and is listed as a
Munafiq. (Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,277)
Rifa'a
He and another person became Muslim but were Munafiqun
and some of the Muslims became friendly with them.
This caused Qur'an 5/61 to be sent down. (11,269)
Rifa'a b. Zayd b. al-Tabut
Qaynuqa'
He remained behind from the Tabuk raid and was referred
to as one of the great ones of the Munafiqun. (Tab,iii,
103; cf.Isaba.i,517,no.2661)
cf. Zayd b. Rifa'a b. al-Tabut
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Sa'd b. Abi Sarh
He is listed as a Munafiq and one of those persons
who attempted to assassinate Muhammad on the return
from Tabuk. (Ma'arif. 343)
Sa'd b. Hunayf
Qaynuqa'
He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munafiq.
(11,246; Muhabbir.470)
He was one of the most wicked of the Munafiqun. (Waq,
iii, 1059)
Sa'd b. Zarara b. 'Adds b. 'Ubayd b. Tha'laba b. Ghanm b. Malik
b. al-Najjar al-Ansari
B. al-Najjar of Khazraj
He is listed as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir.469;Bal.A.i.274)
He may have repented. (Isaba.ii,27.no.3155)
Salama b. al-Humam
Qaynuqa'








He was one of the most wicked of the Munafiqun. (Waq,
iii,1059)
He had accepted Islam as a Munafiq and become friendly
with some Muslims. Therefore Qur'an 5/57-61 was sent
down. (11,269; Bay,ii,157)
He was among those who offered to help the Nadir but
failed to do so. Therefore Qur'an 59/11-16 was sent
down. (11,246; Tab,ii,554)
He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble started
at al-Muraysi'. (Waq,ii,4l6)
Suwayd b. *Adiy b. Rabi'a
Khazraj
He is listed as a Munafiq. (Muhabbir,470; Bal,_A,i ,274)
Suwaylim
The Munafiqun were gathering in his house so Kuharamad
ordered that it be burned down. (II,782,no.858 from
Ibn Hisham)
Tha*laba b. Hatib/Abi Hatib al-Ansari
« • • » •
B. Umayya b. Zayd of Aws
He and Mu'attib b. Qushayr made a covenant with God
which resulted in the sending down of Qur'an 9/75.
(11,243; Muhabbir.468; Bal,A,i,276; Isaba.i.198.no.928)
• 0
He tried to stop the people from going on the Tabuk
raid. (V/aq,iii , 1003)
He was involved in the building of the Mosque of
Opposition. (Tab,iii,111; Waq,iii,1047)
He may have been at Badr and therefore not a Munafiq.
(II,731-732,no.297 from Ibn Hisham; Isaba.i,198.no.928)
Tu'ma/Tu'ayma b. Ubayriq b. 'Umayr al-Ansari
Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq and among those v/ho attempted
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to assassinate Muhammad on the Tabuk raid. (Muhabbir.469:
• •
Ma*arif,343)








He is listed as a Munafiq. (Bal,A,i,274)
Wadi'a
B. 'Awf
He was involved with the problems at al-Muraysif and
therefore the descent of Qur'an 63 (11,246).
He was involved in the offer made to the Nadir which
was never fulfilled and therefore the descent of
of Qur'an 9/11-16. (11,246; Tab,ii,554)
This name may refer to V/adi'a b. Thabit
Wadl'a b. Thabit
B. 'Amr b. *Awf/B.Umayya b. Zayd b. Malik/ B.'Awf
b. al-Khazraj
He was among those who offered their help to the Nadir
but did not fulfil their promise. (11,437)
He was on the Tabuk raid and caused the sending down
of Qur'an 9/65. (II,606-607; Waq.iii,1003,1039)
He was involved in the building of the Mosque of





He and another man made impossible demands on Muhammad
and Qur'an 2/108 was sent. down. (11,257-258)
Yazid b. Jariya b. 'Amr/'Amir b. Mujammi*/al-Attaf
• •
Aws
He, his father and his brothers were involved in the
building of the Mosque of Opposition. (V/aq,iii, 1047;
Muhabbir,468; Bal,A,i,276).
Zayd b. *Amr
B. al-Najjar of Khazraj
He is listed as a Munafiq and was thrown out of the
mosque at the orders of the Prophet. (11,245,247;
Muhabbir.469; Bal,A,i,274,283)
Zayd b. Jariya b. 'Amr/'Amir b. KujammiVal-'Attaf
• •
B. Tha*laba of Aws
He, his father and his brothers were involved with the
building of the Mosque of Opposition. (11,243-244;





He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munafiq.
(11,246; Muhabbir,470)
«
He was one of the most wicked of the Munafiqun. (Waq,
iii,1059)
He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble began
at al-Muraysi*. (Waq,ii,416)
On the raid to Tabuk there were two occasions when




Zayd b. Rifa'a b. al-Tabut
Qaynuqa*
He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Kunafiq.
(11,246; Kuhabbir.470)
He was a great Munafiq whose death was announced by
Muhammad on the return from al-Muraysi'. (Waq,ii,
422-423)
Because of his activities Qur'an 5/57-61 were sent
down. (11,269; Bay,ii,157)
cf. Rifa'a b. Zayd b. al-Tabut
Zuwayy b. al-Harith
B. Lawdhan b. *Amr b. *Awf of B. *Amr b. *Awf b.
Malik of Aws
He is listed as a Munafiq. (11,242)
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